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INTRODUCTION

VER the past two decades federal law enforcement has faced formidable challenges: the Wall Street insider trading scandals of the

1980s;' the "S&L crisis" of the early 1990s;2 the "War on Drugs" to combat

the importation and distribution of cocaine and other controlled substances; 3 and, most recently, a series of acts of international terrorism that
culminated in the horrific September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. 4 In addition to the threat of international terrorism, federal law enforcement authorities are presently grappling with a
new crisis in confidence in the management and conduct of corporate
1. See generally, e.g., CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE JUNK-BOND
RAIDERS AND THE MAN WHO STAKED THEM (1988) (discussing insider trading scandals of 1980s);JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (same); DAVID A. VISE &
STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET

2. See generally, e.g.,

(1991)

(same).

MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE

COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (1990) (discussing savings and loan
scandals of early 1990s); PAUL Z. PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE S&L MESS (1989) (same); STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING
OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989) (same); L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH

S&L DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS (1993)
(same).
3. See generally, e.g., Symposium, New Voices on the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV.

AND CREDIT: THE GREAT

747 (2002) (analyzing challenges enforcing drug laws while simultaneously maintaining civil liberties); Symposium, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy
in the War Against Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REV. 301 (1995) (examining implications of

United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines on drug war).
4. See, e.g., N.R. Klienfield, U.S. Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting 9/11 terrorist attacks); Roberto Suro & Thomas E. Ricks, Blast in Yemen
Kills U.S. Sailors: Terrorism Suspected in HarborExplosion, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2000,

at Al (describing attack on USS Cole).
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America, precipitated by the failure of Enron and exacerbated by financial
reporting scandals and bankruptcies at other large U.S. corporations, such
5
as Global Crossing and WorldCom.
One important consequence of the extraordinary challenges facing
federal law enforcement agencies in the past two decades has been a more
aggressive stance on the part of federal law enforcement officials toward
the attorney-client privilege, with accompanying efforts to overcome the
confidentiality protections the privilege provides. This aggressive opposition to the privilege on the part of law enforcement authorities has been
evidenced in a variety of contexts and appears to have been gaining momentum since the September 11 terrorist attacks and the new wave of corporate financial scandals. While no one should question the importance
of appropriate law enforcement responses to these threats to national security and economic well being, it is fair to question some of the tactics
that law enforcement officials have been employing as they combat crime
in this increasingly complex and challenging environment.
This Article focuses on federal law enforcement authorities' approach
to attorney-client privilege issues and concludes that important public policy interests that are served by the privilege are being unnecessarily put at
risk. Other commentators have recognized this trend and have criticized
it in increasingly strident terms. 6 Most of those commentators have fo5. See, e.g.,
John R. Wilke & Robert Gavin, Brazen Trade Marks New Path of Enron Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2002, at C1 (noting investigation into questionable
accounting practices of company); WorldCom Comments on Indictment Reports, WALL
ST.J.,July 26, 2002, at A4 (discussing criminal case against WorldCom executives).

6. See Stuart M. Gerson &Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: ErodingConfidentiality in FederalHealth Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 164-65 (1999) ("Of greater
practical importance at the moment ...is the fact that health care lawyers understand that they no longer can remain anonymous advisors. Instead, in providing
their advice, they sail between the Scylla of zealous federal law enforcement agents
and prosecutors who attack privilege under the guise of the so-called "crime-fraud"
exception and the Charybdis of besieged clients who readily waive privilege in an
attempt to show that they acted pursuant to the advice of counsel and not with any
intent to violate the law or to minimize financial and prosecutorial risk by participating in government voluntary disclosure programs.") (emphasis in original);
Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege
and Tax Policy Become Casualtiesin the War Against Money Laundering,24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 623, 626 (1996) ("Attorneys are forced to provide information which will in
all likelihood lead to the indictment of their own clients. In a sense, lawyers are
now being drafted as informants against clients who pay in cash."); David M.
Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege
in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 147, 147 (2000) ("Oncecelebrated goals of our legal system-the client's right of confidentiality and freedom from self-incrimination-are giving way to the government's powerful demands for the swift disclosure of all evidence relevant to its investigations of
corporate misconduct."); see also Aviva Abramovsky, Comment, Traitors in Our
Midst: Attorneys Who Inform on Their Clients, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 676, 677-78, 709
(2000) ("In the past ten to fifteen years, the use of criminal defense attorneys as
informants against their clients has become more and more widespread. This
practice has its roots in several larger trends in the criminal justice system, including the increasing number of defense attorneys who are themselves under criminal
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cused on a particular area of law and emphasized the threats to the privilege that have arisen in that area. 7 This Article examines a broad range of
areas in which federal law enforcement activities are encroaching on the
privilege, and in doing so seeks to demonstrate that the threat to the privilege is even greater than the examination of any one particular area would
suggest. In other words, the whole of the potential effect of the federal
government's multi-front assault on the privilege is greater than the sum
of its parts, in that the net result may be to create such uncertainty that the
privilege is terminally wounded.8 This Article examines recent attacks on
the privilege by federal law enforcement authorities and concludes that a
number of these attacks have been misguided or overzealous. Finally, the
Article closes with suggested changes in the manner in which federal law
enforcement officials should analyze and respond to privilege issues. It
also proposes a new approach for law enforcement officials to follow in
developing and administering cooperation and voluntary disclosure programs, an approach that is intended to further legitimate law enforcement
interests without threatening the important policy interests that are served
by the attorney-client privilege.

investigation and the growing tendency of prosecutors to use high-pressure tactics
and to view the defense bar as criminals rather than colleagues. Moreover, despite
their verbal condemnation of this practice, the courts' weak response has had the
effect of enabling prosecutors to use attorney-informants with immunity."); Kathleen N. Allen, Note, Turning Lawyers into Witnesses: Does Forced Client DisclosureBreach
the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 824 (1997) ("The government has many effective resources to use in the war against crime. It is unnecessary to threaten the long standing privileged relationship between attorneys and
their clients by turning lawyers into witnesses."); Avidan Y. Cover, Note, A Rule
Unfit for All Seasons: MonitoringAttorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and the
Sixth Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1235-37 (2002) (discussing government
intrusion into comm nications between attorneys and clients in interest of
preventing fiture terrorist acts); Brian M. Smith, Note, Be Careful How You Use it or
You May Lose it: A Modern Look at CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege and the Ease of
Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 389, 390 (1998) ("The judicial
system is in the middle: determining whether a corporate agent has disclosed
enough privileged information during interactions with the government regulator
so as to create a waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege.").
7. See Gerson & GladietIx, supra note 6, at 165-66 (focusing on federal health
care law); Harrington & Lustig, supra note 6, at 626 (focusing on IRS reporting);
Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 149 (focusing on corporate criminal investigations); see also Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 678 (focusing on federal crimes); Allen,
supra note 6, at 795 (focusing on IRS use of attorneys to discover criminal activities); Cover, supra note 6, at 1234-35 (focusing on terrorism); Smith, supra note 6,
at 390-91 (focusing on corporate attempts to comply with government
regulations).
8. Then-Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized this
danger over twenty years ago in the opinion he wrote for a unanimous Supreme
Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, in which he warned that "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

A.

Relevant HistoricalBackground

Almost every article, case, and treatise on the attorney-client privilege
begins with the observation that the attorney-client privilege is the oldest
evidentiary privilege recognized in Anglo-American common law. 9 By noting that observation at the outset this Article follows the usual convention,
but the focus of this Article is the other end of the privilege's life span-is
the long life of the attorney-client privilege rapidly coming to an end?
The recent developments at the federal level of law enforcement that are
the subject of this Article suggest that the end may be nearer than we
might previously have thought (or would prefer). The significance of
these developments, and what they portend for the privilege, can best be
appreciated if viewed in the context of the privilege's long history, so a
brief historical overview of the privilege is provided for that purpose.
1.

Origins and HistoricalDevelopment of the Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is recognized in the federal judicial system and in all state judicial systems.'
The roots of the privilege extend
back to Roman law and the notion that the loyalty a lawyer owes to a client
disqualifies the lawyer from serving as a witness in the client's case. 1 I In
9. See, e.g., id. at 389 ("The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law."); 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter 8 WicMORE] (discussing history of attorney-client privilege); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L.

REV.

597, 603 (1980)

(explaining that attorney-client privilege may be traced back to Roman law); Julianna M. Thomas, Fifteen Years After Weintraub: W4ho Controls the Individual's Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 635, 635 (2000) (stating that

attorney-client privilege is one of oldest privileges protecting professional communications); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 475-87 (1987) (discussing historical

development of attorney-client privilege); Jacqueline A. Weiss, Beyond Upjohn:
Achieving Certainty by Expanding the Scope of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 1182, 1185-86 (1982) (same); Steven J. Wood, Comment, Bankruptcy: Waiver of a CorporateDebtor'sAttorney-Client Privilege-A New Powerfor the Trus-

tee [Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986
(1985)], 25 WASHBURN L.J. 565, 566 (1986) (stating that privilege's purpose is to
promote complete attorney-client communication).
10. See 1 CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCF §§ 76.176.2 (John W. Strong, ed., 5th ed. West 1999) (discussing existence of attorneyclient privilege in federal and state courts). The only other privilege that is recognized so uniformly in our legal system is the husband-wife marital privilege. See id.
§ 76.2 (describing state patterns of privilege).
11. See id. § 87 (citing Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication
between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928)). Radin observed that it

is not possible to establish a link between Roman law and the common law origin
of the attorney-client privilege. See Radin, supra, at 489 ("That the Roman precedent was the origin of the English rule as far as attorneys are concerned, cannot be
proved."). Radin continued to note that "from the eighteenth century on, the
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English common law the rule of confidentiality for attorney testimony
came to be grounded in the client's right to have his secrets protected,
rather than the lawyer's right not to be compelled to testify.' 2 Although
the existence of the privilege was established in English common law by
the beginning of the nineteenth century, its scope and boundaries were
not well settled. 13
The early American cases recognizing the privilege did little to resolve
the ambiguities surrounding it, although they did establish the availability
of the privilege when legal advice was "related directly to pending or anticipated litigation."'1 4 In the United States, two principal influences served
to define the privilege and establish the policy grounds upon which it
came to rest during the twentieth century. One of those influences, not
surprisingly, was the United States Supreme Court. The other, and perhaps the more important, influence was the treatise on evidence published by then-Professor and later Dean John Henry Wigmore of the
5
Northwestern Law School shortly after the turn of the century.'
Wigmore's original treatise on evidence made two especially significant contributions to the development of attorney-client privilege law in
the United States. 1 6 First, and most relevant to this Article, Wigmore
sought to articulate a policy basis for the privilege that both justified its
duty of loyalty conceived in terms of the attorney's duty to his employer, has overwhelmed the notion of the gentleman-barrister's honor." Id.
12. Professor Hazard traced this development in a 1978 article on the historical development of the privilege. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070-80 (1978) (discussing
historical development of attorney-client privilege). The original rule appears to
have been one in which "the privilege was that of the lawyer (a gentleman does not
give away matters confided to him), [but] as the rule developed the privilege became that of the client to have his secrets protected." Id. at 1070; see also Radin,
supra note 11, at 487 (noting that similar to master-servant relationship, clients'
secrets were expected to be protected); 8 WIwMORE, supra note 9, § 2286 (discussing underlying policy of attorney privilege as it existed in English common law).
In the first edition of his treatise, Wigmore observed that "[t]he privilege is designed to secure subjective freedom of mind for the client in seeking legal advice."
4JOHN HENRY WICGMORE, Ev~nENCE § 2317 (1st ed. 1904) (internal cross-reference
omitted) [hereinafter 4 WIC.MORE].

13. See Hazard, supra note 12, at 1083-85 (discussing English cases Bolton v.
Corporation of Liverpool, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch. 1833), and Greenough v. Gaskell, 39

Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833), which Professor Hazard describes as enlarging potential
scope of privilege while creating confusion about its boundaries).
14. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1091.
15. See, e.g., 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2290-2329 (discussing attorney-cli-

ent privilege as it applies to communications between clients and their attorneys).
16. For discussion of the significance of Wigmore's contributions to the law of
evidence generally, see Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 241 (2002) ("Theory plays such a prominent role

in privilege doctrine in large part due to the continuing influence of that giant of
American evidence law, Dean John Henry Wigmore.").

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 469

continued existence and answered the arguments of its critics. 17 That policy basis is discussed below. Second, and perhaps most important to the
orderly development of privilege law, Wigmore sought to define the privilege in terms of its essential elements and "to group them in natural se'
quence."18
This undertaking, which Wigmore described as "a matter of
some difficulty,"' 19 led to the now-classic definition of the privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the client
2
waives the protection. 11
Wigmore organized the discussion and analysis of the privilege in his
treatise according to these numbered elements. 2 1 The influence and acceptance of Wigmore's treatise as the leading authority in the field resulted in a widely accepted definition of the privilege and contributed to
22
an orderly development of the law in this area.
17. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291 (describing various rationales for
attorney-client privilege).
18. Id. at § 2292.
19. Id.

20. Id. This definition was refined in subsequent editions of the Wigmore
treatise. In the treatise's second edition, parts 3 and 8 were changed to read "the
communications relating to that purpose" and "except the protection be waived,"
respectively. 5JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2292
(2d ed. 1923). The fourth edition retained the changes made to the definition by
the second edition. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292 (listing relevant criteria).
21. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2294-2329 (discussing elements of attorney-client privilege).
22. A widely cited judicial test for application of the privilege is that ofJudge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). Judge Wyzanski did not cite Wigmore (or
any other authority) in support of his test for application of privilege, but both the
organization (numbered elements) and content (generally tracking Wigmore's
definition) suggest Wigmore's influence. Judge Wyzanski appears to have been
reading Wigmore at the time. Although he did not cite Wigmore in that case,
Judge Wyzanski repeatedly cited Wigmore, referring to him as one of "the masters
of the law of evidence" in a companion case involving the same parties and decided the same day addressing an issue arising under the hearsay rule. See United
Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 351-52 (citing Wigmore); cf DavidJ. Fried, Too High a Pricefor
Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds,
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The elements of the privilege and the many issues that arise in its
application are not the subject of this Article, so that aspect of Wigmore's
important contributions to privilege law are not addressed here. 23 As
noted above, the contribution by Wigmore that is most relevant to this
Article is his articulation of the policy basis that supports the attorneyclient privilege. In the first edition of his treatise, Wigmore identified four
elements that must be present before any privilege should be recognized:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4)
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
24
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
He concluded that all four elements were present in the case of the attorney-client privilege. 25 He also stated categorically that the "modern theory" of the policy underlying the privilege was to promote freedom of
26
consultation of legal advisers by clients.
In embracing the modern theory of the privilege, Wigmore defended
the privilege against its most influential nineteenth century critic, Jeremy
Bentham. 27 Bentham's argument against the privilege, in short, was that
deterring a guilty client from seeking legal advice was not cause for concern, while an innocent client had nothing to fear if the privilege were not
64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 443 n.1 (1986) ("judge Wyzanski's statement of the rule of
privilege is an expansion of Professor Wigmore's version.") (Wigmore quotation
omitted). For a contemporary definition of the privilege, see the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNINc. LAw. § 68 (2000) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege
may be invoked ... with respect to: (1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal assistance for the client.").
23. For comprehensive analysis of the elements of attorney-client privilege
and its application, see EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE A-r-ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 45-263 (4th ed., A.B.A. Publishing 2001) (explain-

ing four core elements of attorney-client privilege and their application in various
contexts); see also PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 2:1 (2d ed., West Group 1999) (same).
24. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2285 (citation omitted). For an analysis of
Wigmore's policy arguments in the context of broader societal interests, see
Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 605-12.
25. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291 (discussing four elements within
context of privilege's policy).
26. See id. ("In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be
removed; and hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's
consent. Such is the modern theory.").
27. See id. (refuting "Benthamic argument"). For a discussion of Wigmore's
refutation of Bentham's argument, see Radin, supra note 11, at 491.

r
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available, and thus would not be deterred.2 8 Wigmore exposed both the
naivete and the flawed premises underlying Bentham's argument. First,
Wigmore observed that (even in the relatively simpler times in which he
wrote), "[t] here is in civil cases often no hard-and-fast line between guilt and

innocence," and in many cases neither party will be completely in the right
or completely in the wrong in a moral sense. 29 Wigmore made the case
that in actual practice, unlike in Bentham's abstract argument, the reality
of the legal system is much more complex, and the costs of depriving one
party of confidential legal advice are higher, than Bentham's argument
would suggest."
A second flaw in Bentham's argument, exposed by Wigmore, was the
assumption that no social good would be served by fostering access to legal
counsel by those with weak or wrongfully advanced causes. Wigmore
made the point that in many cases principled legal counsel would persuade clients not to pursue such causes or would pursue an appropriate
settlement of cases that had limited merit."' Wigmore's careful refutation
of Bentham's attack on the privilege provided a compelling and influential catalogue of the utilitarian benefits of a broadly available privilege.3 2
Thanks to the broad acceptance of the arguments made by Wigmore,
throughout the twentieth century there has been a widespread acceptance
that those benefits outweigh the costs, in terms of withheld testimony, imposed by a widely available attorney-client privilege.343
The second major influence on the development of the attorney-client privilege in the United States was the Supreme Court. The Court's
views on the subject were in accord with the arguments Wigmore advanced in his treatise. It appears that by the late nineteenth century the
28. See 4 WIGMORL, supra note 12, § 2291 (summarizing Bentham's argument
against maintaining attorney-client privilege).
29. Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 87 ("Bentham's apocalyptic division of the client world into righteous and guilty seems somewhat naive in a time
when even the best-intended may doubt their compliance with an ever more overwhelming body of law.").
30. Wigmore observed that "the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice;
and even Bentham does not go so far as to question this hypothesis." 4 WIGMORE,

supra note 12, § 2291. The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar view
in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 n.2 (1981) ("[A]n individual trying
to comply with the law or faced with a legal problem also has strong incentive to
disclose information to his lawyer, yet the common law has recognized the value of

the privilege in further facilitating communications."). The Court's privilege analysis in Upjohn is discussed further infra Part lI.B.l.a.
31. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 3203 ("To guarantee for clients of unjust
causes a freedom of consultation with legal advisers cannot be deemed an evil
except to the extent that the bar is unprincipled; and in that condition more radical remedies are needed than the denial of the privilege.").
32. Cf MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 87 (describing modern "clearly utilitarian justification" for attorney-client privilege).
33. See id. (referring to Wigmore as "the great champion and architect of the
privilege").
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Supreme Court had enthusiastically embraced the."modern" rationale for
the attorney-client privilege. In an 1876 case involving a dispute over a life
4
insurance policy, Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer,. the Court
described the interests served by the privilege in particularly strong terms:
"If a person cannot consult his legal adviser without being liable to have
the interview made public the next day by an examination enforced by the
courts, the law would be little short of despotic. It would be a prohibition
upon professional advice and assistance."3 5 The Court made this statement in support of its conclusion that the attorney-client privilege had
been properly invoked to block testimony by an attorney about conversa3
tions with a client whom he had represented in a divorce. " The defendant insurance company had sought to examine the attorney about
statements the client had made to him about her deceased ex-husband
that, if admitted into evidence, might have proved that false statements
were made in the insurance application.3 7 The Court upheld the assertion of privilege and applauded the protection of confidential communications to one's attorney as dictated by the "wise and liberal policy" quoted
above. 38 This case indicates that by the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court had enthusiastically embraced the attorney-client privilege.
Subsequent cases support this conclusion and demonstrate that the
regard in which the Court holds the privilege has not wavered, despite
t
considerable criticism of the privilege by academics and commentators. )
In 1888 the Supreme Court described the policy grounds for the privilege
as "founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when
4°
1
Several imfree from consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."
Court
recognized
First,
the
description.
portant points are implicit in this
expert adthe
that laypersons cannot function in our legal system without
34. 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
35. Id. at 458.
36. See id. at 457-58 (discussing broad policy of permitting confidential communication to professional advisers).
37. See id. at 458 (discussing facts of case).
38. See id. (determining federal law to be applicable).
39. As discussed above, the leading nineteenth century critic of the privilege
was Jeremy Bentham. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2291 (describing and refuting "Benthamic argument" on variety of grounds, including important point that,
in Bentham's time, parties were disqualified from testifying and, therefore, cost of
attorney-client privilege was high, but now that parties can be called to testify, "the
loss to truth is comparatively small, in modern times"); cf MCCORMICK, supra note
10, § 75 ("Until very recently, the heavy consensus among commentators has favored narrowing the field of privilege, and attempts have been made, largely without success, to incorporate this view into the several 20th century efforts to codify
the law of evidence.") (citation omitted).
40. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
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vice that can be obtained only from those with special training in law. 4 1 In
other words, one can no longer be "self-taught" in law-it is simply too
complex a field to master without expert assistance. 4 2 Second, our justice
system will not function properly if laypersons do not seek out and obtain
such expert advice. Our legal system is neither particularly user-friendly
nor self-executing, and the legal advice provided by trained attorneys is
what keeps the system functioning. 43 Finally, and perhaps most important, laypersons will not seek out this advice if the system creates impediments to their doing so or if they believe that doing so will have adverse
consequences for them. 44 Each of these points raises important issues
with respect to the recent actions by federal law enforcement authorities
that threaten to limit the availability of the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine.
2.

The Attorney Work Product Doctrine Described and Distinguished

Another important historical development involving the Supreme
Court that merits discussion before reviewing the Court's more recent attorney-client privilege cases is the Court's approval of the attorney work
product doctrine in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor.45 The concept of protecting attorney work product-such as an attorney's notes of witness interviews-from discovery by opponents in litigation was a new development
in the law of evidence. Prior to the liberalization of pre-trial discovery
rules, work product protection was not needed because adversaries generally did not seek information from one another. 4 6 In Hickman the Court
held that attorney work product has a qualified immunity from discovery
41. As one commentator has observed: "Although a lay person can read law
and gather legal knowledge to represent herself, most observers recognize that a
nonprofessional, especially if involved in formal litigation, will have better success
with a lawyer's assistance." Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 605 (citation omitted).
42. See id. (discussing attorney's essential role in litigation).
43. See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72 (describing this rationale as "utilitarian" justification for attorney-client privilege); see also Allen, supra note 6, at 80506 (discussing attorney-client relationship within context of utilitarian justification
to promote good for entire legal system).
44. See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72 (observing that, with respect to privileges intended to protect communications in the context of professional relationships, "[t]he rationale traditionally advanced for these privileges is that public
policy requires the encouragement of the communications without which these
relationships cannot be effective").
45. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46. See Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 612 (citing 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.63[3], at 354 n.1 (2d ed. 1979) for the point that
"[b] efore Hickman, '[f] ederal court decisions were almost non-existent'"); see also
MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 96 ("Thus, under the old chancery practice of discovery, the adversary was not required to disclose, apart from his own testimony, the
evidence which he would use, or the names of the witnesses he would call in support of his own case.") (citation omitted).
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in litigation. 47 The protection is qualified because the Court was careful
to note that if written statements and documents in an attorney's files contain facts that are "essential to the preparation of [an adversary's] case,
discovery may properly be had." 48 A detailed analysis of the protections
provided by the doctrine is not necessary for purposes of this Article, and a
brief overview of the work product doctrine, focusing on the important
distinctions between the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege, will suffice. 49 What is more important for purposes of this Article is a comparison of the policy grounds underlying the privilege and the
work product doctrine, and an analysis of how those policy grounds may
be undermined by recent federal law enforcement attacks on the
privilege.
Since Hickman was decided the work product doctrine has been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 5 As it has evolved, the work product doctrine recognizes a distinction between so-called "opinion work product"-an attorney's mental impressions and legal theories-and the underlying factual
information contained in an attorney's work product. 52 The work product doctrine does not limit or deter independent efforts by adversaries to
collect factual information, even if the same information has previously
been collected by an adversary and incorpoi'ated into her work product.
As a leading commentator has explained the difference, "[m] ental impressions are fully protected; facts, on the other hand, seem to be fully
53
discoverable."
47. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509-10 (concluding that discovery of attorney
work product "falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims"). Although
Hickman involved civil litigation, subsequent cases have extended work product
protection to criminal cases and regulatory investigatiol.s. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra
note 23, at 485-87 (collecting cases).
48. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see also Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: ProtectionNot Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 929-32 (1983) (discussing different
methods for overcoming work product protection); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W.
King, Policing CorporateCrime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs,50 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 30 (1997) (discussing loss of protection of work product doctrine
through waiver).
49. For thorough treatments of the work product doctrine, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 23, at 477-641; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 96; Jeff A. Anderson, et al.,
Special Project, The Work ProductDoctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 760-893 (1983);
Cohn, supra note 48, at 932-35; John Soumilas, Comment, Compilations: Truth, Privacy, and the Work-Product Doctrine, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 227, 227-68 (2000).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
51. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
52. See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 96 n.35 ("The work product defined by
this phrase is today often referred to as 'opinion' (as opposed to 'fact') work product.") (citation omitted).
53. Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 613-14; see alsoAnderson, et al., supra note 49, at
783-84 ("[T] he rule singled out for special protection 'opinion work product': the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of the client. This added protection suggested the existence
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Another distinguishing aspect of the work product doctrine is the extent of the protection provided. The attorney-client privilege applies only
to confidential communications between an attorney and a client for the
purpose of giving or receiving legal advice, 5 4 while the work product doctrine protects a broader range of materials prepared by or at the direction
of an attorney in preparation for or in anticipation of litigation. 55 For
example, an attorney's notes of an interview or discussion with a thirdparty witness would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, but
would be protected by the work product doctrine. 5 3 Similarly, an attorney's notes of her legal analysis or litigation strategy, assuming they did
not reflect communications with her client, 5 7 would not be protected by
the privilege but would be subject to the highest level of protection as
"opinion work product.15 8
of some ill-defined bifurcation within the rule."); Soumilas, supra note 49, at 23940 ("Opinion work product, which tends to show mental impressions, conclusions,
legal theories, or opinions, is distinct from ordinary work product presumably because it always lies well within the zone of privacy that is available to the attorney
operating within the adversarial system.").
54. For a more detailed analysis of the scope of the privilege, see EI'S-IEIN,
supra note 23, at 45-263 (discussing four elements of attorney-client privilege); MCCORMICK, supra note 10, §§ 88-92 (discussing general application of privilege); Paul
R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion about Attorney Communications,
Drafts, Pre-ExistingDocuments, and the Source of the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L.

REv. 967, 967-1005 (1999) (same); Bufkin Alyse King, Comment, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Cor)orateEnvironment, 53 Ai-,. L. REV. 621, 621-38 (2002)
(discussing application of privilege in context of corporations).
55. See Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 615 ("The work-product doctrine extends to
third persons and objects that an attorney might examine, while the attorney-client
privilege is limited exclusively to the lawyer and her client.") (citations omitted);
see also Nancy Horton Burke, The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible
Waiver of the Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 33, 38

(1997) ("Courts generally construe the work product doctrine to provide broader
protection than the attorney-client privilege."); Cohn, supra note 48, at 922-23
("Although information obtained by an attorney directly from a client is, in the
broad sense, work product, the work-product doctrine encompasses much more
than the attorney-client privilege: work product includes information obtained by
the attorney from persons other than a client.") (emphasis in original).
56. Attorney interview notes and related materials were the subject of Hickman, which established the work product doctrine. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 510-11 (1947) (discussing scope of documents entitled to protection); see also
Cohn, supra note 48, at 924 ("[0]pinion work product includes the attorney's personal recollections, memoranda, handwritten notes, legal opinions, and litigation
strategy and is discoverable only in the rarest situations."); Soumilas, supra note 49,
at 241 ("Drafts of legal memoranda, summaries of conferences, and settlement
proposals plainly represent opinion work product.").
57. See, e.g., RiCE, supra note 23, § 5.9 (discussing application of attorney-client privilege to attorneys' notes and files).
58. Anderson, et al., supra note 49, at 789 (" [O]pinion work product, presents
a clearer view of the attorney's thought processes than does ordinary work product, and therefore receives near absolute protection."); Cohn, supra note 48, at
923-24 ("Although documents and tangible things are subject to discovery upon
the proper showing under rule 26(b) (3), the opinions and mental impressions of
counsel germane to the case subjudice are rarely discoverable even if they are writ-
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The differences between the protections provided by the two legal
doctrines are significant, particularly in the real world of litigation practice, and analytically it is important always to distinguish between the two
separate and distinct legal doctrines. 59 Commentators have tended to focus on the differing policy grounds that are promoted by the two doctrines. 60 The attorney-client privilege is often described as promoting the
interests of the client in access to legal advice, 6 1 while the work product
doctrine is often described as serving the interests of the attorney in preparing for litigation. 6 2 Most commentators do recognize, albeit implicitly
in many instances, that both policy grounds ultimately promote the same
core value of efficient administration of justice and effective functioning
of our legal system. 63 What is often not adequately considered, however,
is another core value that both doctrines serve-protecting the interest of
the client in effective legal representation.
This latter value, which was explicitly embraced by the Supreme
Court in Hickman, is one that merits attention when analyzing the effects
of law enforcement efforts to curtail availability of the privilege and the
work product doctrine. 64 A fundamental policy objective underlying the
ten or otherwise recorded. Indeed, any tangible attorney work product containing
opinions of counsel receives a higher degree of protection even if the items contain otherwise discoverable information."); Soumilas, supra note 49, at 239-43
("Work product immunity, therefore, is almost always assured in cases involving
opinion work product.").
59. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("Where, as here, the documents involved all reflect the opinions,judgments, etc.
of a lawyer, the work product privilege is for practical purposes as absolute as the
attorney-client privilege, and it extends to a larger class of material.").
60. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2-3, 477 (discussing different focuses of both
doctrines); Cohn, supra note 48, at 936 (discussing intent of work product and
attorney-client privilege doctrines); Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 614-16 (discussing
differing policies promoted by both doctrines); cf. Cynthia B. Feagan, Issues of
Waiver in Multiple-Party Litigation: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product
Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REv. 757, 773-75 (1993) (discussing general distinctions between work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege).
61. For a discussion of the development of and policy considerations served
by the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 1044 and accompanying text; see
also EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2-3 (discussing policy behind privilege); RICE, supra
note 23, § 2.3 (discussing purpose and rationale of privilege).
62. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 477 (discussing policy behind work product
doctrine).
63. See id. ("The protection given to both attorney-client communications and
'work product' arises from a common assumption-that an attorney cannot provide full and adequate representation unless certain matters are kept beyond the
knowledge of adversaries."); RIcOE, supra note 23, § 2:3 (arguing that privilege increases law's effectiveness); cf Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 812 (observing in context of
crime-fraud exception analysis that "the coverage and purposes of the attorneyclient privilege are completely subsumed into the work product privilege") (citation omitted).
64. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) ("And the interests of the
clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served [without the protections of
the work product doctrine].").
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work product doctrine is protection of the attorney-client relationshipthe same policy objective that underlies the "modern theory" of the attorney-client privilege. 65 The Supreme Court's enthusiastic embrace of the
work product doctrine in Hickman and thereafter demonstrates its respect
and concern for the attorney-client relationship, and its desire to protect
that relationship from unnecessary outside interference. 66 That is precisely what the recent law enforcement initiatives that are the subject of
this Article seek to do-invade the attorney-client relationship. The fundamental interest that must be preserved is that clients are adequately and
effectively represented-an overarching policy interest that is essential to
our adversarial system of justice. As the discussion above demonstrates,
the Supreme Court has been consistently protective of this interest, in
both its attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine jurisprudence.
The same is true of the Court's application of the privilege and the work
product doctrine in the corporate context.
3.

Development of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine
in the Corporate Context

As one influential commentator has observed: "In the modern era,
the principal arena in which the value of the privilege is being contested is
in connection with the assertion of the privilege by a corporation. '6 7 Although the application of the privilege to a corporate entity, which cannot
itself communicate with counsel and can act only through employees and
other agents, 68 has presented a great many issues for resolution by the

courts, 69 there no longer is any question that the privilege is available to
corporations and other collective entities when they seek confidential legal advice. 70 This result is consistent with the modern theory of the policy
interests that are furthered by the privilege.
65. For a further discussion of the modern theory of attorney-client privilege,
see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981) (expressing
importance of preserving confidential attorney-client communications); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975) (holding that, although generally
applicable in criminal cases, work product did not apply where defendant waived
such privilege). The Upjohn Court itself stated that, "[t]he 'strong public policy'
underlying the work product doctrine was reaffirmed recently in Nobles and has
been substantially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)."
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted).
67. 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 503.03[3] (2d ed. 1997).
68. Cf RICE, supra note 23, § 4:22 (noting that "corporations can only speak
through their agents about corporate matters that are within the scope of those

agents' employment responsibilities").
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 99-109 (collecting cases).
70. See id. at 99 (distinguishing attorney-client privilege from Fifth Amendment, which does not extend to corporate entities).
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In the leading case shaping the corporate attorney-client privilege,
Upjohn Co. v. United States,7 1 the Supreme Court recognized that full and
frank disclosure by the client is required in order for the attorney effectively to serve the client as either adviser or advocate. 72 Guided by those
policy objectives, the Court concluded that the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine are available to corporate clients as well as
to individuals. 7 3 In Upjohn, the Court identified a series of factors supporting application of the privilege when corporate employees communicate
with corporate counsel:
The communications at issue were made by [corporate] employees to counsel for [the corporation] acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from
counsel ....
The communications concerned matters within the
scope of the employees' corporate duties .... [T] he communications were considered "highly confidential" when made ... and
74
have been kept confidential by the company.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorneyclient privilege belongs to the corporate entity itself, rather than to any
individual corporate officer or employee, and that consequently only the
71. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In some ways Upjohn is the paradigmatic case illustrating the aggressive stance of federal law enforcement officials in seeking to overcome the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. In Upjohn, the
defendant corporation had voluntarily disclosed to the government, in a Securities
and Exchange Commission filing, potentially illegal payments to or for the benefit
of foreign government officials. See id. at 387-88 (The SEC's "Voluntary Disclosure
Program" and the post-Watergate foreign payments scandal are described infra
Part III.F.). Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service undertook an investigation of the payments and issued an investigative summons for all interview memoranda, notes and other files of the internal investigation conducted by the
company's general counsel. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383-84. As the Supreme Court
pointed out, the government could have sought to obtain the same factual information for itself through independent investigation, but the IRS instead sought to
override the company's privilege and obtain the information the easy and "more
convenient" way-through the fruits of the company's legal counsel's investigation. See id. at 396, 399. The Court rejected the government's approach in the
circumstances of the Upjohn case but, as discussed infra Part Ill, twenty years later
the government continues to pursue the same approach, albeit through more sophisticated means. Today, in addition to seeking to overcome the protections of
the privilege though judicial proceedings, see infra Parts III.A and Il.B, law enforcement authorities instead seek to compel its waiver through "cooperation" policies and aggressive use of the sentencing guidelines, see infra Parts IlI.C-F.
72. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing importance of confidential attorney-client communications); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562
(1989) (same); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348 (1985) (same); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (same).
73. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (addressing attorney-client privilege); see
also id. at 401-02 (addressing work product protection). For a further discussion of
the policy issues addressed in the Upjohn case, see infra Part ll.B.l.a.
74. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
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corporation can assert or waive the privilege. 75 The lower federal courts
have since recognized the corporate attorney-client privilege in a wide variety of contexts.

76

Although government investigators and prosecutors frequently are
frustrated by corporate assertions of the attorney-client privilege, the privilege serves a vital purpose in the corporate context. 77 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court warned that attacks on the corporate attorney-client privilege
could "limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law." 78 As the Court's admonition indicates, the
policy reasons that underlie the attorney-client privilege are particularly
strong in the attorney-corporate client context: "In light of the vast and
complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to
find out how to obey the law . .."'79 The government's effort to invade a
corporation's privilege thus implicates societal interests larger than the
prosecutor's desire to prove criminal charges in a single case.
Courts have recognized that, as a matter of policy, corporations
80
should be encouraged to investigate and correct internal wrongdoing.
Failing to afford the protection of the attorney-client privilege to communications between business entities and their legal counsel would have a
chilling effect on internal investigations of corporate activities. 8 1 Thus,
75. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (stating that waiving attorney-client privilege
can only be done by those with power to act on corporation's behalf); see also In re
Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that privileged document written by former in-house counsel belonged to corporation, not to former
employee); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.
1997) (stating that to assert attorney-client privilege, corporate officers must actually seek legal advice); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding joint attorney-client privilege exists where corporate officers seek advice
to comply with law); United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 700-01 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding no privilege where individuals never sought individual representation from corporate attorneys); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D.
47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding joint privilege where attorney represented both
corporation and its subsidiary).
EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 99-109 (collecting cases).
76. See, e.g.,
77. See King, supra note 54, at 623 ("Corporations today especially need the
assistance of attorneys to help them comply with the numerous government regulations applicable to corporations.").
78. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; see also In re Woolworth Corp. Sec. Class Action
Litig., No. 94 Civ. 2217 (RO), 1996 WL 306576, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 7, 1996)
("Strong public policy considerations ... militate against finding a waiver of the
privilege. A finding that publication of an internal investigative report constitutes
waiver might well discourage corporations from taking the responsible step of employing outside counsel to conduct an investigation when wrongdoing is
suspected.").
79. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).
80. See generally Upjohn 449 U.S. at 383 (finding attorney-client privilege necessary to advise client on potential legal difficulties).
81. See id. at 398 (noting lack of degree of privacy causesjustice to be poorly
served).
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although the corporate attorney-client privilege may be the most recent
battleground in the ongoing privilege wars, the same core values that have
prevailed throughout the historical development of the privilege in this
country remain paramount. From Wigmore's initial articulation at the beginning of the twentieth century of the "modern theory" of the policies
underlying the privilege, to the federal courts' application of the privilege
to corporations at the end of the century, the consistent message has been
that the privilege plays a vital role in our legal system and should be retained and respected. That important lesson gleaned from review of the
historical development of the privilege is reiterated by the Supreme
Court's more recent cases applying and analyzing the privilege.
B.
1.

The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions Affirming the Importance of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine

Privilege Issues Decided by the Court Since 1980

In view of the historical importance attached to the attorney-client
privilege in our adversarial system ofjustice,8 2 it is perhaps surprising that
the United States Supreme Court has addressed attorney-client privilege
issues on relatively few occasions. 83 What is remarkable about the Supreme Court's privilege jurisprudence is not its quantity, but rather the
82. See David A. Nelson, Attorney-Client Privilege and ProceduralSafeguards: Are
They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 368, 368 (1992) (noting that attorney-client
privilege has "become a cornerstone of the American legal system"); Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversmay System, and the CorporateClient's SEC Disclosure
Obligations, 33 HAs'INcs L.J. 495, 495-96 (1982) ("The prominence and visibility of
the [attorney-client] privilege in American jurisprudence today can be attributed
to its ability to encompass several of the essential threads that structure the American legal process.").
83. See generally, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)
(holding that privilege survives death of client); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554 (1989) (discussing crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (discussing
waiver of attorney-client privilege in corporate context); F.T.C. v. Grolier, 462 U.S.
19 (1983) (discussing Freedom of Information Act and work product); Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 383 (discussing scope of attorney-client privilege in corporate context);
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (discussing work product in criminal
context); N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (discussing Freedom of Information Act and work product); Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S.
1232 (1972) (pointing to potential conflict between search warrant obtained
under Fourth Amendment and confidentiality of attorney-client communications
under Sixth Amendment regarding application for bail); Massey v. Georgia, 401
U.S. 964 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (linking attorney-client privilege with
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (providing origin for work product doctrine); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933)
(analogizing to attorney-client privilege and crime-fraud exception); United States
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915) (mentioning attorney-client
privilege); Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897) (discussing testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888) (discussing policy underlying attorney-client privilege and waiver); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110
U.S. 311 (1884) (applying attorney-client privilege); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
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consistency with which the Court has upheld both the application of the
privilege and the policy grounds, discussed above, that underlie it. In recent decades the Supreme Court has decided four significant attorneyclient privilege cases. 84 Each of those cases has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary and analysis, 85 and this Article does not seek to
analyze further the specific legal issues presented by those cases. This Article instead reviews the cases from a different perspective, seeking to ascertain what those cases, taken together, tell us about the Court's general
Co. v. Schafer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876) (discussing policy underlying attorney-client
privilege) .

84. See generally Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 399 (holding that attorney-client
privilege survives death); Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (discussing crime-fraud exception);
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (discussing waiver of privilege within corporation);
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383 (evaluating attorney-client privilege within corporation).
85. For analysis and commentary on the Upjohn case, see generally Darrell
Anthony Baldwin, Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege-Rejection of the Corporate Control-Group Test: Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), 48 TENN. L. REV.
1024, (1981); Jeanne Andrea Di Grazio, The Calculus of Confidentiality: Ethical and
Legal Approaches to the Labyrinth of CorporateAttorney-Client Communications Via E-mail
and the Internet-From Upjohn Co. v. United States and Its Progeny to the Hand
Calculus Revisited and Revised, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 553 (1998); Stanley A. Freedman,
CorporateAttorney-Client PrivilegeSince Upjohn, at Home and Abroad, 9 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 425 (1984); James Heckmann, Evidence-Upjohn v. United States-Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 7 J. CORP. L. 359 (1982); John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn
Consideration of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982);
Louis A. Stahl, Ex ParteInterviews with EnterpriseEmployees: A Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181 (1987); Waldman, supra note 9, at 473; Weiss, supra note
9, at 1182; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilegeand the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go
After Upjohn ?, 81 Micu. L. REV. 665 (1983).
For analysis and commentary on the Weintraub case, see, for example,
Thomas, supra note 9, at 635; Wood, supra note 9, at 565. For analysis and commentary on the Zolin case, see, for example, Christopher Paul Galenek, The Impact
of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-FraudException to the Attorney-Client Privilege,24 GA.
L. RiEv. 1115 (1990); Rachel A. Hutzel, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege, United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (Interim Ed. 1989), 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 365 (1990); S. Aftab Sharif, Another Independent Evidence Rule Goes
Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Strikes a Balance in United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct.
2619 (1989), 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 127 (1990).
For analysis and commentary on the Swidler & Berlin case, see, for example,
Jason Greenberg, Swidler & Berlin v. United States.... andJusticeforAll?, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 939 (2000); Aquanetta A. Knight, Swidler & Berlin v. United States: The
Derogation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 43 How. L.J. 243 (2000); Clint Langer, Evidence-The Attorney-Client Privilege:Nearly Breached: Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 34 LAND & WNER L. REx'. 479 (1999); Kenneth K. Lee,
Attorney-Client Privilege-Deador Alive?: A Post-mortem Analysis of Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & Put3. POL'Y 735 (1999); Rob
Shumaker, Failingto Recognize the Need for an Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege:
The Supreme Court's Decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399
(1998), 24 S. ILL. U. LJ. 645 (2000); Julie Peters Zamacona, Eividence and EthicsLetting the Client Rest in Peace: Attorney-Client Privilege Sunrvives the Death of the Client:
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 21 U. ARK. Lr'-rLE ROCK L.
REV. 277 (1999); Paul A. Gordon, Note, Evidence/ProfessionalResponsibility-Life After Death: The Attorney-Client Privilege--Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081 (1998), 72 TEMP. L. REV. 493 (1999).
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disposition toward the privilege and the propriety of the recent efforts by
86
federal law enforcement authorities to overcome assertions of privilege.
As the discussion below indicates, those cases make clear that the Court is
strongly "pro-attorney-client privilege" and therefore is unlikely to look
with favor on actions by federal law enforcement that unnecessarily undercut or curtail the availability of the privilege.
a.

Upjohn Co. v. United States and the Corporate Attorney-Client

Privilege
In 198187 the Supreme Court decided the Upjohn case and unanimously rejected the "control group" test for availability of the privilege in
the corporate context. 88 In Upjohn, then-Associate Justice William H.
Rehnquist emphasized the public policy basis for the privilege. He recognized that by encouraging full and frank communication between attorneys and clients the privilege promotes broader public interests in
86. For a further discussion of these concepts, see infra Part III.
87. This date was selected as a starting point for analysis of the Court's recent
privilege jurisprudence because prior to 1981 the Court had not decided a significant attorney-client privilege or attorney work product case since its 1947 decision
in Hickman v. Taylor. See Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (establishing the work
product doctrine); cf Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege:A
Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 294-305 (1989) (noting historical
context prior to 1981's Upjohn); Baldwin, supra note 85, at 1024-25 n.2 (discussing
decisions in Upjohn & Hickman). In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980),
the Supreme Court considered the witness spouse privilege. Additionally, Fisherv.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), addressed the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
88. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (stating that control group test "frustrates the
very purpose of the privilege"). The Court was unanimous in rejecting the control
group test. Then-Chief Justice Burger did not join in part II of the Court's opinion, which declined to articulate a general rule for application of the privilege in
the corporate context, but the ChiefJustice made clear that he "agree[d] fully with
the Court's rejection of the so-called 'control group' test, its reasons for doing so,
and its ultimate holding that the communications at issue are privileged." Id. at
402. ChiefJustice Burger believed that under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which
"provides that the law of privileges 'shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience,'" the Court had a special duty to clarify the law in this
area by articulating a rule of general application, rather than merely deciding the
facts of the case before it. Id. at 403-04 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). Justice Rehnquist and the other seven members of the Court disagreed, and concluded that
articulating such a rule would violate the spirit of Rule 501's "case-by-case" approach to the law of privilege. See id. at 396 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13
(1974)) (stating that "the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship ...should be determined on a case-by-case basis"). This reluctance of the
Court to articulate rules of general application in the attorney-client privilege area
arguably has contributed to uncertainty in this area of law. This Article stresses the
need for the lower federal courts to recognize and respect the guiding principles
that the Supreme Court has articulated in this area and carefully weigh attempts by
federal law enforcement officials to curtail the privilege against those fundamental
guiding principles. See infra Part IV.
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compliance with the law and the administration ofjustice.8 9 He described
the privilege as "recognizing that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's
being fully informed by the client." 90 His opinion for the Court concluded that the control group test was inconsistent with these public policy
objectives because it would limit the persons within a corporation who
received confidential legal advice from the corporation's attorneys while
at the same time limiting the amount of information that corporate attorneys received from employees and agents of the corporation. 9' The opinion acknowledged that complications arise when the attorney-client
privilege is applied to an artificial entity such as a corporation, 9 2 particularly where middle-level and lower-level employees are involved. 9 3 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that limiting application of the privilege to
the high-level "control group" of a corporation was untenable because to
do so would frustrate "the very purpose of the privilege" and could "limit
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compli94
ance with the law."
89. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (noting purpose of attorney-client privilege).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 392-93 (illustrating drawbacks of control group test); see also RiCE,
supra note 23, § 4:13 ("Even if the application of the control group test were pre-

dictable, a more telling criticism is that it unnecessarily restricts the free flow of
information to corporate counsel by arbitrarily limiting the privilege protection to
those who make decisions for the corporation and excluding equally, if not more,
important classes of employees-those to whom the legal advice may be most important because they must act upon it, and those who acquired the relevant infor-

mation through their job performance that is critical to the legal assistance being
sought."); Alexander, supra note 87, at 319 ("[E]xpansion of the corporate attorney-client privilege beyond the control group at least has the potential for encouraging management to authorize open channels of communication between all
employees and the corporation's attorneys in an effort to comply with the law.");
Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal
Corporate Investigations, 12J. CORP. L. 355, 356 (1987) (citations omitted) ("The
attorney-client privilege is applicable to corporations and preserves the confidences of communications between the attorney and his clients on the theory that
effective legal advice will be furthered by the creation of this zone of confidentiality."); Stahl, supra note 85, at 1194, 1198 ("[T]he Supreme Court recognized that it
is the nature of the communication, and not the rank, position or status of the
employee who is a party to the communication, that is critical in determining the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege .... [T]o the extent enterprise employees do not feel free to communicate with counsel and/or counsel is inhibited
in inquiring of and advising the employees of an enterprise, the effectiveness of
representation of counsel is inevitably reduced. When denied the effective representation of counsel, the enterprise may be prejudiced in asserting its legitimate
interests and protecting its legal rights.").
92. See Up5john, 449 U.S. at 389-90 (noting distinction between corporations
and individuals).
93. See id. at 391 (discussing potential for certain classes of employees to "embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties").
94. Id. at 392 (rejecting control group test).
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Significantly, the core rationale of the Upjohn decision is the belief
that confidentiality is essential if the societal interest in fostering compliance with the law is to be served. Without an assurance of confidentiality,
clients are unlikely to confide in their attorneys and, if they do not obtain
95
fully informed legal advice, they are less likely to comply with the law.
Any doubt that the Court wished to emphasize this point is dispelled by
the frequently quoted statement in Upjohn that, "[a]n uncertain privilege,
or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." 96 This rationale
has remained constant in the Court's other privilege cases that have been
decided since Upjohn, notwithstanding the passage of over two decades
and the changes in the make-up of the Court that have occurred in that
time.
b.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub and Bankruptcy
Trustees

In 1984 the Court revisited the application of the privilege to a corporate entity, this time in the context of a corporate bankruptcy. In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub 7 the Court held that control over a
bankrupt corporation's attorney-client privilege passes to the bankruptcy
trustee. 98 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, 99 concluded
that in the case of a corporate bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy, by
virtue of the management powers the trustee assumes, is analogous to the
board of directors of a solvent corporation. 10 0 Because the officers and
directors of a solvent corporation exercise the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege, 1° 1 the trustee should assume that power
when the bankruptcy court has appointed a trustee and stripped manage10 2
rial power from the bankrupt company's officers and directors.
95. See id. (observing that need for legal advice is particularly great for corporate entities in today's regulatory environment because "compliance with the law
in this area is hardly an instinctive matter"); see also H. Lowell Brown, The CrimeFraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87
Ky. L.J. 1191, 1195-96 (1999) ("In order for the privilege to be effective in achieving the goal of compliance with law resulting from sound legal advice based on
client candor .... there must be predictable certainty that the confidentiality of
client communications will be preserved."); King, supra note 54, at 623 ("Corporations today especially need the assistance of attorneys to help them comply with
the numerous government regulations applicable to corporations.").
96. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
97. 471 U.S. 343 (1984).
98. See id. at 354 (pointing to power of trustee in corporate bankruptcy
proceedings).
99. Justice Powell did not participate in the case. See id. at 358.
100. See id. at 352-53.
101. See id. at 348 n.4 (citing DEL. CORP. ANN. Tit. 8, § 141 (1983); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); and MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 35
(1979)).
102. See id. at 351-52 (listing powers and duties of bankruptcy trustee).
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Like Justice Rehnquist in Upjohn, Justice Marshall in Weintraub recognized that the administration of the attorney-client privilege raises "special
problems" in the corporate context because a corporation is an inanimate
entity and cannot speak directly to its lawyers.10 3 He described Upjohn and
Weintraub as presenting "related" questions arising out of the application
of the privilege to corporations.' 0 4 The key point from Weintraub for purposes of this Article is that Justice Marshall based his analysis on the same
core rationale thatJustice Rehnquist relied on in Upjohn-that by promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients the
privilege "encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration
of justice." 105
This concern with not unduly interfering with attorney-client communications is evident in the portion of the Weintraub opinion that dismisses
the argument that vesting power to waive the privilege in the trustee of a
bankrupt corporation "will have an undesirable chilling effect on attorneyclient communications."' 0 6 Rather than rejecting the underlying premise
that chilling attorney-client communications should be avoided, Justice
Marshall dismissed the argument because the chilling effect with a bankruptcy trustee is no greater than in the case of solvent corporation that
undergoes a change of management.' 0 7 In both cases the corporation's
prior management loses its control over assertion and waiver of the corporation's attorney-client privilege. In essence, the Weintraub Court began its
analysis with explicit approval of the public policy objectives identified in
Upjohn that are served by the attorney-client privilege' 0 8 and concluded its
analysis with an implicit recognition of the importance of those same public policy objectives.' 0 9
c.

United States v. Zolin and the Crime-Fraud Exception

Five years later, the Supreme Court's next venture into the attorneyclient privilege arena resulted in an even stronger affirmation of the rationale underlying the privilege and the public policy objectives the privilege
103. See id. at 348 (explaining that corporations must use agents to communicate with their lawyers).
104. See id. (considering whether privilege covers only communications between counsel and top management).
105. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976)).
106. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 357. The respondents in Weintraub argued that
corporate managers would "be wary of speaking freely with corporate counsel if
their communications might subsequently be disclosed due to bankruptcy" of the
corporation. Id.
107. See id. (rejecting second argument of respondents).
108. See id. at 348 (approving policy of communication between attorney and
clients).
109. See id. at 357 (accepting, implicitly, Upjohn policy objectives).
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promotes. In United States v. Zolint1 0 the Court grappled with the "crimefraud exception" to the attorney-client privilege, which arguably is one of
the most vexing areas of privilege law. 1"' In yet another unanimous decision,11 2 the Court concluded that a court may use in camera review to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies to attorney-client
communications-but only if the party challenging the privilege presents
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may
establish that the exception is applicable.' 13 The Zolin Court also rejected
the "independent evidence rule" that the purportedly privileged communications themselves cannot be considered by the court in camera, concluding that such a rule would create "too great an impediment to the
adversary process." 14
On first examination, Zolin might appear to signal diminished support for the privilege by the Supreme Court, but a close reading of the
opinion proves that is not the case. In Zolin, as it had done in Upjohn and
Weintraub, the Court began its attorney-client privilege analysis by explaining that the privilege is intended to encourage full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients, which promotes the broader
public policy interests in observance of law and administration of justice. 115 The Zolin Court expressed its support of this core principle, which
it articulated as "the centrality of open client and attorney communication
to the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice."' 16 Rather
than departing from this concept of the role and importance of the attorney-client privilege in our legal system, the Zolin opinion recognized an
important limitation on it: the privilege does not apply if the purpose of
110. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
111. For a further discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see infra Part
II.C.1.
112. The decision in Zolin was unanimous, butJustice Brennan took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 575. It is noteworthy that three of the Supreme Court's four recent major attorney-client privilege cases have been unanimous. That fact, coupled with the point that all four
cases share a common rationale and conception of the role of the attorney-client
privilege, as discussed herein, supports the conclusion that the attorney-client privilege is a particularly important doctrine in our legal system and thus should be
guarded zealously against unnecessary encroachment by law enforcement
authorities.
113. See id. at 574-75 (accepting in camera review determination).
114. Id. at 569. As the Zolin Court explained, "the threshold showing to obtain in camerareview may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained,
that has not been adjudicated to be privileged." Id. at 575.
115. See id. at 562 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389

(1981)). The Zolin Court also pointed out that the underlying rationale for the

privilege has evolved over time. Id. (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290; Hazard, supra note 12, at 1455-58 (noting development, over time, of objectives behind
attorney client privilege). For a brief summary of this evolution and the historical
developments leading up to the modern rationale for the attorney-client privilege,
see supra Part II.A.
116. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562.
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the communications is to further future wrongdoing.' 17 In those circumstances, the policy reasons for recognizing the privilege are not present,
and therefore the privilege should not be available.
The conclusion in Zolin that the privilege should not be available to
shield communications in furtherance of a future crime or fraud is neither
remarkable nor inconsistent with the policy interests the privilege is intended to serve.' I" Further, it does not detract from the Court's strong
support for the privilege when properly invoked to shield the confidentiality of legitimate legal advice. The Zolin Court made this point clear in its
analysis of whether in camerajudicial review should be conducted whenever a party asserts that the crime-fraud exception is applicable to attorney-client communications. The primary reason that the Court rejected a
blanket rule that in camera judicial review should always be conducted
when a party challenged the privilege on crime-fraud grounds was concern that such a rule "would place ... legitimate disclosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk."'1 19 Accordingly, the Court was unwilling to
endorse a rule that would discourage full and frank communications between clients and their lawyers. The Court went so far as to condemn any
approach to the crime-fraud problem that would "permit opponents of
the privilege to engage in groundless fishing expeditions."' 20 This refusal
to permit such fishing expeditions, even when it is alleged that the privilege has been misused to further an ongoing or future crime or fraud, is
consistent with the Court's prior support for the privilege and the policy
interests it serves, as previously demonstrated in Upjohn and Weintraub.
The test that the Court adopted in Zolin for when an in camera review
should be conducted also reflects the Court's concern that the availability
of the privilege not be unduly curtailed. A requirement that evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief" that in camera review may yield evi117. See id. at 562-63 (explaining crime-fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege).
118. In fact, the Supreme Court itself subsequently stated that the crime-fraud
exception applied in Zolin is consistent with the purposes of the privilege. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1998) (discussing crime-fraud
exception). For a more detailed discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see infra
Part II.C.1.
119. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571.
120. Id. The Court also pointed out that, as the Government had "reluctantly" conceded at oral argument, a court would be mistaken to review purportedly privileged documents in camera simply because a party requested it to do so,
without presenting any evidence of a crime or fraud. See id. (asserting that in camera review cannot be used in all circumstances). The Court therefore required a
showing of "a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person" that legal advice was being used to further a crime or fraud as the standard
for in camera review. Id. at 572 (citing Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33
(Colo. 1982)). The Court concluded that this standard struck an appropriate balance between protecting legitimate assertions of privilege, including advice concerning past crimes or misconduct, and preventing misuse of the privilege when
legal advice is used to further an ongoing or future crime or fraud. See id. For a
further discussion of this aspect of the Zolin case, see infra Part II.C.I.
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dence establishing that the crime-fraud exception is applicable to the
privilege communications at issue means that a court must be presented
concrete evidence of criminal or fraudulent conduct-mere unsubstantiated allegations will be insufficient to breach the privilege. 12 1 Moreover,
the use of the term "reasonable belief" demonstrates that the Court intended that an objective standard should apply to the initial determination of whether a legitimate crime-fraud exception challenge to the
22
privilege is being advanced.'
An objective standard limits the discretion of individual judges and
screens out weak and spurious challenges to the privilege. Thus, both the
rejection of a blanket rule permitting in camera review and the objective
standard that the Court established for availability of such review indicates
that the Court's primary concern in Zolin was to avoid any unwarranted
invasion of the privilege. This solicitude for the continued vitality of the
privilege and hesitance to formulate a rule that might deter legitimate attorney-client communications demonstrates that the Zolin Court remained
committed to the core principle that the privilege is a vital element of our
legal system.
d.

Swidler & Berlin v. United States and the Deceased Client

The Court's most recent attorney-client privilege case provides even
stronger confirmation that the Court remains strongly opposed to any unnecessary encroachment on the protections provided by the attorneyclient privilege. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,12 3 the office of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr sought to obtain the handwritten
notes taken by Swidler & Berlin attorney James Hamilton during an initial
interview with a client, then-Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Fos1 24
ter, Jr., shortly before Foster committed suicide.
121. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571 ("There is no reason to permit opponents of
the privilege to engage in groundless fishing expeditions, with the district courts as
their unwitting (and perhaps unwilling) agents."). See also Brown, supra note 95, at
1226 ("[1]n order to establish the predicate crime or fraud, more must be shown
than mere allegations of misconduct or simply the fact that a party to the communication is a target of a grand jury investigation."); Sharif, supra note 85, at 127,
141 ("The newly adopted reasonable belief standard requires that opponents of
the privilege can present any relevant non-privileged evidence to support a reasonable belief that an in camera review may yield evidence that established the exceptions to trigger such a review.").
122. The use of the word "reasonable" denotes an objective standard of review that can readily be subjected to appellate review if a trial court overreaches
and allows invasion of the privilege based on inadequate evidence. Cf RicE, supra
note 23, §§ 4:32 at 170-71 (discussing joint representation of corporations and individual corporate officers, directors and employees, and noting that reasonable
belief standard indicates that subjective belief alone is insufficient to meet that
standard).
123. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
124. See id. at 401 (noting facts of case).
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Two unusual aspects of this case made for a dramatic confrontation
between the public interests served by the privilege and the evidentiary
costs it imposes by excluding potentially relevant evidence. First, the case
involved that most sacred form of attorney work product recording client
communications: an attorney's handwritten notes of an initial interview
with a client.125 Second, the information was sought in connection with a
criminal investigation of the President of the United States. The combination of these two factors created a test case with a unique juxtaposition of
competing public policy interests: those served by the privilege and those
presented by allegations of wrongdoing by the country's chief law enforcement officer. Perhaps surprisingly to those who question the importance
of the privilege in our modern legal system, 126 the Supreme Court lined
27
up squarely behind the attorney-client privilege.'
Read as a whole, the Swidler & Berlin opinion reflects an overwhelming reluctance on the part of the Court to accept a change to existing
privilege law that would be contrary to the interest of clients and therefore
might undermine clients' reliance on the privilege, as well as their willingness to provide their attorneys with full and frank disclosure of relevant
information. 128 In rejecting the Independent Counsel's argument for ex125. See id. at 401-02 (discussing issues involved in case). Because the Court
upheld the attorney-client privilege claim with regard to the notes, it did not address the claim of work product protection. See id. at 403 n.1 (declining to review
'the claim of work product privilege"). For a further discussion of the work product doctrine and the distinction between the protections provided by the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine, see supra Part II.A.2.
126. For recent commentary criticizing the role of the attorney-client privilege and the costs it imposes in terms of keeping potentially relevant evidence
from finders of fact, see, for example, Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy:
The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157
(1993).
127. The Court voted 6-3 to uphold the privilege, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who, as an Associate Justice, had authored the Upjohn
opinion almost two decades earlier. The Chief Justice began his analysis by citing
Upjohn, and never retreated from the principles he had articulated in that earlier
case. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403. Although Swidler & Berlin is the Supreme Court's only recent attorney-client privilege case not to be decided unanimously, it is not surprising that unanimity was not forthcoming in a case that
presented such a direct conflict between competing public interests and that involved a matter as polarizing and politicized as the Starr investigation.
128. See id. at 410 (declining opportunity to narrow privilege). The Court
emphasized the strong weight of existing authority deciding-or assuming-that
the privilege survives the death of the client in cases other than those involving
disputes among a deceased client's heirs. See id. at 404-05 (collecting cases). The
Court also relied upon Federal Rule of Evidence 501, to conclude that in light of
this weight of contrary authority, "at the very least the burden is on the Independent Counsel to show that 'reason and experience' require a departure from this
rule." Id. at 405-06. This concern over compliance with Rule 501 is consistent with
the approach Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Rehnquist followed almost
twenty years earlier in Upjohn when he declined to articulate a general rule governing attorney-client communications in the corporate context because to do so
would be inconsistent with Rule 501. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 396-97 (1981) (discussing the "spirit" of Rule 501 as requiring "case-by-case"
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tending "posthumous curtailment of the privilege" beyond cases involving
disputes among a deceased client's heirs,129 the Court emphasized that
the rationale for overcoming the privilege in those cases is that doing so
130
furthers the client's intent.
The Court's concern with protecting the interest of the client in
maintaining the confidentiality of communications with counsel was most
evident in its response to the argument advanced by the Independent
Counsel that after the client's death "the interest in determining whether
131
a crime had been committed should trump client confidentiality."
Here the Court focused on the concerns a client might have, beyond concern about criminal prosecution, that could cause that client to withhold
information from counsel if confidentiality was not assured. The Court
identified concerns about "reputation, civil liability [and] possible harm to
132
friends or family as reasons why a client might withhold information."
The Court was unwilling to accept the risk that clients' willingness to confide in counsel would be impaired, even if the exception to the privilege
133
applied only in criminal cases.
The Swidler & Berlin Court also expressed concern about injecting
additional uncertainty into the privilege's application. 134 This concern is
consistent with the Court's core objective, consistently applied since its
decision in the Upjohn case, that the application of the privilege should
35
encourage clients to communicate frankly and fully with their lawyers.'
In advancing this objective, the Court embraced a broad concept of the
privilege, extending beyond client concerns about prosecution in criminal
development of privilege law). For a further discussion of Federal Rule of Evi-

dence 501, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
129. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402, 410-11 (discussing the principle that
attorney-client privilege survives death of client in certain cases).
130. See id. at 406.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 407 (noting reasons client may withhold information).
133. See id. at 409 (refusing to forsake interests of clients and forego application of attorney-client privilege). The Court rejected a posthumous exception in
criminal cases as "at odds with the goals of encouraging full and frank communication and of protecting the client's interests." Id. at 410. It is noteworthy that the
Court's approach was not to balance one interest against another, but rather to
reject the criminal investigation interest-even in an investigation of wrongdoing
by the President of the United States!-because it was inconsistent with the interests promoted by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 409 (refusing to use balancing test in defining contours of privilege). This suggests that the Court may
view the societal interests served by the privilege as paramount to the public interest in investigation and prosecution of particular crimes, even crimes of national
importance. If this is indeed how the Supreme Court views the privilege, it should
make law enforcement officials hesitate before implementing investigatory procedures or prosecutorial policies that tend to undercut the privilege. For further
discussion of this point, see infra Part III.A.3.
134. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
135. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.").
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cases to client confidences about personal and family matters that must be
revealed to obtain appropriate legal advice. 13 6 Even these kinds of client
confidences, perhaps only tangentially related to the legal advice provided
in the course of such communications, were deemed worthy of protection
by the Court. Taken as a whole, the Swidler & Berlin case represents perhaps the strongest affirmation yet of the value ascribed to attorney-client
13 7
privilege by the Supreme Court.
2.

Conclusion

For purposes of this Article, it is important to note that all of these
cases involved efforts by law enforcement officials to overcome assertions
of privilege by parties subject to government regulatory proceedings or
criminal prosecutions.138 In all instances, the Court sustained the availability of the privilege1 3 9 and rejected efforts by the government to limit its
protections. 141 Moreover, as discussed above, in all four of the cases, the
Court consistently upheld the policy grounds that historically have been
recognized as supporting the privilege. In short, these cases demonstrate
consistent support of the privilege by the Supreme Court over the past two
decades.
C.

Existing Checks on Abuse and UnwarrantedAssertion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine

Both the long history of the attorney-client privilege in the AngloAmerican legal system and the recent strong support of the privilege by
the United States Supreme Court suggest that hostility to the privilege and
attempts to undermine its protection by law enforcement authorities are
misguided and unwise. The policy grounds supporting the privilege and
136. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408 (noting situation where confidences
are revealed to assure sound legal advice).
137. See Knight, supra note 85, at 254-59 (noting fashion in which Court reinforces vitality of attorney-client privilege in Swidler & Berlin); Zamacona, supra note
85, at 296-97 (discussing significance of Swidler & Berlin decision for principle of
attorney-client privilege); Gordon, supra note 85, at 511-16 (discussing Court's refusal to find exception to attorney-client privilege in Swidler & Berlin for deceased
client).
138. Zolin and Upjohn involved Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigations
and efforts to enforce IRS summonses. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
556-61 (1989); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-88. Weintraub involved a formal investigation by a government agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 345-46 (1985).
Swidler & Berlin involved a criminal grand jury investigation supervised by an Independent Counsel. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 401-02.
139. See, e.g., Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 343 (holding that attorney-client privilege
is controlled by bankruptcy trustee and not by former management of bankrupt
company).
140. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 404-11 (holding that attorney-client
privilege survives death of client, despite arguments by Office of Independent
Counsel that in case of deceased client law enforcement interests should overcome
privilege).
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the work product doctrine, discussed above, are integral to the United
States legal system. Although these considerations are sufficient reasons
to oppose overbroad attacks on the privilege by government law enforcement authorities, there is another compelling reason to oppose such efforts: the checks on the privilege that already are in place in our system
are adequate to ensure that information is not wrongfully withheld from
law enforcers.
Four important checks on abuse and unwarranted assertion of the
privilege are discussed below. The most important is the "crime-fraud exception" to the attorney-client privilege, which ensures that the confidentiality otherwise provided by the privilege does not protect communications
that are misused to further an ongoing or future crime or fraud. Another
important check on improper assertion of privilege is imposed by the limitations that have evolved under the "common interest" doctrine. A third
doctrine that prevents improper assertion of privilege or work product
protection is the law of waiver, which has developed in such a way as to
protect against unwarranted assertions of privilege or work product protection. Finally, the work product doctrine, from its inception in the Supreme Court's Hickman decision to the present day, has featured built-in
protections against unwarranted withholding of information. All of these
limitations, working together, are sufficient to ensure that in cases where
law enforcement has a legitimate need for information, and the policy
interests underlying the privilege and the work product doctrine would
not be served by confidentiality, the information will be made available to
law enforcement.
Another important preliminary consideration concerning existing
limitations on assertion of privilege and work product protection is that all
of these existing limitations provide forjudicial oversight and involvement
in the decision to abrogate the protections of the privilege. Many of the
efforts by law enforcement to overcome-or do an "end run" around-the
privilege seek to obtain access to privileged information without invoking
judicial process. 4 This is a disturbing trend that threatens to undermine
important values in our legal system without the checks provided by judicial review and orderly development of judicial precedents in an area that
Congress intended to "be governed by the principles of common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
141. Perhaps the most dramatic recent example of this trend is the new Department ofJustice policy on "eavesdropping" on conversations between prisoners
and their counsel if the prisoner is found to pose a threat of terrorism. For a
further discussion of this policy, see infra Part III.D.1; see also National Security;
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (Oct.
31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500 and 501) [hereinafter Prevention]
(stating that communications between inmates and their attorneys are not always
entitled to protection); Cover, supra note 6, at 1238 (determining that application
is complicated by possible crime-fraud exception in context of future terrorist
attacks).
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reason and experience." 142 These points are discussed in greater detail
below in the context of each of these existing limitations.
1.

The Crime-FraudException

The crime-fraud exception protects against the most egregious class
of abuses of the privilege: instances in which a client misuses legal advice
to commit a crime or perpetrate a fraud.' 43 The Supreme Court has
stated that "the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege [is] to assure that the 'seal of secrecy'

. . .

between lawyer and

client does not extend to communications 'made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or a crime."1 44 The rationale
for the exception is well established and follows from the policy goals that
underlie recognition of the attorney-client privilege in the first instance:
the attorney-client privilege is intended to promote the administration of
justice, and any use of the privilege that is inconsistent with that end
should not be permitted. 145 The crime-fraud exception prevents use of
the privilege to protect communications that do not further legitimate
142.

FED.

R. EvID. 501; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396

(1981) (applying Rule 501). For a discussion of the importance ofjudicial involvement in the development of the law of privileges, see Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should be Abolished, 47 DuKE L.J. 853,
868-88 (1998) (reviewing involvement of courts in development of attorney-client
privilege).
143. Cf 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290 ("It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with an
attorney a crime or other evil enterprise."); see also Brown, supra note 95, at 1218
("Today, communications which would otherwise be considered privileged ... are
excepted from the privilege if the communication furthers an ongoing or future
crime. Indeed, it is to prevent abuse of the secrecy accorded bona fide attorneyclient communications that the modern crime-fraud exception has been fashioned.") (citations omitted); Hutzel, supra note 85, at 372 ("The purpose of the
crime-fraud exception is generally to prevent the attorney-client privilege from
shielding from prosecution the client who uses his attorney's advice to initiate or
continue a fraudulent or criminal activity.") (citation omitted).
144. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) and O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604
(P.C.)). The lower federal courts have formulated the exception in similar terms:
"[t] he attorney-client privilege does not apply where the client consults an attorney to further a crime or fraud." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Company X) v.
United States, 857 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Martin,
278 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that attorney client privilege does not
extend to communications made to lawyer involving future criminal purpose); In
re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that when legal advice is
sought in furtherance of crime or fraud, attorney-client privilege is waived); Alexander v. FBI, 198 F.R.D. 306, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting requirements for crimefraud exception).
145. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 418-22 (reviewing policy reasons
for the exception and collecting cases); RICE, supra note 23, § 8:2 (asserting that
one must question invocation of privilege that would not further policy concerns);
see also Zolin, 491 U.S. at 569 (discussing "policies underlying the privilege" and
"the proper functioning of the adversary process").
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purposes and therefore do not promote the administration of justice. 146
It is important to recognize, however, that the exception applies even
if the attorney is completely innocent and unaware of the client's
wrongdoing; 14 7 it is the intent and actions of the client that determine
whether or not the exception applies. 148 Of course, the exception also
146. The communication must actually further wrongdoing; however, merely
coinciding in time with client wrongdoing is not sufficient. Rather than relying
upon a mere "temporal nexus" to hold that the crime-fraud exception applies, a
court must find that the "requisite purposeful nexus" exists between the communications and the crime or fraud. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 798
F.2d 32, 34 (1986) (finding that documents provided temporal nexus but did not
give rise to probable cause to allow belief that communications were made to advance criminal activity); see also Fried, supra note 22, at 482-83 (decrying "a tendency in this area for the courts to assert that the cock's crowing made the sun rise,
or at least that the client's purpose must have been unlawful because the consultation was followed by the commission of a crime," and suggesting that "courts have
lost sight of the principle of causation"). To meet this requirement, a prosecutor
often will attempt to rely upon the communications themselves as proof that the
exception applies. Commentators have criticized "the circularity of relying upon
the confidential communication itself to prove the client's fraudulent intent,
which in turn serves as the necessary justification for disclosure." Id., at 460; see also
Galenek, supra note 85, at 1124 (stating that "circular proof problem" has "plagued
the judicial system since the birth of the [crime-fraud] exception"); PeterJ. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and ProsecutingWhite CollarCrime: How FarWill
the CourtsAllow Prosecutorsto Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 405, 461 (1993) ("The circularity in asserting that the communication is dispositive of whether the privilege applies to it is compounded by the fact that prosecutors arguing for the crime-fiaud
exception will necessarily have only a limited amount of information about the
content of the discussions on which to move for disclosure."). The mere fact that
the privileged communications at issue might aid the prosecution in proving its
case-in-chief does not make the crime-fraud exception applicable. See PritchardKeang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 283 (8th Cir. 1984) ("That the [attorney-client communication] may help prove that a [crime or] fraud occurred does
not mean that it was used in perpetrating the [crime or] fraud.").
147. For a recent, high-profile example of a case where the crime-fraud exception was invoked even though the lawyer was innocent of any wrongdoing, see
In re GrandJuiy Subpoena to FrancisD. Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *4-5
(D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (applying crime-fraud exception to
Monica Lewinsky's communications with attorney who assisted her with preparation of affidavit stating that she did not engage in sexual relations with President
Clinton and observing that, "[t]he attorney does not need to know about his client's potential wrongdoing for the exception to apply"), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom., In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This is discussed in
more detail infra Part III A.1.
148. See generally RICE, supra note 23, § 8.5 (explaining when exception applies); see also Allison E. Beach et al., ProceduralIssues, 38 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1151,
1198 (2001) ("The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege permits
an attorney to disclose communications that indicate a client intends future criminal behavior. Because it is controlled by the client's intent, this exception applies
even when the attorney has no actual or constructive knowledge of the crime.");
Brown, supra note 95, at 1232 (" [I] t is the client's intent at the time of the communication that is considered determinative of whether the crime-fraud exception
will apply."); Fried, supra note 22, at 499 ("[T]he crime-fraud exception is predicated on the blameworthiness of the intention with which counsel was con-
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applies if the attorney acts in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent
activity. 149
Although the rationale for the crime-fraud exception is widely accepted, the application of the exception in actual cases poses difficulties. 15 As one appellate court has explained, "[tihe crime/fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege cannot be successfully invoked
merely upon a showing that the client communicated with counsel while
the client was engaged in criminal activity.' 15' The party seeking to overcome the privilege must present evidence of something more than ongoing criminal activity involving the client to establish that the crime-fraud
1 52
exception applies to communications between a client and an attorney.
suited."). The importance of the client's motivation is illustrated by an articulation
of a two-part test for application of the exception by the Eleventh Circuit:
First, there must be a prima facie showing that the client was engaged in
criminal or fraudulent conduct when he sought the advice of counsel,
that he was planning such conduct when he sought the advice of counsel,
or that he committed a crime or fraud subsequent to receiving the benefit of counsel's advice. Second, there must be a showing that the attorney's assistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent
activity or was closely related to it.
In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA), 938 F.2d 1578, 1581 (11th Cir.
1991) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226
(11th Cir. 1987)).
149. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, (Company X), 857 F.2d 710, 712
(10th Cir. 1988) (stating that law firm was used to "cover up and perpetuate"
crimes). To establish a causal connection between the privileged communications
and criminal activity, the prosecution can make a showing that privileged communications were intended to aid, further, or conceal criminal activity. See Martin,
278 F.3d at 1001 (stating standard for crime-fraud exception); In re Richard Roe,
Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (asserting standard for crime-fraud exception);
United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (setting standard for
where crime-fraud exception applies); Federal GrandJury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA),
938 F.2d at 1581 (stating standard for crime-fraud exception).
150. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 22, at 461-69 (discussing controlling court decisions concerning requisite showing of criminal intent necessary to negate attorneyclient privilege); Henning, supra note 146, at 406-13 (explaining how complex
white collar crime investigations have led to "fragmentation in the decisions" and
incomplete set of rules that apply to crime-fraud exception); Ronald L. Motley &
Tucker S. Player, Issues in "Crime-Fraud"Practiceand Procedure: The Tobacco Litigation
Experience, 49 S.C. L. REV. 187, 209-12 (1998) (arguing that tobacco industry has
created confusion concerning crime-fraud exception through use of suspect arguments "loosely based on the language of certain courts"). For a recent, high-profile case that grapples with the application of the crime-fraud exception to both
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, and discusses the

"somewhat different inquiry" required in the work product context, see Carter,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *4-8 (applying crime-fraud exception to Monica
Lewinsky's communications with attorney who assisted her with preparation of affidavit stating that she did not engage in sexual relations with President Clinton and
to attorney's work product), discussed in more detail infra Part III.A.1.
15 1. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d at 34.
152. See In. re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that
mere coincidence in time,' without more, cannot support the invocation of the
exception"); see also United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(stating that "[iUt does not suffice that communications may be related to a crime"
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Defining precisely what evidence must be presented to trigger application
of the exception and what process should be followed in evaluating that
1 53
evidence has proved difficult for the courts.
and defendant's "failure to heed his lawyer's counsel does" not render communication in furtherance of crime); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 168 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "merely because some communications may be related to a
crime is not enough to subject that communication to disclosure").
153. One troublesome issue is that of "circularity," referred to in supra note
146. The argument that the client is guilty of a crime and therefore the crimefraud exception applies is an argument that prosecutors often will present to a
court, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's first encounter with the crime-fraud
exception in Alexanderv. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891). In Alexander, the Court
reversed a murder conviction solely because the trial court had admitted into evidence ambiguous privileged communications between the defendant and an attorney. See id. at 360. The defendant consulted counsel regarding property owned
jointly with a partner. See id. at 358. The partner was later found to have been
murdered before the consultation occurred. See id. At the defendant's murder
trial the court relied upon the crime-fraud exception to permit the prosecution to
introduce the privileged consultation with counsel as evidence that the defendant
knew the deceased was missing and would profit from his murder. See id. The
Supreme Court held that it was reversible error to admit into evidence privileged
communications that would be subject to the crime-fraud exception only if the
defendant in fact was guilty:
Now the communication in question was perfectly harmless upon its face.
If it were true that his partner was missing, and he had not heard from
him, and that [the partner] had taken off [with] the money, there was no
impropriety in his consulting counsel for the purpose of ascertaining if
he could hold the horses, so as to secure his part of it .... It is only by

assuming that he was guilty of the murder that his scheme to defraud his partner
becomes at all manifest.
Id. at 360 (emphasis added). The Alexander Court refused to assume that the defendant was guilty and interpret ambiguous privileged communications as evidence of guilt:
It is evident from [the attorney's testimony] that defendant consulted
with [the attorney] as a legal advisor, and while, if he were guilty of the
murder, it may have had a tendency to show an effort on his part to defraud his partner's estate, and to make profit out of his death, by appropriating to himself the partnership property, it did not necessarily have
that tendency and was clearly a privileged communication.
Id. at 358. To approach the situation otherwise-and assume prior to trial that a
defendant is guilty of the crime charged-would emasculate the attorney-client
privilege whenever criminal conduct is charged. AsJustice Cardozo later observed,
"'it would be absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making
a charge of fraud.'" Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (quoting
O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604). As the Court concluded in Alexander, invocation of the crime-fraud exception is inappropriate in cases where the
exception would be applicable only if the defendant is assumed to be guilty. A flaw
in the Alexander Court's reasoning, unrelated to the "circularity" problem, has limited the influence of the case, however. The clarity of the holding in Alexander was
obscured by a discussion distinguishing the facts of Alexanderfrom an English case,
Queen v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884), and suggesting that the crime-fraud exception
should only be invoked when the attorney-client communication furthered the
same crime which is being tried. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 359-60 (distinguishing case
at bar from Cox, because Cox involved defendant consultation with attorney prior
to commission of crime, while Alexander consulted attorney after crime was committed). Courts discussing Alexander have accurately characterized this portion of
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The Supreme Court weighed in on the issues presented by application of the crime-fraud exception in 1989 with its decision in Zolin, discussed above.1 54 Zolin did not answer every question concerning
application of the exception, but it did provide guidance on the points
that are most relevant to this Article. The focus of the Court's opinion in
Zolin was not "the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception," 155 but rather the showing required to obtain in camerajudicial review of the privileged communications at issue so that a court can make the determination of whether or
not the exception applies. 156 As noted in Part II.B.l.c above, the Zolin
Court concluded that to obtain in camera review the party opposing the
privilege "must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief
that in camera review [of the purportedly privileged communications (tape
recordings in the Zolin case)] may yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability."1 57 The Zolin Court also rejected the "independent evidence rule" that had been applied by the appellate court below,
concluding that "evidence directly but incompletely reflecting the content
of the contested communications" (partial transcripts of the tape record-

the opinion as dicta and declined to follow that suggestion. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1987) (claiming Alexander rule was dictum and that it "has never been used to deny application of the
crime-fraud exception"); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1980)
(noting characterization of Alexander as dictum); In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d
805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1956) (arguing distinction in Alexander was dictum and stating that all courts have adopted rule that communication between attorney and
client is not privileged if in pursuit of crime or fraud). Nothing in these cases
undercuts the teaching of Alexander that a trial court should not assume a defendant is guilty and interpret ambiguous attorney-client communications as furthering crime and therefore unprivileged. See Berkley, 629 F.2d at 554 n.ll (stating that
Alexander held that crime-fraud exception was inapplicable because "the client's
communication with the attorney was harmless on its face and did not necessarily
relate to any future intended wrong-doing").
154. For a discussion of the support for the attorney-client privilege evidenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Zolin, see supra Part II.B.l.c.
155. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (citations omitted).
156. See id. at 563-65 (listing relevant inquiry courts should apply before
granting in camera review of privileged material). The Court also addressed the
related questions of what kind of evidence the party opposing the privilege may
present in support of an application for in camera review. See id. at 573-74 (concluding that "any nonprivileged evidence" may be used to support request for in
camera review, regardless of whether it is independent of communications in question). For more detailed analysis of the Zolin case, see Galanek, supra note 85, at
1132-40 (analyzing Zolin and its impact on crime-fraud exception); Hutzel, supra
note 85, at 365 (arguing that policy concerns of attorney-client privilege were not
given adequate consideration when Supreme Court lowered evidentiary burden on
parties raising crime-fraud exception); Sharif, supra note 85, at 127 (concluding
that Zolin Court followed trend of eliminating defendant safeguards in favor of
prosecuting criminals).
157. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574-75.
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ings) could be used by a court to determine whether in camera review of
the privilege communications themselves would be appropriate.1 58
Zolin's adoption of the reasonable belief standard and rejection of the
independent evidence rule removes significant procedural obstacles for
parties seeking to establish that the crime-fraud exception applies, while
retaining the important safeguard of judicial review-in camera to protect
the confidentiality of the privileged communications if the challenge
fails-in determining whether the exception should be applied. Unfortunately, the Zolin opinion does not provide further guidance as to what
constitutes sufficient proof to establish applicability of the crime-fraud exception and does not suggest how that quantum of proof exceeds the
showing necessary to obtain an in camera inspection.15 9 The lower federal
courts have been left to grapple with those issues, 160 and the law in this
158. Id. at 573. The Court concluded that "the party opposing the privilege
may use any nonprivileged evidence in support of its request for in camera review,
even if its evidence is not 'independent' [of the contents] of the contested communications .... Id. at 574. In a footnote to the quoted statement, the Court also
concluded that such evidence "may be used not only in the pursuit of in camera
review, but also may provide the evidentiary basis for the ultimate showing that the
crime-fraud exception applies." Id. at n.12.
159. The Supreme Court noted that use of "the phrase 'prima facie case' to
describe the showing needed to defeat the privilege has caused some confusion."
Id. at 563 n.7. Additionally, the Court quoted criticism of courts which "'have
allowed themselves to be led into holding that only a superficial, one-sided showing is allowable on any admissibility controversy."' Id. at 564 n.7 (quoting Maguire
& Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining Admissibility of Evidence, 40
HARv. L. REv. 392, 400 (1927)). The Court also acknowledged that "[t]he quantum of proof needed to establish admissibility was then, and remains, subject to
question." Id. The greater "quantum of proof' needed to establish applicability of
the crime-fraud exception may be demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's opinion
after Zolin was remanded by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the
parties to the taped conversations at issue "admit on the tapes that they are attempting to confuse and defraud the U.S. Government." United States v. Zolin,
905 F.2d 1344, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit thus held that the crimefraud exception is applicable when an in camerareview revealed explicit admissions
of an intent to defraud. See id. at 1345-46 (suggesting that tapes showing intent to
defraud are within crime-fraud exception). But cf.Henning, supra note 146, at 462
("While Zolin thus rejects the proposition that it is addressing the issue of what
quantum of proof is necessary to vitiate a claim of privilege, the Court's analysis of
how much evidence must be introduced to have a district court conduct an in
camera review effectively resolves the issue of what proof is sufficient to establish the
application of the crime-fraud exception.").
160. For a high-profile example of a case in which a district court stnggles
with the issue of what is the standard for application of the crime-fraud exception,
see In re GrandJu Subpoena to FrancisD. Carter,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *5
(D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (comparing approaches of Second
Circuit and D.C. Circuit and noting that "[t] here is some confusion over which of
these standards the D.C. Circuit finds controlling"), affd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom., In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In addition to the authorities cited in Carter,the D.C. Circuit addressed the crime-fraud exception in United
States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The defendant in White was on trial
for conspiring to defraud the United States. See id. at 269. Over his objection,
White's attorney was required to testify as to conversations in which he told White
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16 1
difficult area is still evolving.

The crime-fraud exception is a difficult area of the law, but it provides
an important limitation on availability of the attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, the procedure for asserting a claim that the exception applies is
sufficiently clear, at least since the Supreme Court's Zolin decision, to permit government officials readily to obtain judicial review of improper assertions of privilege. 16 2 The relatively low showing required by Zolin to
obtain in camera review, coupled with Zolin's rejection of an independent
evidence rule, means that if law enforcement authorities have credible evidence that legal advice is being or has been misused, they can obtain judicial review to determine if the crime-fraud exception should be
invoked. 163 Although law enforcement authorities may be frustrated if
that certain actions would be illegal. See id. The Court held that the crime-fraud
exception did not justify admission of the attorney's testimony. See id. at 271. In
the words of the court: "Far from showing that [the attorney's] advice was intended to further a crime or fraud, the evidence suggests ... that [the attorney's]
advice was intended to prevent unlawful conduct." Id. White is consistent with the
concerns for protection of the attorney-client relationship demonstrated by the
Supreme Court in Zolin and other recent cases, see supra Part I1B, because the
court refused to assume the guilt of the defendant and rely upon ambiguous privileged communications as the basis for applying the crime-fraud exception.
161. See Fred C. Zacharias, HarmonizingPrivilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX.
L. REV. 69, 80-81 (1999) (noting that "Zolin does not identify any new substantive
dividing line for assessing when communications fit the crime-fraud definitions.
Zolin is procedural in nature"). For post-Zolin applications of the crime-fraud exception by the lower federal courts, see United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1001
(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1997))
(stating that government must show "that the communications with the lawyer
were 'in furtherance of an intended or present illegality and that there is some
relationship between the communications and the illegality' [in order to make] a
prima facie case"); In re RichardRoe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting In
re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995)) ("[A] party seeking to invoke
the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate that there is probable cause
to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that the
communications were in furtherance thereof."); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495,
1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Grand jury Proceedings (The Corporation), 87
F.3d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1996)) (" 'To invoke the crime-fraud exception successfully,
the government has the burden of making a prima facie showing that the communications were in furtherance of an intended or present illegality and that there is
some relationship between the communications and the illegality.'").
162. Even prior to the Zolin decision the crime-fraud exception served this
important purpose. For a pre-Zolin example of a court overruling a claim of privilege (and work product protection) based upon the applicability of the crimefraud exception, see In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
163. One commentator has asserted that growth of government regulation of
business and increased reporting requirements incorporating criminal penalties
for failure to comply or for providing false information has expanded the availability of the crime-fraud exception:
Not only can more acts be labeled "criminal" or "fraudulent," but lawyers
play such a pervasive role in advising clients on complying with or avoiding regulatory schemes that the opportunity to use legal advice to commit
an illegal act has increased correspondingly. Moreover, the improper act
does not have to be a violation of a specific criminal provision, and the
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courts do not always conclude that the exception is applicable, that frustration is both predictable and desirable in our adversary system ofjustice. In
light of the importance of the policies served by the attorney-client privilege, it is appropriate that decisions about its availability be made by neutral judicial officers, rather than by government officials who are
responsible for law enforcement. Absent some evidence that the crimefraud exception is not adequate to protect against abuses of the system,
law enforcement officials should rely upon it to overcome wrongful assertions of privilege on a case-by-case basis, and should not seek to undercut
the overall availability of the privilege in our legal system.
2.

The Law of Waiver

The crime-fraud exception to the privilege is only one of several established doctrines that serve to prevent unfounded or abusive assertions
of privilege. Another such limitation is provided by the extensive body of
law regarding waiver of the privilege. 164 The waiver concept has always
been a part of attorney-client privilege law, and Wigmore included the
element of client waiver in his original, classic definition of the privilege. 165 A client 166 can waive the protection of the privilege by voluntary
disclosure of the privileged communications or by other conduct, such as
partial disclosure, that is inconsistent with subsequent invocation of the
privilege. 167 Determining whether or not a waiver has taken place in a
particular case often is difficult, and an examination of all the circumact only has to be one objective of seeking the legal advice for the exception to apply. Therefore, the question of whether an alleged course of
conduct qualifies as a crime or fraud is rarely at issue because the breadth
of white collar criminal law encompasses most acts which are of questionable legality.
Henning, supra note 146, at 460-61 (citations omitted).
164. For an argument that recent developments in the law of waiver "have
seriously undercut the exercise of the privilege and adversely affected judicial administration," see generally George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637 (1986). For a comprehensive analysis of
the law of waiver, see RICE, supra note 23, ch. 9.
165. For a further discussion of the development of Wigmore's definition of
privilege, see supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text. Wigmore's first edition
defined the privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except when the client waives the protection.
4 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2292 (emphasis added). Wigmore also noted that "it
has always been recognized that a waiver may be made." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
166. Wigmore notes that "since the domination of the modern theory [it has]
been perfectly plain that the waiver, like the privilege, belongs solely to the client,
and not to the attorney." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2327 (internal cross-references omitted).
167. See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 93.
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stances that may constitute a waiver is beyond the scope of this Article.1
Discussion of a few examples of circumstances where waiver of the privilege is routinely held to have occurred is sufficient to illustrate the point
that is relevant to this Article: that the waiver doctrine serves as a check on
abusive or unwarranted assertions of the privilege.

Several established categories of waiver serve to prevent governmental
law enforcement agencies from being disadvantaged by assertions of privilege that are not entitled to confidentiality. For example, if the subject of
a civil governmental enforcement proceeding or a criminal prosecution
asserts reliance on advice of counsel as a defense, the privilege will be
deemed to have been waived and the government will be permitted full
access to the privileged communications in which the advice was conveyed. 16 9 Similarly, if the subject of an enforcement proceeding seeks to
make "offensive" use of privileged communications in presenting a defense, such use will be construed as a waiver and the communications will

168. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances that can constitute waiver,
see EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 292-391 (discussing seventeen different categories of
attorney-client privilege waiver and collecting cases), 60741 (discussing categories
of waiver of the work product doctrine and collecting cases). A distinction should
be noted between waiver of the attorney-client privilege and waiver of the work
product doctrine:
The waiver of the attorney-client privilege for a communication does not
automatically waive whatever work-product immunity that communication may also enjoy, as the two are independent and grounded on different policies. Waiver of the privilege should always be analyzed distinctly
from waiver of work product, since the privilege is that of the client and
the work product [doctrine] essentially protects the attorney's work and
mental impressions from adversaries and their parties even when communicated to the client.
Id. at 608. For further discussion of the distinction between the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, see supra Part II.A.2.
169. See Cohn, supra note 48, at 924-25, 936 ("There are certain situations...
in which the attorney's files or papers are not merely a record of some other evidence ....

They are instead facts at issue in the case ....

The attorney's files may

be relevant to th[e] issue and therefore discoverable. [This] situation arises when
counsel's specific advice is relevant to a party's claim that he acted 'on advice of
counsel."'); Jared Goff, Comment, The UnpredictableScope of the Waiver Resultingfrom
the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 BYU L. REV. 213, 218
("The defendant may then assert the advice-of-counsel defense, stating that the
infringement was not willful. However, by asserting this defense, the defendant
waives the attorney-client privilege and possibly the work product protection for all
documents related to the infringement."). The same waiver doctrine applies to
attorney work product when the client asserts an "advice of counsel" defense, and
even "opinion work product" is subject to discovery; moreover, some courts have
required disclosure of all work product related to the representation, and not just
work product that was conveyed to the client. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 347-62
(collecting cases).
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no longer be protected. 170 The rationale for this rule is that "the attorney171
client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword."
The waiver rule also applies if otherwise protected work product is
172
voluntarily disclosed to the government in an adversarial proceeding.
If a party who is potentially subject to an agency civil enforcement proceeding or criminal prosecution makes a strategic decision to provide
work product documents to law enforcement authorities in order to obtain an advantage in that proceeding, then work product protection for
those documents likely will be found to have been waived. 173 Significandy, the waiver extends to other parties, in addition to the party who was
provided the documents, such as other governmental authorities and private civil litigants, and even to other proceedings. 174 This outcome is con170. See, e.g.,Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13560, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that waiver is implied where party asserts
information is privileged, but relevant information is necessary to prove asserting
party's claim); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 472-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that offensive use of attorney's investigative notes of employee interviews waived privilege). For a strict application of this rule, see generally United
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that attempted use of
communications with counsel to show "good faith" effort to comply with law
waived privilege).
171. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292.
172. See, e.g.,
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817-22 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Company has promulgated a carefully worded story in the form of a full disclosure, and
its apparent consent to letting the SEC staff evaluate its disclosure, by examining
the relevant underlying material, has lent credence to its representation of full
candor. Yet at the same time it has withheld crucial documents that reveal a different, highly embarrassing, version of events. If we were to allow corporations to use
the work product privilege to accomplish such a slight-of-hand, it would severely
limit the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure programs."). See generally EPSTEIN,
supra note 23, at 626-27 (collecting cases on "affirmative use" of work product and
resulting waiver). Waiver of work product protection differs in important respects,
however, from waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Most important for purposes
of the points discussed here, waiver of the attorney-client privilege generally is held
to apply to all communications with counsel relating to the same matter, while
work product protection generally is not subject to such a broad "subject matter
waiver" rule. For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine in the corporate context, see supra at Part II.A.3. It therefore is
essential to treat the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine separately when analyzing a waiver or potential waiver.
173. See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 234-36 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding that voluntary disclosure of work product to adversary waives privilege);
see also Cohn supranote 48, at 936 (discussing development of waiver of work product protection due to voluntary disclosure); Goldsmith & King, supra note 48, at
29-30 (categorizing waiver into three types: through disclosure of information to
anyone who lacks common interest; when work product is prepared to further
crime or fraud; and when work product is used to refresh memory of witness
before or during trial).
174. See Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235 ("Once a party allows an adversary to share
the otherwise privileged thought processes of counsel, the need for the privilege
disappears. Courts therefore accept the waiver doctrine as a limitation on workproduct protection. The waiver doctrine provides that voluntary disclosure of
work product to an adversary waives the privilege as to other parties.").
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sistent with the view of most courts that a "selective" disclosure of
privileged documents in one proceeding or as to one governmental
agency waives the privilege for those documents in other proceedings and
17 5
before other agencies.
The law of waiver, both as to the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, therefore protects law enforcement from unfair,176 one-sided assertions of privilege by the subjects of law enforcement
investigations and legal proceedings. This protection, taken together with
the other limitations on the privilege discussed in this Part, is sufficient to
guard against abuses of the privilege and assertions of privilege that do not
further the administration of justice. When law enforcement seeks to go
beyond these protections and override assertions of privilege or force waivers of the privilege in the ways that are the subject of Part III of this Article, the policy objectives that underlie the privilege are frustrated and the
legal system may be adversely affected. Before turning to a discussion of
recent government actions that threaten to undermine the privilege, however, two additional checks on abuse and unwarranted assertion of the
privilege and the work product doctrine should be noted.
3.

The Common Interest Doctrine

Like the crime-fraud exception and the law of waiver, the "common
interest privilege" or 'joint defense privilege"17 7 also provides protections
175. The leading case is Permian Corp. v. United States. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that corporation waived privilege when it voluntarily disclosed
documents to SEC); see also In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that attorney-client privilege was never designed to protect conversations between client and government);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424-26
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that voluntary cooperation with government agency does
not promote intended purpose of attorney-client privilege). But see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (producing privileged
documents in response to Securities and Exchange Commission investigative subpoena did not waive privilege). For a detailed analysis of the "selective waiver"
doctrine, see EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 619-626 (collecting cases); RIcE, supra note
23, § 9:86; Burke, supra note 55, at 34. For a recent decision by an influential court
holding that disclosures to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement do not constitute a waiver, see generally Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
176. Cf 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2327 ("A privileged person would seldom
be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There is always also the objective consideration that when his conduct
touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease
whether he intended that result or not.").
177. Although the terms "common interest privilege" and 'joint defense privilege" sometimes are used interchangeably, their origins differ. The 'Joint defense
privilege" developed in criminal cases in which co-defendants cooperated in
presenting a defense, and later expanded to encompass cooperating parties in civil
litigation. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 23, §§ 4:35-38 (collecting cases). The "common interest privilege" is a broader concept that does not require a pending case
and extends to cover parties with common interests in nonlitigated matters. See
James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Pivilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement:

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRIVIILEGES

against unwarranted assertions of privilege. The common interest doctrine is an exception to the law of waiver in that sharing of privileged information17 8 that otherwise would constitute a waiver does not relinquish the
protections of the privilege, so long as the parties maintain the confidentiality of the shared information. ' 79 The common interest doctrine is applicable in a wide variety of situations, and there is an extensive body of case
law deciding issues relating to the common interest doctrine's
application. 180
Although some prosecutors and government enforcement attorneys
are hostile to 'joint defense agreements" and information sharing pursuant to a common interest doctrine,' 8 ' the extension of the confidentiality
Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REv. LiTic..
631, 640-44 (1997) (arguing that no reason exists to limit comrion interest privilege to litigation matters). The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers adopts the latter, broader definition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING L\W. § 76 cmt. c (2000) (stating that "[e]xchanging communications"
may involve matters other than litigation). This Article will use the term "common
interest doctrine" to encompass both concepts.
178. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 23, § 4:35. The common interest doctrine applies to sharing of both attorney-client privileged information and attorney work
product. See, e.g.,
LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 209
F.R.D. 112, 117 (D. Md. 2002) (citing In re GrandJury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902
F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990)) (noting that "the 'common interest' rule applies not
only to the attorney-client privilege but also to communications protected by the
work product doctrine"); IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust Co. v. Cory & Assocs. Inc.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12440, at *11 (N.D. 11. 1999) (noting that "as with the attorney-client privilege, work product may be created or shared with another party that
has a 'common interest' without a waiver of the protection"); see also Feagan, supra
note 60, at 757-58 ("[T] he [attorney-client] privilege is not waived by disclosure to
a co-party or his attorney if there is an 'agreement' among the parties to pursue a
'common interest.'... [C]ourts have allowed the sharing of work product among
co-parties, who share a 'common interest' without the waiver of the work product

doctrine.").
179. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 211-13 (collecting cases); RICE, supra note
23, §§ 4:35-38 (same).
180. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 196-219 (collecting cases on common interest privilege); RICE, supra note 23, § 4:36 (same).
181. For discussion of two cases in which federal prosecutors aggressively challenged assertions of a common interest doctrine, see the discussion of the Starr
investigation cases involving White House attorneys infra Part III.A.2. The hostility
of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to information sharing among
targets of criminal investigations is evidenced by a statement in the DOJ's formal
policy on "Federal Prosecution of Corporations." Part VI of that policy states that
one factor a prosecutor should use in "weighing the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation" in a criminal investigation is whether the corporation has provided "support to culpable employees and agents . . . through providing
information to the employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a
joint defense agreement." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General,
United States Department ofJustice, Policy Statement on FederalProsecutionof Corporations, Part VI.B, at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html
(June 16, 1999). This statement suggests a profound hostility to joint defense
agreements, and is consistent with the views of many prosecutors, who appear to
regard joint defense agreements among subjects and targets of criminal investiga-
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protection to such information sharing is "consistent with the modern rationale for the attorney-client privilege." 18 2 Moreover, and most relevant
to this Article, the courts have carefully limited expansion of the common
interest doctrine beyond the limits of the modern rationale for the attorney-client privilege. The limits that have been imposed by the courts ensure that the common interest doctrine will not be abused or asserted in a
manner that is inconsistent with the administration ofjustice. A few examples involving criminal prosecutions or investigations and civil governmental enforcement proceedings illustrate this point.
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of a court's willingness
to reject a claim of the common interest doctrine is the decision of the
Eighth Circuit refusing to apply the privilege to meetings among then-First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, her private attorneys and attorneys in the
White House Counsel's Office who were government employees. 183 A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit, over a strong dissent, concluded that
the requisite "common interest" was lacking between Mrs. Clinton and her
private lawyers, who were primarily concerned with her exposure to criminal prosecution, and the lawyers representing the Office of the President,
tions as a barely legal form of obstruction ofjustice. TheJustice Department Memorandum is discussed in more detail infra Part III.C.2.
182. Patricia Welles, Comment, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321, 325 (1981) ("If the privilege exists to promote full
disclosure of the truth between a client and his attorney, the purpose is not impaired by merely multiplying the number of truth-tellers and confidence-receivers
(the result of an extension of the privilege to joint defense). Full disclosure of the
truth between client and attorney was said to increase the effectiveness of the administration of justice. This part of the rationale provides compelling reason to

extend the attorney-client privilege to joint defense."); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), cited in
Welles, supra, at 325 ("The privilege is, after all, born of the law's own complexity.
The layman's course through litigation must at least be evened by the assurance
that he may, without penalty, invest his confidence and confidences in a professional counselor. That assurance is no less important or appropriate where a cooperative program of joint defense is helpful or, a fortiori, necessary to form and
inform the representation of clients whose attorneys are each separately retained.") (citations omitted); Michael W. Tankersley, Note, The CorporateAttorneyClient Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58
TEX. L. REv. 809, 838-43 (1980) (analyzingjustification for joint defense privilege);
cf Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separatingthe Joint-DefenseDoctrinefrom the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1280 (1990) ("The policy underlying the joint-defense privilege, then, is to promote the general efficiency of legal representation
by giving parties the tactical advantage of access to information in the possession of
others.").
183. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922-23 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that common interest doctrine did not apply because there
existed no common interest between First Lady in her personal capacity and White
House as institution). The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari in Office
of the President v. Office ofIndep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). The ruling allowed
the decision of a divided Eighth Circuit panel to stand. See generally RicE, supra
note 23, §§ 3:13, 4:35 (analyzing Supoena Duces Tecum).
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which in the court's view could not legitimately share that concern. 184 In
a subsequent case the D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion with respect to President Clinton's communications with Deputy White House
Counsel Bruce Lindsey.18 5 Although commentators have criticized both
the Eighth Circuit and D.C. Circuit opinions,' 8 6 they provide striking examples-in high-profile cases-of the willingness of courts to reject assertions of the common interest doctrine.
They also demonstrate the point that judicial relief is available to law
enforcement officials when the subjects of government enforcement proceedings attempt to stretch the protections of the common interest doctrine too far.1 87 This provides an important check on unwarranted
assertions of privilege and is adequate to protect the legitimate interests of
law enforcement officials who oppose such assertions of privilege.
4.

Limits on Work Product Protection

A final safeguard under existing law should be noted briefly. It is well
settled that under Hickman and its progeny, as well as both Rule 26(b) (3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, work product protection is not absolute. 188 In both
civil and criminal proceedings, a party, including the government in a
criminal prosecution or civil enforcement proceeding, can obtain otherwise protected work product by showing "substantial need" and that the
information is not otherwise available without "undue hardship." 189 If the
184. See Supoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 924 (noting separablilty of interests
of First Lady and White House). The Eighth Circuit opinion and the issues
presented by the Independent Counsel's position in that litigation are discussed in
greater detail infra Part III.A.2.
185. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(holding that common interest doctrine did not protect information known to
President's official attorney simply because that attorney acted as intermediary between President and his personal attorney). As was the case with the Eighth Circuit case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. For a further discussion of the
D.C. Circuit's opinion and the issues presented by the Independent Counsel's position in that litigation, see infra Part III.A.2.
186. See infra note 215 (referencing scholarly criticism of Subponea Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1998) and Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
187. For further discussion of the use of existing legal doctrines to challenge
unwarranted assertions of privilege, see infra Part IV.B.1.
188. See Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective Prosecution: United
States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996), 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 94950 (1997) (stating that defendant may circumvent FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 by meeting
"significant barrier" created to eliminate unsubstantial claims); Max D. Stern &
David Hoffman, Legitimate Means or "Chilling Wedges?" Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1783, 1796-1804
(1988) (recognizing gaps in attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine).
189. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 982-83 (3d Cir.
1998) (discussing government overcoming work product protection by obtaining
file of adversary and refusing to return it); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussing government need to obtain private counsel's memorandum of interview with deceased employee). See generally Feagan,
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government can make this showing to the satisfaction of a reviewing court,
work product protection can be overcome. I 1 Although this exception to
work product protection applies only to factual information and not to
"opinion work product,"' '9 it nonetheless provides another important
"safety valve" limiting confidentiality protections for information that in
the interests of efficient administration of justice should not be protected
from disclosure. If law enforcement officials have a substantial need for
factual information and cannot obtain that information from other
sources without undue hardship, the present system allows them to obtain
such information from opposing counsel after making that showing to a
court.
This exception to the work product doctrine is particularly important
for purposes of this Article because a number of the recent governmental
efforts to overturn or force waivers of the privilege that are described below would be more appropriately pursued through this avenue. For example, requiring a wholesale waiver of all attorney-client privilege and work
product protection as a condition of leniency in corporate prosecutions by
the Department of Justice'19 2 or in civil enforcement actions by a government regulatory agency 9 3 is contrary to the policy interests that underlie
94
those legal doctrines. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Upjohn,'
where witnesses are available to the government, it is not necessary to override work product protection and allow the government to obtain from
opposing counsel information it could obtain directly. As discussed in
Parts III and IV below, a policy that promotes such a result is misguided.

supra note 60, at 758 ("[W]ork product can be discovered by the opposing party
upon a showing of 'substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent' of the document."); Soumilas, supranote 49, at 241 ("Drafts of legal
memoranda, summaries of conferences, and settlement proposals plainly represent opinion work product.") (citations omitted).
190. This point is important. As is the case with the crime-fraud exception,
discussed supra Part II.C.1, the fact that judicial intervention is necessary protects
against overreaching by the government and ensures that, in most cases, the exception will be properly applied. It seems likely that the recent governmental attacks
on the privilege that are the subject of this Article are inspired, at least in part, by a
desire to circumvent the judicial review requirement and overcome the privilege
without seeking judicial intervention. For a further discussion of this point, see
infra Part IV.B.2.
191. For a further discussion of the distinction between factual information
contained in an attorney's work product and opinion work product that reflects an
attorney's legal analysis or litigation strategy, see supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
192. For a further discussion of the Department ofJustice Policy on prosecuting corporations, see infra Part III.C.2.
193. For a further discussion of civil enforcement actions by a government
regulatory agency, see infra Part III.F.
194. For a further discussion of Upjohn, see supra Part II.B.l.a.
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Conclusion

As the four examples of limitations on privilege discussed above suggest, the government has adequate means at its disposal under existing law
to guard against unwarranted assertions of privilege and to overcome its
protections in appropriate cases. Further weakening of the privilege is unnecessary and will undermine core values in our legal system. Part III of
this Article examines recent governmental attacks on the privilege and argues that in many of these instances the privilege has been unnecessarily
weakened by misguided efforts to overcome its confidentiality protections.
These attacks often occur to achieve prosecutorial objectives in a particular case and without adequate consideration of the cumulative effect of
such actions on our justice system.
III.

RECENT ATTACKS ON THE PRIVILEGE BY FEDERAL

LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

A.

The StarrInvestigations

Perhaps the most widely publicized governmental attacks on the privilege in recent years have been the actions of the Office of Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. Starr's office fought vigorously to overcome
assertions of attorney-client privilege and work product protection on a
number of occasions during the long course of its several investigations of
President Clinton. 195 The actions of Starr's office are instructive in that
they encompass the entire range of governmental attacks on the privilege:
from conventional to questionable to excessive. Three examples serve to
illustrate each of these points on the continuum of privilege challenges
and are useful for purposes of analyzing law enforcement authorities'
more recent actions that are the principal focus of this Article. These
three examples all involve legal doctrines discussed above, so they can be
treated briefly here.

195. For a summary of the various efforts of Starr's office to overcome assertions of privilege by the Clinton White House in the Monica Lewinsky investigation, see Robert W. Ray, FinalReport of the Independent Counselfor In Re: Madison
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Regarding Monica Lewinsky and Others, App.
C, at 113-18 ("The Courts Ruled in Every Case that the Independent Counsel and
the Grand Jury Were Entitled to Evidence from White House Employees.") (Filed
May 18, 2001; Modified Sept. 20, 2001; Released Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Ray
Report App. C]. This report describes only privilege disputes pertaining to the
Monica Lewinsky investigation. It does not, however, describe efforts by Starr's
office to overcome the privilege in its other investigations, such as the successful
efforts to overcome privilege assertions by attorneys in the White House Counsel's
Office, discussed infra Part III.A.2, and the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the
notes taken by Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster's attorney, discussed
supra Part II.B.L.d and examined further infra Part III.A.3.
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Starr's Conventional Attack on the Privilege:Monica Lewinsky and the
Crime-FraudException

Oddly enough, Starr's most conventional and least objectionable-by
current standards of prosecutorial behavior-efforts to overcome the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine occurred in the context of what probably was the most widely criticized of the several separate
and discrete investigations conducted by Starr's office during the course of
its more than seven-year life: the Monica Lewinsky investigation.' 9 6 The

major events leading up to that investigation are well-known, so it is unnecessary to review them here.
For purposes of this discussion, the key event in the Monica Lewinsky
saga is her retention of Washington, D.C. attorney Francis D. Carter to
represent her in connection with the Paula Jones lawsuit and to prepare
an affidavit stating that she did not engage in a sexual relationship with
196. This Article does not take on the Herculean task of assessing the wisdom
and propriety of all of Starr's actions as Independent Counsel. A great deal has
been written on that subject, and much more will be written before history makes a
final judgment. For a recent and comprehensive examination of Starr's work as
Independent Counsel, see BENJAMIN WITTES, STARR: A REASSESSMENT (2002). For
purposes of this Article's focus on the propriety of the attacks on the privilege by
Starr's office, it is sufficient to note that the actions of Starr's office have been
criticized and questions have been raised concerning his conduct as Independent
Counsel. For example, one commentator has argued that Starr's conduct in acting
as Independent Counsel while continuing to represent private clients with interests adverse to the Clinton administration breached legal ethics rules and even if it
did not, "it was so obviously inappropriate, under any reasonable understanding of
the roles of lawyers and government officials, and particularly of independent
counsels, that it was irresponsible for Starr to engage in it." David Halperin, Ethics
Breakthrough or Ethics Breakdown ? Kenneth Starr'sDual Roles as PrivatePractitionerand
Public Prosecutor,15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 231, 234 (2002). Of the many criticisms
leveled at Starr, some of the most vehement have been based on the conduct of his
office in the Monica Lewinsky investigation. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Structuring
Intimacy: Some Reflections on the Fact that the Law Generally Does Not Protect Us Against
Unwanted Gazes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2074 (2001) (criticizing Starr's decision to compel Lewinsky's mother to testify before grand jury); Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of
Commitment: Legal Ethics in the Impeachment Context, 52 STAN. L. REv. 269, 279-80
(2000) (criticizing Starr for not adequately supervising his office's contacts with
Linda Tripp). Even the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia expressed "concern that the Office of Independent Counsel
may have acted improperly in conducting immunity negotiations with Ms. Lewinsky without the presence of her counsel .... " See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Francis D. Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *28 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998)
(unpublished opinion), affd in part and revd in part sub nom., In re Sealed Case, 162
F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Rhode, supra at 335-36 (criticizing Starr's office
for disrupting Lewinsky's attorney-client relationship with Carter). But see Ray Report App. C, supra note 195, at 113-18 (defending actions of Starr's office and
rejecting findings of Department ofJustice Special Counsel, Jo Ann Harris, finding
that poor professional judgment was exercised in planning and executing office's
initial contact with Lewinsky). For a thoughtful and comprehensive criticism of
Starr's conduct and professional judgment in connection with the Lewinsky investigation, see generally Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship:Starr's OIC
and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDIAM L. REV. 639 (1999).

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRIVILEGES

President Clinton. 197 In early 1998, shortly after Starr's office began investigating the Lewinsky matter, grand jury subpoenas were issued to Carter
calling for him to provide testimony and produce documents relating to
his representation of Lewinsky. 198 Carter moved to quash the subpoenas,
arguing, among other things, that the subpoenas improperly sought to
pierce Lewinsky's attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection. 19 9 Starr's office countered with the argument that the crimefraud exception applied and therefore Carter should be compelled to pro20 0
duce the subpoenaed documents and testify before the grand jury.
ChiefJudge Norma HollowayJohnson analyzed the application of the
crime-fraud exception to Lewinsky's engagement of Carter to prepare the
affidavit. 20 1 Based upon an in camera submission of evidence by Starr's
office, 2 2 JudgeJohnson concluded that the crime-fraud exception was applicable and overruled the assertions of attorney-client privilege. 20 3 The
evidence contained in the in camera submission was sufficient to convince
the court that "Lewinsky committed perjury when she signed her affidavit,
procured as a result of Mr. Carter's legal advice, and used her false affidavit as part of a broader scheme to obstruct justice. ' 20 4 Judge Johnson also
concluded that the crime-fraud exception should overcome the assertion
of work product doctrine protection because Lewinsky consulted Carter
for the purpose of committing perjury and obstruction ofjustice, and used
his work product for that purpose. 20 5 Based upon those conclusions, the
court ordered Carter to testify and to produce the subpoenaed
20 6
documents.
197. See Sealed Case, 162 F.3d at 672 (describing Lewinsky's retention of Carter
and quoting affidavit that Carter prepared for Lewinsky); see also Ray Report App.
C, supra note 195, at 117-18 (summarizing litigation arising out of Carter
subpoenas).
198. See Sealed Case, 162 F.3d at 672 (discussing issuance of grand jury
subpoenas).
199. See Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *1-2 (listing Carter's arguments to quash subpoenas).
200. See id. at *4 (noting response of OIC).
201. See id. at *3-18 (discussing application of crime-fraud exception).
202. For a discussion of the use of in camera submissions in crime-fraud exception cases, see supra Part II.C.1.
203. See Carter,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *5-6 (concluding crime-fraud
applied).
204. Id. at *6-7. In a footnote to the quoted statement, Judge Johnson explained that she was not concluding that Lewinsky necessarily had committed
those crimes: "The Court finds here that the OIC has met its burden under the
crime-fraud exception. It expressly does not find, however, that Ms. Lewinsky in
fact committed these crimes." Id. at *7 n.2. In another portion of the opinion
Judge Johnson made clear that "there is no suggestion that Mr. Carter knew about
any alleged wrongdoing." Id. at *5.
205. See id. at *7-8 (discussing crime-fraud exception).
206. The court did accept Carter's arguments that forcing him to produce
certain items that Lewinsky had given to him would violate Lewinsky's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. See id. at *18-20 (analyzing Carter's
Fifth Amendment argument). That portion of Judge Johnson's opinion was re-
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The crime-fraud exception ruling, and the success of Starr's office in
overcoming the privilege, requiring Carter to testify and produce documents relating to his representation of Lewinsky did not generate significant attention or controversy. 20 7 As discussed in Part II.C.1 above, the
crime-fraud exception is a well-established doctrine, and Starr's use of it in
this instance was not inconsistent with existing case law under the doctrine. 20 8 Although commentators have raised a number of serious con20 9
cerns about excessive use of attorney subpoenas by federal prosecutors,
Starr's attack on the privilege in this particular instance is not subject to
other criticisms that are a primary focus of this Article. In relying upon
the crime-fraud exception to compel Carter to testify and produce documents, Starr's office did not seek to overcome existing privilege law or
extend recognized exceptions to the privilege beyond their prior applications.2 1° The approach that Starr's office employed by invoking the
versed by the D.C. Circuit. See In re. Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)) (concluding that, because no attorney-client privilege existed, there would be no compulsion in violation of Lewinsky's Fifth Amendment privilege in forcing Carter to produce
subpoenaed items). The D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Johnson's ruling that the
crime-fraud exception applied, rejecting Lewinsky's materiality and intent arguments. See id. at 673-74 (finding that Lewinsky's statements contained in her affidavit were material and thus "predictably capable of affecting" lower court's
holding).
207. Cf Attorney-Client Privilege at Stake in Lewinsky GrandJury Inquiry, 22 CHAMPION 7, 7 (1998) (noting that matter had "received only cursory notice by the
media").
208. See Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *8-9 (noting that "case law on
the crime-fraud exception nowhere indicates that there must be a particular quantity of crime committed for the exception to apply"). Judge Johnson rejected as
"merely alarmist" the amicus brief arguments of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the District of Columbia Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers that application of the "exception under these circumstances would eviscerate the privilege in garden-variety civil and criminal proceedings." Id. at *10.
She noted that the message of her decision was simply "that clients may not use
their attorneys for the express purpose of committing a crime or fraud and expect
their communications with the attorney to remain privileged." Id. at *11. Of
course, one can agree with Judge Johnson's crime-fraud exception analysis and
ruling in favor of Starr's office on that issue without necessarily agreeing that
Starr's office acted properly in obtaining and using the Linda Tripp tapes, which
were part of the in camera presentation. See Sealed Case, 162 F.3d at 674 (analyzing
crime-fraud exception); see also Gordon, supra note 196, at 646 (claiming that
Starr's OIC performed "very badly" with regard to ethical standards in investigating
Lewinsky matter).
209. For a discussion of the "attorney subpoena problem" and what many
commentators believe is a trend toward excessive use of attorney subpoenas, coupled with crime-fraud exception arguments to overcome assertions of privilege, as
an investigative tool by federal prosecutors, see infra Part III.D.2. It likely is because this trend has made attorney subpoenas appear more commonplace that
Starr's office's subpoena of Carter did not generate more controversy or criticism
by practitioners and commentators.
210. For an example of an attack on the privilege that fails to meet this test,
see infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Foster notes case) and infra Part III.B (discussing
Marc Rich pardon case).
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crime-fraud exception also provided for an adversary process and prior
judicial determination of whether the privilege should be overcome. 2 11 In
light of these considerations, it seems appropriate to place the actions of
Starr's office in this case at the "conventional" end of the spectrum of
governmental efforts to overcome the privilege. Unfortunately, however,
in other efforts to overcome assertions of privilege Starr's office would
seem to have moved well toward the opposite end of that spectrum. Those
actions are discussed below.
2.

Starr's Questionable Attacks on the Privilege: White House Attorneys and the
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege

In two cases, Starr's office convinced federal appeals courts to reject
assertions of attorney-client privilege by government attorneys. 2 12 These
cases involved assertions of privilege by White House attorneys regarding
communications with President Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton. In simplest terms, Starr's office convinced the courts in both
cases that federal government attorneys should not be permitted to assert
a governmental attorney-client privilege as a basis for withholding infor21 3
mation from a federal grand jury conducting a criminal investigation.
The legal issues involved in the cases are complex, however, and the reviewing courts were deeply divided as to the appropriate resolution of
those issues. 2 14 This Article does not undertake an in-depth analysis of
211. For examples of Department of Justice policies that seek to avoid these
safeguards against unwarranted invasion of the privilege, see infra Part II.D.1 (discussing prison inmate attorney-client monitoring policy) and infra Part III.D.3 (discussing "Thornburgh Memorandum" policy on contacts with unrepresented
persons and its successors).
212. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that while "an attorney-client privilege may not be asserted by Lindsey to avoid
responding to the grand jury if he possesses information relating to possible criminal violations, he continues to be covered by the executive privilege to the same
extent as the President's other advisers"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997) (arguing that government attorneys remain
free to discuss "anything with a government official-except for potential criminal
wrongdoing . . .").
213. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278 ("In sum, it would be contrary to tradition,
common understanding, and our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.");
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 925-26 ("To sum up, we hold that neither the
attorney-client privilege nor the attorney work product doctrine is available to the
White House in the circumstances of this case.").
214. Although Starr's office prevailed in both cases at the court of appeals
level and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases, leaving the court of
appeals opinions as the final authorities, the reviewing courts were more deeply
divided than this outcome might suggest at first glance. In both cases the federal
district judge that initially heard the case concluded that a governmental attorneyclient privilege could be asserted by the White House. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the lower court in the Lindsey case ruled that Starr's office had made a
sufficient showing of need and unavailability to overcome the privilege. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1267 (discussing applicability of attorney-client privilege). Additionally, in both cases, the appellate panels that ruled in favor of Starr's office did
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those issues; other commentators have already done so, 2 1 5 and it is unnecso by 2-1 votes over vigorous dissents. By simply doing the math, one is left with
the result that the eight federal judges at the district court and appeals court levels
who reviewed the cases were evenly divided four-to-four on the key question of
whether White House attorneys could assert a governmental attorney-client privilege in response to a grand jury subpoena. That fact alone demonstrates that the
cases involved an extremely difficult legal judgment on the core privilege issue.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari is not inconsistent with this conclusion,
as two Justices objected strongly to the denial of certiorari in the Lindsey case. See
Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 525 U.S. 996, 997 (1998) (Breyer,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for granting of certiorari in Lindsey
case). As Justice Breyer aptly observed: "The divided decision of the Court of Appeals makes clear that the legal question presented by this petition has no clear
legal answer and is open to serious legal debate." Id. For purposes of this Article,
however, the importance of noting the deep division of the courts is not merely
"scorekeeping," but rather that Starr's office did more in these two cases than simply request the courts to apply well-settled privilege law. But see Ray Report App.
C., supra note 195, at 113 ("The Independent Counsel repeatedly faced invalid
assertions of legal privileges that were either well recognized but unavailable under
the circumstances or previously unrecognized."). Reasonable minds certainly can
differ as to whether the Breyer version or the Ray version is the better characterization of the privilege disputes in these cases, but that potential for disagreement
alone distinguishes the action Starr's office took in these cases from the more conventional application of the crime-fraud exception in the Carter case, discussed
supra Part III.A.1.
215. See generally Todd A. Ellinwood, "In the Light of Reason and Experience": The
Casefor a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1291 (proposing that governmental attorney-client privilege be identical to private attorney-client privilege regardless of nature of proceedings); Michael K. Forde, The White
House Counsel and Whitewater: Government Lawyers and the Scope of Privileged Communications, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 109 (1997) (examining governmental attorneyclient privilege); Katherine L. Kendall, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum:
Destruction of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Government Realm?, 1998 UTAH L. REv.
421 (criticizing majority's holding in Supoena Duces Tecum); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473
(1998) (arguing that government has "same attorney-client privilege that exists for
a corporation or other organizational entity"); Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The Uncertain State of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2D
269 (2001) (analyzing apparent "legal no-man's land" created by Eighth and D.C.
Circuits and fostered by Supreme Court's denial of certiori in Lindsey case); Adam
M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1682 (1999) (arguing against "blanket prohibition on the application of the
attorney-client privilege to a government attorney representing a government client. . ."); AmandaJ. Dickmann, Note, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REV. 291 (1999) (explaining how Lindsey altered
status of governmental attorney-client privilege by restricting its application for use
in criminal investigations); Sara A. Rana, Note, Restricting the Attorney-Client Privilege:
Necessary Limitations or Distortingthe Privilege?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 687 (1999)
(examining inherent problems of applying attorney-client privilege to government
entities and resulting policy implications, and questioning "the limitations recently
imposed on the privilege, and whether these restrictions undermine the policy on
which the privilege is founded"); Lisa E. Toporek, Comment, "Bad Politics Makes
Bad Law": A Comment on the Eighth Circuit's Approach to the Governmental AttorneyClient Privilege, 86 GEO. L.J. 2421 (1998) (examining Supoena Duces Tecum); see also
Lance Cole, The Government-Client PrivilegeAfter Office of the President v. Office of
the Independent Counsel, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 15 (1997-98) (analyzing impact of
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essary to do so here. For purposes of this Article, the important aspect of
these two cases is that Starr's office took an aggressive position in opposition to the privilege and succeeded both in overcoming assertions of privilege in a particular context and, most important, creating new uncertainty
about the availability of the privilege in future cases. 216 The following discussion of the two cases focuses on those points, not on the factual details
or the merits of the legal disputes in the cases.
Starr's office's first attack on the governmental attorney-client privilege arose out of a Whitewater investigation grand jury subpoena for handwritten notes taken by attorneys in the White House Counsel's office at
two meetings with Hillary Clinton. 2 17 Starr's office took the position that
applying the attorney-client privilege to those meetings "would be tantamount to establishing a new privilege," while the White House took the
position that under established privilege law the communications that
took place at the meetings should be protected. 218 The federal district
court concluded that both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine applied to the notes, and Starr's office appealed to the Eighth
2 19
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Finding little case law on point, the appeals court relied on "general
principles," to analyze the privilege issue, 220 and concluded that the governmental attorney-client privilege should not be available to thwart a federal grand jury subpoena because of the "important differences between
Supoena Duces Tecum holding on attorneys working in state or local government
departments).
216. For a further discussion of the deep division of the courts on difficult
legal issues presented by Starr's office's challenges to privilege in these two cases,
see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. See Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 913-14 (discussing Starr's office's
request for grandjury subpoenas for certain documents). The court described the
attorney notes at issue as follows:
The first set of documents comprises notes taken by Associate Counsel to
the President Miriam Nemetz on July 11, 1995, at a meeting attended by
Mrs. Clinton, Special Counsel to the PresidentJane Sherburne, and Mrs.
Clinton's personal attorney, David Kendall. The subject of this meeting
was Mrs. Clinton's activities following the death of Deputy Counsel to the
President Vincent W. Foster, Jr. The documents in the second collection
are notes taken by Mrs. Sherburne on January 26, 1996, during meetings
attended by Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Kendall, Nicole Seligman (a partner of Mr.
Kendall's), and, at times, John Quinn, Counsel to the President. These
meetings, which took place during breaks in and immediately after Mrs.
Clinton's testimony before a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., concerned primarily the discovery of certain billing records from the Rose
Law Firm in the residence area of the White House.
Id. at 914.
218. Id. at 915.
219. See id. at 914 (arguing that attorney-client privilege applied because
White House and First Lady possessed "'a genuine and reasonable...' belief" that
relevant communications were privileged).
220. See id. at 918 (noting that all privileges are exceptions to general rule of
disclosure).
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the government and non-governmental organizations such as business corporations."2 2 1 The key differences identified by the court were that a business corporation may be subjected to criminal liability based upon the
actions of its agents, while a governmental agency like the Office of the
President cannot, 222 and that a "general duty of public service" requires
government employees, including White House attorneys, "to favor disclosure over concealment." 223 These considerations were sufficient to cause
the court to agree with Starr's office that the White House should not be
able to rely upon the attorney-client privilege to withhold the notes from a
2 24
grand jury conducting a criminal investigation.
Employing essentially the same reasoning, the court also concluded
that the attorney work product doctrine did not apply to the attorneys'
notes. Because the White House attorneys were not working in anticipation of litigation involving the White House, and because the White House
as a governmental entity was not the subject or target of the grand jury
investigation, the court concluded that the work product doctrine was inapplicable.2 25 In the court's view, the "essential element" necessary for
attorney work product protection, preparation for an adversarial proceeding involving one's client, was not present because the White House lawyers did not represent Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity; and, it was in
2 26
that capacity that she was being investigated by Starr's office.
Finally, the court rejected applying the common interest doctrine
based upon the presence of Mrs. Clinton's private counsel at the meetings
at which the notes were taken. In what was perhaps the most remarkable
assertion in the entire opinion, the court categorically declared: "The
OIC's investigation can have no legal, factual, or even strategic effect on
the White House as an institution.122 7 The court went on to reject de221. Id. at 920 (distinguishing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981)). For additional discussion of the court's privilege analysis, see Cole, supra
note 215, at 19-21.
222. See Subpoena Duces Tec-um, 112 F.3d at 920 (finding that significant differences exist between governmental and nongovernmental organizations that exclude or severely limit application of legal principles of Upjohn to government
entities).
223. See id. (noting that this distinction alone may be substantial enough to
find Upjohn unpersuasive).
224. See id. at 921 ("An official who fears he or she may have violated the
criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney in confidence should speak with
a private attorney, not a government attorney.").

225. See id. at 924 (holding that work product doctrine did not apply because
White House attorneys were not preparing for trial, nor could they have because
OIC could not investigate White House).
226. See id. at 924-25 (finding that White House bore burden of adequately
demonstrating that work product immunity is applicable and that this burden was
not met).
227. Id. at 923. The OIC's subsequent criminal referral to the House of Representatives in the Lewinsky matter, and the resulting impeachment trial of President Clinton by the Senate, certainly seem to call into question the validity of the
court's categorical statement, but presumably the court's response would be that

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRIVILEGES

mands upon the time of White House staff, vacancies in positions if staff
members were indicted, and other "political concerns" as legitimate "common interests" between the White House and Mrs. Clinton in her personal

capacity. 228 Accordingly, the court rejected the application of the common interest doctrine to the White House attorneys' notes.

The Eighth Circuit's rejection of any governmental attorney-client
privilege, work product doctrine or common interest doctrine protection
for the White House attorneys' notes has been widely criticized by commentators. 229 It also was the subject of a strongly worded dissenting opinion by one of the three judges on the appellate panel that heard the
case. 23° Whether or not one agrees with the court's decision, however, it
those events affected only President Clinton personally and not "the White House
as an institution." Id. That response seems dubious at best, however. Cf In re
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("Impeachment
may remove the person, but no one could reasonably controvert that it affects the
Office of the President as well. Even if there will always be a President and an
Office of the President, it is unrealistic to posit that the Presidency will not be
diminished by an impeachment ....

The possibility of impeachment implicates

institutional concerns of the White House, and White House Counsel, representing the Office of the President, would presumably play an important role in defending the institution of the Presidency."). As with so many other aspects of the
Clinton presidency and the Starr investigation, history will be the final judge of
whether the OIC's actions had any effect on the White House as an institution. Cf
BOB

WOODWARD, SHADow FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE

(1999)

(outlining effect of Watergate scandal on five successors to Nixon presidency).
228. See Subpoena Duces Tecurn, 112 F.3d at 923 ("But even if we assume that it
is proper for the White House to press political concerns upon us, we do not believe that any of these incidental effects on the White House are sufficient to place
that governmental institution in the same canoe as Mrs. Clinton, whose personal
liberty is potentially at stake.").
229. See generally Ellinwood, supra note 215 (criticizing "weak" governmental
attorney-client privilege resulting from decision and arguing for stronger privilege
protection); Forde, supra note 215 (arguing that attorney-client privilege, work
product doctrine and common interest privilege should apply); Paulsen, supra
note 215 (arguing that United States government possesses same attorney-client

privilege as corporation or other organization and proposing new approach for
determining when that privilege should be overcome); Pincus, supra note 215 (asserting that "government attorneys are in a legal no-man's land" with respect to
privilege rules); Toporek, supra note 215 (criticizing "chilling effect of the decision" and advocating requirement for showing need and relevance, with in camera
judicial inspection of subpoenaed material, before overcoming privilege).
230. In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Kopf argued that "[t]he White
House, no less than state government or a corporation, is entitled to the privilege
in all types of cases, including criminal cases, so that the White House can comply
with the law." Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Judge
Kopf agreed that the privilege might be overcome by a grand jury subpoena, but
only if the prosecutor could show that the subpoena information was specifically
needed, relevant and admissible, as the Supreme Court had required to overcome
executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See Supoena Duces

Tecum, 112 F.3d at 927, 935-38 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Judge Kopf also would have
applied the common interest doctrine as "a complete defense to the grand jury
subpoena." Id. at 927. Despite these differences between Judge Kopf and the two

judges in the majority, and despite the importance of the issues involved, the Su-
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is indisputable that the case introduced new uncertainty into the application of the attorney-client privilege to a huge category of attorney-client
communications-those that involve government lawyers. That uncertainty was compounded by a subsequent case in which Starr's office sought
to overcome the assertions of a governmental attorney-client privilege.
Starr's office's second attempt to overcome assertions of governmental attorney-client privilege involved another White House attorney, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and a different investigation, the
Monica Lewinsky investigation. 23 1 In seeking to compel Lindsey's testimony about discussions with President Clinton concerning Lewinsky,
Starr's office took the position that permitting Lindsey to assert a governmental attorney-client privilege before the grand jury "would be inconsistent with the proper role of a government lawyer," and that President
Clinton should be required to rely only upon "his private [attorneys] for
fully confidential counsel." u:3 2 The district court concluded that the President does possess a governmental attorney-client privilege for official consultations with White House attorneys, but ruled that the privilege was
qualified in the grand jury subpoena context and could be overcome by a
showing of sufficient need and unavailability of the subpoenaed information from other sources. 233 The district court concluded that Starr's office
had made a sufficient showing to overcome the qualified governmental
attorney-client privilege, and the parties appealed to the D.C. Circuit
234
Court of Appeals.
The D.C. Circuit undertook its own analysis of the governmental attorney-client privilege issue, and did not base its conclusions on the Eighth
Circuit's prior opinion on that issue. 2 35 After a detailed review of the relevant authorities, the D.C. Circuit concluded that a federal government attorney should not be permitted to assert the governmental attorney-client
privilege in response to a federal grand jury subpoena:
preme Court denied certiorari in the case. See Office of the President v. Office of
Indep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).

231. See generally Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1263 (holding that no absolute attorneyclient privilege exists between President and Deputy White House Counsel in face
of grand jUry subpoena).
232. See id. at 1268 (discussing position of Independent Counsel).
233. See id. at 1267 (describing district court decision).
234. See id. (ruling "President's personal attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity inapplicable to Lindsey's testimony".). The parties on appeal
were the Office of Independent Counsel, the Office of the President and President
Clinton in his personal capacity.
235. See id. at 1267-78 (noting that question of whether government attorneyclient privilege is applicable in context of federal grand jury investigation was issue
of "first impression" in D.C. Circuit). The D.C. Circuit did cite the Eighth Circuit
opinion on the governmental attorney-client privilege issue, albeit well into the
D.C. Circuit's independent analysis of the issue. See id. at 1274 (citing Eight Circuit
opinion's conclusion that "to allow any part of the federal government to use its inhouse attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a
federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public assets").
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In sum, it would be contrary to tradition, common understanding, and our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as
private counsel. When government attorneys learn, through
communications with their clients, of information related to
criminal misconduct, they may not rely on the government attorney-client privilege to shield such information from disclosure to
2 36
a grand jury.
President Clinton also argued that Lindsey's interactions with the
President's private counsel should be protected by the common interest
doctrine. 23 7 In analyzing the common interest doctrine issue, the D.C.
2 38
Circuit, unlike the Eighth Circuit in the case involving Mrs. Clinton,
seemed to accept the proposition that "the President in his private persona" may share some common interests with the Office of the President
as an institution, such as concerns relating to impeachment.2 39 In the
court's view, however, "the overarching duties of Lindsey in his role as a
government attorney prevent him from withholding information about
240
possible criminal misconduct from the grand jury." 1 As a result, the
D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, refused to permit use of the common
interest doctrine by government attorneys to frustrate a grand jury sub24 1
poena in a criminal investigation.
Also like the Eighth Circuit's government attorney-client privilege de2 43
and has
cision, 24 2 the D.C. Circuit opinion provoked a vigorous dissent
236. Id. at 1278.
237. See id. at 1282 (describing President's arguments).
238. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922-23 (8th
Cir. 1997) (asserting that Independent Counsel investigation "can have no legal,
factual, or even strategic effect on the White House as an institution"). For a further discussion of the Eighth Circuit's view of the Independent Counsel investigation's scope, see supra note 227 and accompanying text.
239. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1282 & n.16 (recognizing common interests of
President's private life and Office of President, particularly with respect to
impeachment).
240. Id. at 1283.
241. An interesting aspect of the D.C. Circuit's analysis, although not significant to this Article, is the court's application of the "intermediary doctrine" to the
Lindsey case. The court stated that "in light of the President's undisputed right to
have an effective relationship with personal counsel, consonant with carrying out
his official duties, we hold that the intermediary doctrine can still protect a government official when that official acts as a mere intermediary." Id. at 1282. To this
limited extent, therefore, the D.C. Circuit was willing to grant some confidentiality
protections to communications between the President and a government attorney
working in the White House, even in response to a grand jury subpoena.
242. For a further discussion of commentators' criticism of the Eighth Circuit
case, see supra note 229 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
dissent in the Eighth Circuit case, see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
243. Judge Tatel dissented from the portions of the majority opinion that
concluded the governmental attorney-client privilege did not apply to President
Clinton's communications with Lindsey and that denied those communications
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been widely criticized by commentators.2 44 The extent of the disagreement over these cases would seem to be sufficient to justify categorizing
them as "questionable" efforts on the part of Starr's office to overcome
assertions of privilege. As noted above, however, the purpose of this Article is not to weigh in on the dispute over whether the governmental privilege cases were correctly decided in favor of Starr's office. Instead, this
Article seeks to highlight what is not disputed about the cases-that their
outcome has diminished the confidentiality protections that are provided
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, at least for
communications with government lawyers. 2 45 In some class of caseslarge or small, depending on how broadly these two cases are interpreted
and applied-those protections are no longer available. Thus they serve
as examples of the trend that is the focus of this Article-actions by federal law enforcement officials that have eroded the extent of the protections provided by the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine.
3.

Starr's Excessive Attack on the Privilege: The Foster Notes and Deceased
Clients

Starr's office's most aggressive effort to override the privilege was in
the Foster notes case,2 4 " described in Part II.B.L.d above. Unlike the
protection under the common interest doctrine. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283
(Tatel, J., dissenting). Most important for purposes of this Article, Judge Tatel
argued that recognizing a governmental attorney-client privilege even in the context of a criminal grand jury investigation would not be inappropriate because the
potential application of the crime-fraud exception was sufficient to protect against
abuse of the privilege. See id. at 1287. For a discussion of the role of the crimefraud exception in preventing abuse and unwarranted assertions of privilege, see
supra Part II.C.I.
244. See Ellinwood, supra note 215, at 1317-31 (criticizing "weak" governmental attorney-client privilege resulting from decision and arguing for stronger privilege protection); Paulsen, supra note 215, at 494-512 (arguing that United States
government possesses same attorney-client privilege as corporation or other organization and proposing new approach to determining when that privilege can be
asserted); Pincus, supra note 215, at 269 (asserting that because of D.C. Circuit and
Eighth Circuit opinions, "government attorneys are in a legal no-man's land" with
respect to privilege rules); Dickmann, supra note 215, at 306-10 (describing potential "detrimental consequences" of opinion, "such as 'chilling effects,' outsourcing
of governmental legal work, revelation of military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets, and slippery slope concerns"). Not all commentators disagree
with the holdings in the two cases, however. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Public Official's Lawyer: A Came Study from the Clinton Era, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 999, 1006-14 (2002) ("In two Whitewater-related cases... the
Eighth and D.C. Circuits held that White House officials had no attorney-client
privilege against a federal prosecutor's grand jury subpoena ....The circuit court
opinions differ, and they are controversial, but their holdings are supported by
powerful logic.") (citations omitted).
245. For an analysis of how the Eighth Circuit decision may affect lawyers for
state and local governmental entities, see Cole, supra note 215, at 26-27.
246. See generally Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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Eighth Circuit2 47 and the D.C. Circuit2 48 in their discussions of the positions of the parties in the governmental attorney-client privilege cases, the
Supreme Court in the Foster notes case made clear that in subpoenaing
the notes Starr's office was seeking to "overturn the common-law rule embodied in the prevailing case law." 24 9 That is the important aspect of the
Foster notes case for purposes of this Article: among the attorney-client
privilege challenges pursued by Starr's office, it is the case in which Starr's
office most clearly sought to overcome existing privilege law and create a
new exception to the privilege. It also is the only instance in which the
final reviewing court squarely rejected Starr's office's position on an attorney-client privilege issue. 2 511For those reasons, it is categorized here as an
"excessive" attack on the privilege by Starr's office.
As discussed in Part II.B.l.d and here, the Supreme Court rejected
Starr's argument that the privilege should not be available when the client
is deceased and a federal grand jury is seeking the privileged information
in connection with a criminal investigation.2 5 1 In doing so, the Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit,25 2 which had accepted Starr's argument that
creating an exception in such circumstances "would have little to no chilling effect on client communication," and therefore was appropriate in
light of the "relative importance to criminal litigation" of such an exception. 2 51 The Supreme Court appeared to be very concerned about the
policy interests underlying the privilege,2 54 and at the same time very re247. See In reGrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.
1997) (describing disagreement between White House and Office of Independent
Counsel as to whether "recognizing an attorney-client privilege in these circumstances would be tantamount to establishing a new privilege").
248. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (describing conflict between Office of President and Office of Independent Counsel as to whether the OIC was seeking to
disturb "the status quo" of privilege law).
249. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411.
250. The Supreme Court also rejected Starr's office's position on the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the production
of documents by an immunized witness. .See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,
3840 (2000) (discussing Fifth Amendment privilege of witness granted immunity).
For an analysis of the impact of the Hubbell decision, see generally Lance Cole, The
Fifth Amendment and Compelled Productionof PersonalDocuments After United States v.
Hubbell-New Protectionfor Private Papers, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (2002).
251. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409-11 (holding that attorney-client privilege survives death of client). But cf Knight, supra note 85, at 260-61 (arguing that
by failing to categorically reject posthumous exception to privilege Court weakened confidentiality protection provided by privilege).
252. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232-34 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
253. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402.

254. See id. at 407-08 (expressing concerns about potential withholding of information from counsel by clients). But cf generally Paul R. Rice, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: Loss of PredictabilityDoes Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 Bus.
LAw.

735 (2000) (arguing that concerns about predictability expressed by Swidler

& Berlin Court are not applicable in corporate context, because in that context
privilege protects only corporate entity, not individual officers, directors and employees who speak for corporation).
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luctant to elevate law enforcement interests in a criminal investigation
over those policy interests. 25 5 In short, as it has done in every recent
case, 256 the Supreme Court sided with the attorney-client privilege over
the interests of federal law enforcement authorities seeking to overcome
the privilege to gain information in a criminal investigation.2 57 That is the
important lesson of the Foster notes case, and that is the reason the case is
significant to an analysis of attacks on the privilege by Starr's office. Starr's
office successfully invoked the crime-fraud exception to obtain testimony
and documents from Monica Lewinsky's first attorney. In two other cases
Starr's office narrowly succeeded in convincing appeals courts to abrogate
the privilege in a relatively narrow area of law, the governmental attorneyclient privilege. In the Foster notes case, however, the Supreme Court
rejected Starr's office's attempt to create a new exception to the privilege.
The Foster notes case is important because it demonstrates that efforts by
federal prosecutors to overcome the privilege are not always well founded
and should be carefully scrutinized by the federal courts.
4.

Conclusion

Viewed in its entirety, the conduct of Starr's office with regard to the
attorney-client privilege presents an excellent microcosmic example of the
larger trend in the conduct of federal prosecutors that this Article condemns. It appears that at every opportunity to do so, Starr's office put its
investigative needs and ends ahead of the systemic interests that are served
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The lawyers in Starr's office devised creative, innovative and untested legal arguments to support their attacks on the privilege, and then simply put those
arguments before the federal courts and took whatever the courts would
give them. 258 The only effective check on the excessive zeal of Starr's office to overcome assertions of privilege (whenever those assertions im255. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408-09 (declining to apply privilege differently in criminal and civil cases).
256. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's recent attorney-client
privilege cases, see supra Part ll.B.
257. The Court also implicitly expressed approval for use of "established exceptions" to the privilege, such as the crime-fraud exception, in criminal cases. See
Swidler &Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409-10 (stating that "established exceptions are consistent with the purposes of the privilege"). That aspect of the Court's opinion is
consistent with the Part of this Article arguing that existing privilege law is sufficient to protect against inappropriate and unwarranted assertions of privilege. See
supra Part ll.C.
258. A good example is the governmental privilege cases, where the arguments of Starr's office in opposition to the privilege were so novel that the appellate courts in both cases acknowledged that there was little or no relevant case law
on point. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
("The question whether a government attorney-client privilege applies in the federal grand jury context is one of first impression in this circuit, and the parties
dispute the import of the lack of binding authority."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Lacking persuasive direction in
the case law, we turn to general principles.").
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peded their investigations) proved to be the reluctance of the Supreme
Court to accept legal arguments that would weaken the privilege and endanger the vital public policy interests that the privilege protects.
As discussed in Part IV below, this Article takes the position that responsible prosecutors should take a less self-serving approach and should
consider the effects of the legal arguments they make in particular cases
on the broader systemic interests served by the privilege, rather than simply trying to overcome all assertions of privilege in all cases. This more
enlightened approach to privilege issues is in accord with both recent Supreme Court case law on the privilege and the greater public interests that
prosecutors are expected to serve. 259 Unfortunately, the actions of Starr's
office in its various assaults on the privilege are consistent with recent actions of other federal law enforcement authorities in this area and are
discussed in the remainder of this Part. Part IV returns to the systemic
dangers posed by these assaults on the privilege and suggests new approaches for federal law enforcement officials to follow when addressing
privilege issues.
B.

The Marc Rich Pardon Investigation

The Starr investigation cases are not the only instances in which federal prosecutors investigating President Clinton aggressively sought to
overcome assertions of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
protection in a criminal investigation. On his last day in office in January
2001, President Clinton granted 177 presidential pardons and reprieves.2 60 The end-of-term pardons generated enormous controversy
and widespread criticism and were the subject of a grandjury investigation
conducted by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York.261 The grand jury investigation focused on Clinton's par259. For a further discussion of recent Supreme Court case law on attorneyclient privilege, see supra Part II.B.I. For a further discussion of the interests
served by prosecutors, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
FederalProsecutors,88 GEo. L.J. 207, 226-28 (2000) (describing "Prosecutors' Higher
Obligations" and observing that federal prosecutors "are charged with an overarching duty to seekjustice-a duty recognized for well over a century").
260. See David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr., Clinton's Brother Pursued Clemency Bids for Friends, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2001, at Al (discussing Roger Clinton's
efforts in seeking pardons for acquaintances as well as other potentially scandalous
pardons and clemency bids); Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, Clemency Inquiry is Expanded to all 177 of Clinton's Last Minute Pardons, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 13,
2001, at Al (detailing Attorney General John Ashcroft's decision to investigate all
177 pardons and commutations granted by President Clinton on January 20,
2001).
261. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 9, 2001, 179 F. Stipp. 2d
270, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing commencement of investigation); see also
David Johnston, U.S. Is Beginning Criminal Inquiry in Pardon of Rich, N.Y. TImNIs,
February 15, 2001, at Al (same); Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, PardonsProbe Course
a Mystery; Case Could Be Huge If N. Y. ProsecutorPursues Aggressively, WASi-i. POST,
March 14, 2001, at A4 (stating that many FBI agents are investigating last-minute
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dons of fugitive international financiers Marc Rich and Pincus Green. 2 62

Then-United States Atorney Rudolph Giuliani's office had obtained an
indictment of Rich and Green in the Southern District of New York in
September 1983 for alleged violations of federal income tax and oil price
controls, but Rich and Green fled the country shortly before the indictment was returned and never returned to face trial. 21i3 Because of the
manner in which the court addressed the attorney-client privilege and
work product issues that arose in the grand jury investigation of the Rich
and Green pardons, it is helpful to review briefly the sequence of events
that led up to investigation.
Between 1983 and 1999 various attorneys representing Rich and

Green sought unsuccessfully to negotiate a resolution of the criminal case,
but Justice Department attorneys refused to negotiate unless Rich and
Green returned to the U.S. and surrendered themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court, which they refused to do. 26 4 In early 1999 Rich and Green
and their legal advisers decided to explore the possibility of seeking a presidential pardon, and in July 1999 Rich retained former Clinton White
House Counsel John Quinn, then a partner at the Washington law firm of
Arnold & Porter, to represent him. 265 The retainer agreement between
Rich and the law firm stated that the firm was being retained "to provide
legal services and in connection with Mr. Rich's potential negotiations
'2
with the Department of Justice." ""

Quinn met with Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. and
wrote to then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
Mary Jo White seeking to negotiate a resolution of the case against Rich,
but, like his predecessors, he was unsuccessful in initiating negotiations
presidential pardons); Serrano & Braun, supra note 260 (discussing preliminary
investigation into President Clinton's pardons).
262. SeeJames Vicini, U.S. Prosecutors to Study Clinton's Pardons, REuITERS, Mar.
15, 2001 (describing Rich and Green pardons); Johnston, supra note 261 (detailing investigation into Rich pardon); Richard Cohen, Editorial, The Rich Pardon:
Messy? Yes. Crazy? No., WAsii. Pos-r, Mar. 15, 2001, at A25 (discussing reasoning
behind Rich pardon).
263. See Grandjuy Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (explaining departure of
Rich and Green from United States during indictment proceedings in 1983). On
January 5, 2001, in a letter from Quinn to President Clinton, Quinn stated that he
"became convinced of both Marc's innocence and the outrageously prejudicial
and unfair treatment of him by the then-new U.S. Attorney in New York, Mr.

G[iu]liani." Id. at 279. Additionally, on December 19, 2000, Quinn wrote a letter

to Bruce Lindsey citing "adverse and prejudicial publicity" generated by then-U.S.
Attorney Rudolph Giuliani at time of Rich and Green indictments as justification
for their failure to return to U.S. for trial." Id. at 280 n.4.
264. See id. at 275-76 ("[I]f your clients genuinely believe that they have done
nothing wrong, they should board the next plane to New York and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court.").
265. See id. at 276.
266. Id. (citing letter from K.A. Behan of Arnold & Porter to Marc Rich, dated
July 21, 1999).

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRIVILEGES

with the Justice Department. 26 7 In March 2000 efforts to negotiate with
the Justice Department ceased, and Rich's attorneys and advisers began
working on a presidential pardon request.26 8 On December 11, 2000,
Quinn submitted a pardon petition and supporting memorandum to the
White House. 269 After the petition was submitted, Rich's ex-wife Denise
Rich and others contacted President Clinton and other White House officials in support of the petition. 27° On January 19, 2001, Quinn spoke directly with President Clinton about the petition, and in response to a
request by Clinton subsequently provided a letter confirming that Rich
and Green would waive the statute of limitations for any civil claims the
government might pursue against them. 271 After receiving the statute of
limitations waiver for civil claims, Clinton granted Rich and Green full and
27 2
unconditional pardons on January 20, 2001, his last day in office.
In February 2001 a grand jury in the Southern District of New York
began investigating the circumstances surrounding the Rich and Green
pardons. 273 In the course of the grand jury investigation, subpoenas were
issued to the attorneys representing Rich and Green for all documents
relating to their efforts to resolve the Justice Department's criminal case
and to obtain presidential pardons for Rich and Green. 274 The attorneys
withheld certain documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine, and the Justice Department sought to compel production. 275 Two of the arguments advanced by the government are particularly relevant to this Article and merit examination here, because they
represent extremely aggressive attacks on the privilege by Department of
Justice prosecutors.
The first argument advanced by the government was that the "fugitive
disentitlement" doctrine should be applied to deprive Rich and Green of
the protection of the work product doctrine because they were fugitives
and had no intention of returning to the United States to face the charges
against them. 2 76 Under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which
originated in the nineteenth century, "the fugitive from justice may not
267. See id. at 276-77 (discussing Quinn's unsuccessful efforts in attempting to
negotiate with federal prosecutors).
268. See id. at 277 (describing decision to seek pardon).
269. See id. at 278 (detailing filing of pardon petition).
270. See id. at 279-80 (illustrating post-petition lobbying efforts).
271. See id. at 280 (expressing President's request that Rich and Green waive
statute of limitations defense for civil claims).
272. See id. (stating President Clinton's grant of pardons to Rich and Green).
273. See id. at 280-81 (detailing commencement of investigation into
pardons).
274. See id. at 281 (stating issuance of subpoenas for all documents related to
pardon requests).
275. See id. (discussing Justice Department's motion to compel).
276. See id. (raising "fugitive disentitlement" argument).
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2 77
seek relief from the judicial system whose authority he or she evades.1
The noteworthy aspect of the Justice Department's attempt to use this doctrine to deprive Rich and Green of work product protection is that the two
federal courts that had previously considered the matter both held that
fugitive status alone was not a sufficient reason to deny a party the right to
invoke the attorney-client privilege. 27 8 Moreover, no case had ever applied the doctrine (which, as noted above, had been in existence since the
nineteenth century) to a party's effort to invoke the work product doctrine. 279 Even though the court concluded that Rich and Green indeed
were fugitives, the court wisely declined to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine because Rich and Green were not seeking affirmative relief
and instead were merely asserting the work product doctrine defensively
280
in response to the government's subpoenas.
The government's unsuccessful attempt to rely upon the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is an example of one of the problems this Article
seeks to highlight: aggressive attacks on the privilege by Justice Department prosecutors, often involving novel legal arguments and efforts to
overcome existing law or extend recognized legal doctrines beyond their
prior applications, in order to gain an advantage in a particular investigation. 28' Although it is not surprising that line prosecutors who are heavily
invested in a particular case or investigation, such as the Southern District
prosecutors who probably were personally outraged by the pardons of
Rich and Green, will pursue every available legal argument that can be
asserted in good faith, greater restraint should be exercised by more senior Justice Department officials. 28 2 Those officials should look beyond
the particular case and consider the overall, long-term effect of the Department's actions on the privilege and on the justice system as a whole.
In the long run, repeated efforts to overcome the privilege at every availa-

277. Id. at 285 (quoting Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process & the
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine,87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997)).

278. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 9, 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d
270, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing United States v. Hurley, 728 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass.
1990), and In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)) (declining to use fugitive disentitlement doctrine to deprive parties of attorney-client privilege).
279. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 287-88 (detailing government's "fugitive disentitlement" argument). The prosecution's effort to apply the
doctrine to work product, with absolutely no direct supporting authority and the
only analogous authority, in the attorney-client privilege cases, in opposition, is an
excellent example of the kind of prosecutorial overreaching in privilege cases that
this Article argues should be curtailed.
280. See id. at 288 (defining purpose of work product doctrine).
281. Another example is Independent Counsel's attempt, thwarted by the Supreme Court, to overcome the protections of the attorney-client privilege when the
client is deceased, discussed supra Part III.A.3.
282. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall not

bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
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ble opportunity are inconsistent with the best interests of our adversarial
system of justice. Unfortunately, as the examples collected in this Article
demonstrate, it appears that prosecutorial restraint is being exercised less
frequently, and more often the only protection available against
prosecutorial overreaching is the federal judiciary. Here that protection
proved effective, as the court rebuffed the government's effort to extend
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
The prosecutors' other principal attack on the privilege in the Rich
case, however, survived judicial scrutiny and was successful in overcoming
the privilege. In addition to the fugitive disentitlement argument, the
prosecutors argued that the privilege and the work product doctrine
should not apply because the lawyers for Rich and Green were acting primarily as lobbyists and not as lawyers providing traditional legal services. 283 The court accepted this argument, based upon its conclusions
that the pardon process was not adversarial, that the lawyers were acting
primarily as lobbyists, and that the "litigation" of the criminal charges
against Rich and Green "was over."' 284 For those reasons, the court ordered the attorneys to produce the subpoenaed documents to the
285
government.
The Rich case is important for purposes of this Article because it creates yet another exception to the protections provided by the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine. Although the circumstances of the Rich case certainly are unusual, and perhaps unique, the
holding that the privilege does not apply when lawyers seek a pardon for a
person who is the subject of a criminal prosecution has broad implications
beyond that particular case. 28 6 One cannot predict with any certainty
283. See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (introducing government's second argument concerning why materials are not protected by work
product doctrine).
284. See id. at 288-91 (listing court's conclusions).
285. See id. at 291 (ordering subpoenaed documents). The discussion above
summarizes the complex and important legal issues that the court addressed in
connection with the privilege claims asserted by the lawyers for Rich and Green.
Although those issues, and the validity of the court's conclusions, certainly merit
more detailed analysis, this Article is not the appropriate occasion to do so. As
discussed below, the important point for purposes of this Article is that this case is
yet another example of an instance in which federal law enforcement authorities
succeeded in overcoming the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, not the intricacies of the legal arguments that permitted
the government to do so.
286. For a discussion of the potential implications of the court's decision for
practicing attorneys, see Louis Jacobson, Lobbying & Law: Were They Lawyers or Lobbyists?, NAT'LJ., Jan. 12, 2002, at 109. In that article, Professor Charles Tiefer suggests that the case may require some clients to establish two legal teams to
represent them, a litigation team and a non-litigation lobbying and government
relations team, an arrangement that he calls "highly impractical." See id. (discussing district court decision requiring Rich's attorney to hand over documents to
federal grand jury). "Stanley M. Brand, a veteran white-collar defense lawyer and
lobbyist in Washington, agrees and says that [the] ruling is likely to 'chill a client's
ability to be fully candid with the people representing them.'" Id.
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whether this exception will be expanded to preclude assertions of privilege in other situations where lawyers and clients now understand that the
privilege is available. 28 7 The likelihood, however, is that it will be expanded, as aggressive prosecutors in other cases try to use the exception to
overcome the privilege and obtain information.
It also is difficult to evaluate the importance of the information obtained by the government in the Rich case. The fact that no charges were

brought in the case, however, suggests that this was merely another
prosecutorial "fishing expedition" in pursuit of the mythical "smoking
gun" document that would confirm the prosecutors' worst suspicions.
The government did not succeed in their objective of obtaining information that supported bringing criminal charges, but they did manage to
further weaken the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, with potential long-term damage to our justice system. As discussed
in Part TV below, the time has come for federal law enforcement officials
to take a more enlightened approach to privilege issues, and to stop attacking the privilege at every opportunity.
C.

The Federal OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, the Department ofJustice
Policy on Prosecution of Corporationsand Pressures on Corporations
to Waive Privilege Protections

Perhaps no area of the law has seen as concerted an attack on the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine as corporate criminal
law enforcement by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). Two
former federal prosecutors have characterized recent Department of Justice initiatives as marking "the death of privilege in corporate criminal
investigations."2 88 Although reports of the death of privilege in this area
may be slightly exaggerated, 289 there can be little doubt that the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine are the targets of a multifront assault by the Justice Department, which is not limited to the corpo287. Professor Tiefer noted that the rationale of the ruling might be applied
to "a Wall Street lawyer who had come to Washington to make a pitch to the Securities and Exchange Commission, because it was considered lobbying." Id. at 110.
But cf FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that communications corporation shared with its public relations and government affairs
consultants were protected by attorney-client privilege).
288. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 147.
289. The authors of this statement, although former federal prosecutors, are
partners in a large corporate law firm and acknowledged that they write "from the
vantage point of the criminal defense attorney." Id. at 149. They therefore can
perhaps be expected to advocate the interests of corporations; even if that is so,
however, their concerns about the continued viability of privilege in the corporate
context are valid, and are shared by the author of this Article. This Article takes
the view that the corporate attorney-client privilege remains a viable legal doctrine,
but it has been significantly weakened over the last two decades and its continued
survival is no longer free from doubt.
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rate arena. 29 0 President Bush's July 2002 creation of a new Corporate
Fraud Task Force, headed by Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, is likely to lead to further attacks on the privilege in the corporate
context. 29 1 President Bush stated that the new Task Force "will target major accounting fraud and other criminal activity in corporate finance ...
[and] will function as a financial crimes SWAT team, overseeing the investigation of corporate abusers and bringing them to account.129 2 President
Bush's "SWAT team" rhetoric, coupled with the other recent developments that are discussed below, does not bode well for the future of the
privilege in corporate criminal cases.
1.

The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines

One of the most significant governmental controls on organizational
behavior in the United States is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Corporate Sentencing Guidelines), which have been in effect
since November 1, 1991.293 These Corporate Sentencing Guidelines govern the way in which corporations and other business entities are sentenced for criminal violations of federal law. A noteworthy characteristic
of the Guidelines is the burden they place on business entities to self-police their activities and, as a practical matter, to self-report violations of
law. Under the Guidelines, if a corporation pleads guilty to or is convicted
of a federal crime, it is subject to much harsher fines and remedies if it has
290. For example, the Justice Department's controversial new policy permitting eavesdropping on suspected terrorists' conversations with their attorneys is
merely the latest in a long series of actions by the Department that are likely to
significantly weaken the protections provided by the privilege. For a discussion of
the new attorney-client eavesdropping policy and other justice Department policies and practices that have impinged upon the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine in recent years, see infra Part II1.D.
291. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002) (detailing
purpose and functions of Corporate Fraud Task Force); see also Mike Allen, Bush
Urges Crackdown on Business Corruption; More Resources for Regulators; IncreasedJail
Terms Proposed, WASH. PosT, July 10, 2002, at Al (summarizing President Bush's
proposals for stiffer penalties for dishonest executives); Nicholas Kulish, Senate Penalties for Executives Are Tougher Than Bush's Plan, WALL ST. J., Jtily 10, 2002, at A8
(outlining President Bush's plan for tough penalties for those found defrauding
investors).
292. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Corporate Responsibility at the Regent Wall Street Hotel, New York, New York (July 9, 2002),
reprinted in 38 WEEKLY COM'ILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1158-61 (July 15,
2002).
293. Although this Article uses the term "corporate sentencing guidelines,"
the guidelines apply to all "organizations." The guidelines define the word "organization" to mean "a person other than an individual." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8A].1, cmt. n.1 (1991). This includes corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated
organizations, governments, political subdivisions and nonprofit organizations. See
id. (defining term "organization").
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not implemented a compliance program and has not "fully cooperated"
2 4
with the government's investigation of the criminal activity. 9
a.

Relevant Provisions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines

The United States Sentencing Commission 29 5 approved criminal sentencing guidelines for organizations in 1991 after years of debating the
proper means of imposing criminal sanctions on business entities. 2 9" The
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines provide for restitution to victims by convicted corporations and impose heavy fines and intrusive corporate probation on companies that commit federal crimes. 29 7 The Guidelines set out
detailed procedures for federal judges to use in determining the fines to
impose on corporations. The fine calculation provisions require the court
first to determine the "offense level" of the specific violation, that is based
upon the nature of the particular crime and the circumstances surrounding the violation. The court uses an "Offense Level Fines Table" which
lists dollar amounts, to calculate the base fine. 298 The base fine is the
greatest of: (1) the amount obtained from the Offense Level Fines Table;
(2) the pecuniary gain to the corporation from the offense; or (3) the
pecuniary loss from the offense that is intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused by the corporation. Consequently, if the pecuniary gain or
loss exceeds the amount obtained in the Offense Level Fines Table, the
99
base fine amount will be that amount of gain or loss.2
After arriving at an amount for the base fine, a sentencing court must
still calculate the actual range within which a fine may be imposed. In this
calculation, the court takes into account a complicated array of factors to
determine the convicted corporation's "culpability score" from which the
actual range of fines will be calculated. The court uses the culpability
score to obtain minimum and maximum values that will be applied to the
3°
base fine, thus establishing a range for the fine.
294. See id. § 8C2.5(g)(1)(B) (listing burdens on business entities). The corporation also must "clearly demonstrate [ ] recognition and affirmative acceptance
of responsibility for its criminal conduct." Id.
295. For background on the United States Sentencing Commission, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of Commission and guidelines it promulgates).
296. See, e.g., Richard Gruner, CorporateSentencing Guidelines,2 WiInrE-COLLAR
CRIME REP. 1, 2-6 (1988) (explaining that topics of debate included how monetary
fines should be set for corporate and other organizational defendants, to what
extent organizational fines should be imposed, and how properly to integrate individual and organizational sanctions).
297. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1 .1(1991) (listing fines for
convicted corporations).
298. See id. § 8C2.4(d) (explaining calctlation of base fine).
299. If the calculation of gain and loss would unduly complicate or prolong
the sentencing, however, the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines provide that these
values should not be used to determine the base fine. See id. § 8C2.4(c) (discussing methods for determining base fine).
300. See id. § 8C2.5 (same).
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Several aggravating factors may increase the culpability score. The
first and most significant aggravating factor is whether or not the court
finds evidence of corporate involvement in or tolerance of the criminal
activity. Such a finding by the sentencing court will substantially increase
the culpability score. If an individual within "high-level personnel"-'" of
either the corporation or a corporate unit 30 2 participated in, condoned,
or was willfully ignorant of the offense, or if tolerance of the offense by
"substantial authority personnel" 3°13 was pervasive, points will be added to
the culpability score.
Another significant aggravating factor is the extent to which the corporation has previously engaged in similar misconduct. Points are added
to the culpability score if the corporation (or a separately managed line of
business) committed any aspect of the crime less than ten years after an
earlier criminal, civil or administrative adjudication of similar misconduct. 3 0 4 The number of points to be added depends on how recently the
similar misconduct occurred. The remaining factors that may increase the
culpability score under the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines consist of violating existing judicial orders, violating conditions of probation or obstructing justice. 3 5 Points will be added to the culpability score for each
of these actions.
b.

Mitigation of Sentences Under the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines

Under the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, two significant mitigating factors will result in a lower culpability score and, consequently, a
lower range of potential fines for a convicted corporation. The first such
factor is the extent to which the corporation took the following actions:
(1) reported the violation prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or
investigation; (2) fully cooperated in the investigation; and (3) clearly
301. The term "high-level personnel" is defined by the Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines as individuals who "have substantial control over the organization or
who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization." Id.
§ 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(b).
302. The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines define "unit of the organization"
as "any reasonably distinct operational component of the organization." See id. at
§ 8C2.5, cmt. n.2. This includes subsidiaries and divisions, and may include distinct smaller components as well. Cf id. (indicating smaller units such as specialized manufacturing, marketing or accounting operations are encompassed within
term "unit of the organization").
303. "Substantial authority personnel" are defined by the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines as "individuals who within the scope of their authority exercise a
substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of the organization." Id.
§ 8A1.2, cmt. n.2(c).
304. See id. § 8C2.5(c) (discussing culpability score). The Guidelines provide
that, for purposes of adding points to the culpability score, any prior history of a
corporation will survive mergers and reorganizations (but not asset purchases). See
id. § 8C2.5, cmt. n.6 (clarifying effect of organizations legal structure on culpability
score).

305. See id. §§ 8C2.5(d)-(e) (detailing factors that increase culpability scores).
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demonstrated recognition of the criminal conduct and affirmatively accepted responsibility.116 A corporation can benefit substantially from taking some or all of these actions. These provisions of the Guidelines
obviously exert substantial pressure on a corporation to cooperate with a
government investigation of possible criminal wrongdoing. In the years
since the adoption of the Guidelines, federal prosecutors have become
more and more demanding in their assessment of what constitutes "cooperation" by a corporate offender. 3° 7 The most noteworthy aspect of these
heightened prosecutorial demands is the expectation that a corporation
will waive its attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection, and reveal to the prosecution any information it has collected concerning criminal violations. The information may include attorney work
product prepared by the corporation's counsel in an internal investigation
8
and even records of counsel's interviews with potential witnesses.11
c.

Effects of the Guidelines on Corporate Behavior and Accompanying
Threats to Privilege Protections

Commentators have recognized the significant effects of the Guidelines on corporate behavior generally and on corporate internal investigations in particular. 3°19 Professor Richard S. Gruner has described the
306. See id. § 8C2.5(g) (listing mitigating factors decreasing culpability
scores).
307. SeeJennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct:
An Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 718-19 (1997) (pro-

posing set of mixed liability regimes in conjunction with policing measures to evaluate corporate cooperation); V. S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When
Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1264

(2000) (arguing that type of strict liability imposed on corporations through Organizational Sentencing Guidelines may in effect deter corporations from keeping
effective policing measures and precautionary measures in place because of strict
liability imposed once corporation admits to any wrongdoing); cf David N. Zornow
& Keith D. Krakaur, supra note 6, at 154 (observing that in applying Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, "federal prosecutors more and more frequently go so far as
to state that unless a company provides its privileged information to the government, the company will be deemed not to have cooperated").
308. This result arguably is inconsistent with the role of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine in corporate internal investigations that
was articulated by the Supreme Court in the Upjohn case. For a further discussion
of Upjohn, see supra Part II.B.1.
309. See Richard S. Gruner, Towards an OrganizationalJurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARz. L. Riv. 407,

463-71 (1994) (discussing effect of Guidelines on criminal law enforcement in corporations); William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 651 (2002) ("Freedom from self-incrimination and

rights of confidentiality are being increasingly sacrificed in the name of efficient
law enforcement."); see also Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 153-54 (describing

effect of Corporate Sentencing Guidelines on corporate behavior in criminal investigations). A former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York has observed that the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines create "an enforced
partnership between prosecutors and corporations." Otto G. Obermaier, Drafting
Companies to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at CI 1. For additional discus-
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corporate sentencing guidelines as imposing a "public trustee" role on
corporations by making them responsible for promoting organizational
compliance with the law and even aiding law enforcement investigations
after a crime has been committed within an organization. 31 0 He applauds
this result for being both consistent with agency principles and an efficient
private policing mechanism. 3 1 Professor Gruner acknowledges, however,
that the sentencing guidelines provisions rewarding cooperation and selfreporting are inconsistent with privilege rules in that those rules provide
"little or no protection" for firms that comply with the guidelines. 3 12 In
other words, complying with the guidelines may require waiving privileges,
which has significant potential adverse consequences for both employees
and the corporation in subsequent criminal and civil proceedings involving the same conduct.-13
Professor Ellen S. Podgor also has analyzed the effects of the sentencing guidelines on corporate internal investigations and cooperation with
law enforcement authorities.3 14 While Professor Podgor is more skeptical
than Professor Gruner about the benefits of the guidelines' corporate cooperation provisions, she too recognizes that the cooperation-inducing
provisions of the organizational sentencing guidelines may be inconsistent
with privilege protections.3 15 Thus, whether or not one agrees that the

cooperation and self-reporting provisions of the guidelines are good pubsion of the impact of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, see O'I-ro G.
OBERMAIER AND ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHI1TE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULA-

OFFENSE § 15.08 (1998) (discussing current perspective that organization
guidelines may have less desirable consequences).
310. See Gruner, supra note 309, at 463 (explaining that Guidelines impose
criminal penalties on corporations to encourage attention to preventing and detecting abuses).
311. See id. at 464-67 (citing "sound underpinnings" in agency principles for
such interpretations).
312. See id. at 465 n.343 (arguing that Guidelines send mixed messages). Professor Gruner does not assess the significance of this conflict with privilege rules or
propose any changes in the corporate sentencing guidelines to address it. It is not
surprising that he does not do so, however, because when viewed solely in the
context of the efficacy of the corporate sentencing guidelines the privilege issue
may well not be significant enough to warrant substantial attention, particularly
when balanced against the perceived benefits of corporate self-policing. When
viewed as one of a number of independent legal developments that threaten the
continued vitality of the attorney-client privilege-the perspective taken by this Article-the privilege conflict created by the corporate sentencing guidelines assumes greater importance.
313. See id. (recognizing that compliance with guidelines results in "greater
risk in later civil or criminal investigations"). For a further discussion of the law of
waiver, see supra Part II.C.2.
314. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in
Employer-Employee Relationships,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (2002) (examining cooperTORY

ation's role in effectiveness of guidelines).

315. See id. at 802-08 (describing Professor Podgor's skepticism regarding
Guidelines and her recognition that "evidentiary issues also arise when either the
individual or the organization takes the role of cooperator. To what extent will the
work-product privilege and the attorney-client privilege survive?").
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lic policy, it is clear that the practical effect of those provisions is to exert
considerable pressure on corporations to waive privilege protections.
A significant issue affecting the corporate attorney-client privilege,
recognized by both Professor Gruner 3 16 and Professor Podgor, 317 arises
out of the rewards the guidelines bestow upon corporations that self-report criminal offenses. 3 18 Such corporate self-reporting places the corporation and its counsel in an adversarial posture to the corporate employees
who were involved in the wrongdoing. Professor Gruner characterizes this
result as changing the relationship between a corporation and culpable
employees to "one between adversaries, not confederates." 319 Professor
Podgor makes a similar observation about the cooperation provisions of
the guidelines, noting that "[p]lacing the employer and employee in an
adversarial position, in an attempt to secure the benefits of cooperation,
interferes with the overriding fiduciary employment relationship." 320 This
changed relationship may make it more difficult for corporations to obtain information and cooperation from employees,3 2 and in this regard
316. See Gruner, supra note 309, at 434-36 (outlining negative impact of
Guidelines on employment relationships).
317. See Podgor, supra note 314, at 803-04 (describing how cooperation by
individuals and organizations can prove problematic).
318. See generally Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to CriminalLiability: Can a CorporationSave Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L.
REv. 605, 675 (1995) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUInELINES MANUAL § 8A2.5(g)
(1991)) ("Organizations that voluntarily report violations prior to government investigation or other disclosure and actively cooperate with government investigations will have a substantial number of points subtracted from their culpability
score.").
319. See Gruner, supra note 309, at 435. Professor Gruner also observes that
this potential adversarial relationship makes it essential that counsel interviewing
employees warn the employees that information that they provide may be passed
on to government authorities. See id. This observation is consistent with the oftrepeated admonition that when corporate counsel interviews corporate employees, she must explain to the employees that she represents the corporation, not
the employee personally, and that the attorney-client privilege applicable to those
communications is between the corporation and counsel, not the individual employee and counsel. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983) ("A
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents."); Gary G. Lynch, Internal Investigations,
SD79 A.L..-A.B.A. 317, 334 (1999) (advising that counsel conducting internal investigation should be sure to inform employee that she is attorney for corporation,
not individual employee, to ensure that employee will not later contend that counsel also represents him and that their communications are protected by employee's personal attorney-client privilege).
320. See Podgor, supra note 314, at 803 (citations omitted). Professor Podgor
also points out that the guidelines "may influence a corporation to cooperate with
the government despite its negative effect on employees of the corporation." Id. at
796.
321. See Gruner, supra note 309, at 435-36 (suggesting that one solution to
conflict of interest between corporations and employees that is created by sentencing guidelines may be joint defense agreement between the corporation and its
employees). Professor Gruner acknowledges, however, that "such an agreement
may be problematic under the corporate sentencing guidelines" and will only be
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the guidelines arguably conflict with the policy goals underlying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context that were identified and ap3 22
proved by the Supreme Court in the Upjohn case.
In Upjohn the Supreme Court confirmed that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protect communications between corporate counsel and the corporation's employees, so long as the purpose of
the communications is to provide legal advice to the corporation and prepare for potential litigation. 323 Upjohn has been widely hailed as an affirmation of the vitality of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine in the corporate context. 324 By extending the availability of the
attorney-client privilege beyond a corporation's "control group" and by
extending work product protection to interviews of lower level employees
by corporate counsel, Upjohn markedly increased the confidentiality protections available to corporations in criminal investigations and civil
325
litigation.
In rejecting the "control group test" for application of the attorneyclient privilege to corporate communications, the Upjohn Court emphasized the importance of employees at all levels communicating with corpoadvantageous if the company fights the charges. Id. at 436. As Professor Gruner
implicitly recognizes, a joint defense agreement will not save a corporation from
being forced to waive privileges if it wishes to obtain sentencing leniency under the
guidelines (and will not save the corporation's employees from the consequences
of a waiver by corporation). Professor Podgor has also recognized that joint defense agreements do not eliminate the underlying conflict of interest between the
corporate entity and its employees that is created by the cooperation provisions of
the guidelines. See Podgor, supra note 314, at 806 ("Although joint-defense agreements may offer some relief in some situations, cooperation by one of the parties
to the joint-defense agreement can raise additional issues."); see also United States
v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing convictions when government selected co-defendant who had been part of joint defense agreement to testify at trial and new counsel was not appointed to represent defendants, thus
creating conflict of interest).
322. For a further discussion of the policy goals underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Upjohn and other recent attorney-client privilege cases, see
supra Part II.B.
323. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (concluding attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protect communications
between counsel and employees of corporation).
324. For a further discussion of the significance of Upjohn, see supra part
ll.B.l.a.

325. See Sherman L. Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege
and the No-Contact Rule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETI-lics 739, 754 (1997) ("The Court's
opinion clearly supports the idea that corporations need privacy to the extent afforded by the attorney-client privilege to comply with laws, and that internal investigations should be protected as a corporate effort to monitor compliance.");
Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 Wis. L.
REv. 31, 51 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392) (concluding that Court "emphasized
that the [control group test] frustrated the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client
to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation").
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rate counsel and obtaining advice on compliance with the law. 3 26 The
Court also rejected the argument that "the risk of civil or criminal liability
suffices to ensure that corporations will seek legal advice in the absence of
the protection of the privilege."' 2 7 The Court was concerned that without
the confidentiality protections of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, the depth and quality of investigations to ensure
compliance would suffer and employees might be deterred from seeking
3 28
advice on how to comply with the law.

Ironically, the outcome that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in
Upjohn in 1981 appears to have been promoted, albeit indirectly, by the
Sentencing Commission in 1991 through the cooperation and self-reporting provisions of the corporate sentencing guidelines. The protections
that the Court gave corporations and other business entities in Upjohn are
undercut by the corporate sentencing guidelines if a corporation must
waive those protections in order to obtain a reduced fine or other lenient
treatment for self-reporting and cooperating with government investigators. This inconsistency with Upjohn, coupled with the broader and more
important issue of the potential incremental erosion of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine that is the subject of this Article, invites reconsideration of the self-reporting and cooperation provisions of
the guidelines.3: 29 Even if one concludes that they should be retained,
however, those provisions of the guidelines have weakened the application
of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine in the corporate context.
2.

The Department ofJustice Policy on Prosecution of Corporations

The pressure that the Sentencing Guidelines put on corporations to
waive privileges and cooperate with law enforcement was increased in
1999, when then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder,Jr. distributed a
memorandum within the Department of Justice on "Federal Prosecution
of Corporations" (Holder Memorandum).-'1-' The Holder Memorandum
"provides guidance as to what factors should generally inform a prosecutor
in making the decision whether to charge a corporation in a particular
case."""' Part II of the memorandum identifies eight specific factors that
prosecutors should consider in making a charging decision in a corporate
326. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 ("The control group test ... frustrates the
very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information ....").
327. Id. at 393 n.2.
328. See id. (rejecting government's argument).
329. Cf generally, Podgor, supra note 314 (scrutinizing corporation in contextual setting).
330. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General of the United States of
America, to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Part IV (Jun. 16,
1999), at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter
Holder Memorandum].
331. Id. at Introduction.
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criminal case. 33 2 The fourth factor is: "The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate
attorney-client and work product privileges."33 3 Part VI of the Holder Memorandum, entitled "Charging the Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary
Disclosure," reiterates that "[i]n gauging the extent of the corporation's
cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness
334
...to waive the attorney-client and work product privileges."
These statements in the Holder Memorandum go quite far toward
effectively forcing a corporation to waive privilege protections if it hopes
to obtain favorable charging treatment at the hands of DOJ prosecutors.
In complex corporate criminal cases federal prosecutors have enormous
prosecutorial discretion to decide the nature and the number of charges,
if any, that they will bring against the responsible corporate entity and
Moreover, the manner in which that
culpable individuals.3 3 5
prosecutorial discretion is exercised is not subject to legal challenges or
judicial review. 3 3 6 This combination of broad discretion and limited accountability presents the potential for misguided policy decisions and, in
the worst cases, even abuses of governmental power. Of particular concern is the potential for prosecutors to intrude unnecessarily into the attorney-client relationship 33 7 and frustrate the important policy objectives
332. See id. at Part II (listing factors). The cover memorandum points out
that the factors identified in the policy statement "are, however, not outcome-determinative and are only guidelines." Id. at *1. The comments at Part II.B also
stress that "[s]ome or all of these factors may or may not apply to specific cases,
and in some cases one factor may override all others." Id. at Part II.B. Notwithstanding these caveats, the factors represent an official policy statement by the
Department ofJustice, and as such they are intended to influence federal prosecutors in corporate criminal cases throughout the country. See.Jim Oliphant, The
Holder Memorandum, LEGAL TiMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 11 ("The memo, in which
Holder established guidelines for bringing criminal charges against a corporation,
remains in effect as official department policy.").
333. Holder Memorandum, supra note 330, at Part II.A.4 (emphasis added).
334. Id. at Part VI.A.
335. See Podgor, supra note 314, at 799 ("Prosecutors have enormous discretion in the charging process. They have the ability to choose who will receive immunity and who will not be charged with criminal conduct."); Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 6, at 154-55 (discussing influence of Holder Memorandum on federal
prosecutors' determination of whether or not to bring charges). See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995) (analyzing whether body of federal criminal law and
role national police power can be reconciled with federalism principles).
336. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 330, at *1 (acknowledging explicitly and seeking to protect exercise of prosecutorial discretion by stating that
"[flederal prosecutors are not required to reference these factors in a particular
case, nor are they reqtired to document the weight they accorded specific factors
in reaching their decision").
337. Commentators have recognized that expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in recent decades has increased the power of federal prosecutors and put
new pressures on privilege protections. See generally Fried, supra note 22 (analyzing
expansion of crime-fraud exception through increase in number of available pred-
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that underlie the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.33 8 Unfortunately, the approach to evaluating cooperation and voluntary disclosure that is set forth in the Holder Memorandum does not
339
reflect appropriate sensitivity to privilege issues.
The Holder Memorandum's commentary on the "Cooperation and
Voluntary Disclosure" factor suggests that a principal objective underlying
the policy statement may be overcoming the difficulties involved in successfully prosecuting corporate crime.3 4°1 The commentary points out that
in developing a criminal case against a corporation "a prosecutor is likely
to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself."'34 1 After discussing the difficulties of assessing responsibility
for misconduct within a large corporate entity, the commentary concludes
with the observation that "a corporation's cooperation may be critical in
'3 42
identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence.
The type of cooperation and voluntary disclosure that is most specifically sought by the Holder Memorandum is waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection. The commentary makes clear
that the kind of waiver the DOJ wishes to obtain is full disclosure of all
legal advice provided to the corporation and its officers and employees in
connection with the conduct under investigation, as well as all work product developed by counsel in the company's internal investigation.3 4 3 In
other words, the commentary indicates that DOJ prosecutors will not be
satisfied with disclosure of the relevant underlying factual informationthey want to obtain communications between attorneys and clients and
icate crimes, particularly in federal arena). Professor Fried warned in 1986 of the
potential for increasing intrusion into attorney-client relationships by federal prosecutors. See id. at 499 ("The modern tendency of federal criminal law is to federalize state crimes and to criminalize common-law torts. This trend has placed a new
power in the hands of federal prosecutors, which they have not been reluctant to
exploit. One mode of exploitation has been unprecedented intrusions into attorney-client relationships."). The Holder Memorandum is yet another development
in this disturbing trend. See Podgor, supra note 314, at 801-02 (discussing Holder
Memorandum); see also William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. Ruv. 1343, 1382-83 (1999) (questioning efficacy

of "carrot and stick" methodology to enhance corporate compliance with law and
arguing that real effect of approach is to shift risk of noncompliance away from
corporation).
338. For a further discussion of the policy objectives of privilege legislation,
see supra Parts Il.A and II.B.
339. For a discussion of the Securities and Exchange Commission's adoption
of a new "cooperation policy" that reflects somewhat more sensitivity to privilege
issues, see infra Part III.E.
340. Other commentators have criticized this aspect of the Holder Memorandum's approach to cooperation and voluntary disclosure. See Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 6, at 155 ("This memorandum reflects the view that the ends justify the
means in corporate [criminal] investigations.").
341. Holder Memorandum, supra note 330, at Part VI.B.
342. Id.
343. See id. (calling for assessment of adequacy of corporation's cooperation).
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opinion work product developed by counsel. 34 4 This, however, is more
than prosecutors need to do their job. In the typical investigation prosecutors need facts, not privileged communications providing legal advice or
4
opinion work product reflecting counsel's legal analysis, 345
and in those
few cases where the advice or work product of attorneys is relevant to a
determination of criminal responsibility the government can use the
34 6
crime-fraud exception to obtain access to privileged communications.
The Holder Memorandum's treatment of this important issue is inadequate. A footnote to the commentary states that the waiver sought by the
government "should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal investigation and any contemporaneous advice given to the corporation concerning the conduct at issue." 34 7 The first part of this statement reflects some
appreciation of the more subtle aspects of the privilege issues involved, in
that it suggests the focus of the cooperation policy should be obtaining
facts that were collected during the corporation's internal investigation.
The second part of the statement, however, inappropriately suggests that
the government generally has a legitimate need to compel a waiver for
privileged communications of legal advice relating to the conduct at issue.
Contrary to the position taken by the Holder Memorandum, however,
prosecutors need access to attorney-client communications and opinion
work product only if the corporation is relying on the advice of counsel as
a defense or if the government believes the crime-fraud exception is applicable. 3 48 In both of those situations, the government is entitled to obtain

the privileged communications under recognized exceptions to the privilege. Thus, compelling a waiver by the corporation is unnecessary. More344. The commentary does state that the Justice Department "does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation's privileges an absolute requirement, and
prosecutors should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive the privileges
when necessary to provide timely and complete information as only one factor in
evaluating the corporation's cooperation." Id. It is difficult to view this caveat as a
significant limitation on the otherwise strong pressure that the Holder Memorandum puts on corporations to waive privileges, especially if one reads the caveat as
applying only when waiver is not "necessary" to provide information that prosectItors wish to obtain.
345. The critical distinction here is the one that was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Upjohn, between privileged communications, on the one hand,
and underlying factual information, on the other. See United States v. Upjohn Co.,
449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (noting that privilege extends only to communications
and not to underlying factors). The latter is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege, as the Court made clear in Upjohn, and can be communicated to a government law enforcement agency (or any other party) without waiving the privilege. As discussed below, obtaining the underlying factual information, rather
than requiring waiver of privilege, should be the objective of government cooperation and voluntary disclosure programs.
346. For a further discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see supra Part
I1.C.1.
347. Holder Memorandum, supra note 330, at n.2.
348. For a further discussion of the circumstances where prosecutors need
access to attorney-client and work product information, see supra Part II.C.I. and
Part II.C.3., respectively.
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over, in both of those instances the applicability of an exception to the
privilege would be decided by a neutral judge, not by a prosecutor whose
objective is a successful criminal prosecution. Unfortunately, it appears
that the involvement of a neutral judge may be what the DOJ is seeking to
avoid by compelling waivers of the privilege in all corporate criminal investigations, rather than relying upon the crime-fraud exception or other es3 4
tablished judicial doctrines as appropriate on a case-by-case basis. 9
That, however, is not the full extent of the shortcomings in the
Holder Memorandum's treatment of the privilege waiver issue. The same
footnote in the Memorandum goes on to state that "[e]xcept in unusual
circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a waiver with respect to communications and work product related to advice concerning the government's criminal investigation."3 5 11 This statement suggests the possibility
of a serious abuse of the government's power in seeking to compel corporations to waive privilege protections. To suggest that a corporate client
should be required to waive privileges with respect to legal advice provided in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation and potential
prosecution, as opposed to legal advice provided in connection with the
past conduct that is the subject of the pending criminal investigation, is
effectively to deny that client effective assistance of counsel in the pending
proceeding. Because of the breadth of the waiver doctrine,'. 5 1 a corporate
client that waives privileges for advice and opinion work product provided
in an ongoing investigation is likely to lose the benefits of a confidential
attorney-client relationship for all litigation and proceedings arising out of
or related to that investigation .15 2 The Holder Memorandum does not
349. Cf Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 155 ("The government, of course,
is the sole decision maker as to what is 'necessary' to its investigation, and it is the
rare prosecutor who would find that any available evidence-gathering tool is not
,necessary' to further his criminal investigation"); Cover, supra note 6, at 1236 (discussing application of crime-fraud exception to Department of Justice rule on
monitoring of prison inmates' communications with their attorneys and criticizing
lack of judicial involvement in determination of whether to monitor because
"[w]here the government intrudes on the privilege without judicial approval, it
clearly violates privilege's utilitarian and humanistic goals"). As discussed infra
Part IV.B.2, the justice Department's practice of avoiding judicial review when
seeking to obtain access to privileged information is unwise and should be
reconsidered.
350. Holder Memorandum, supra note 330, at n.2.
351. For a discussion of the breadth of the waiver doctrine, see supra Part
II.C.2.
352. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 156 ("Thus unfettered [by the
Holder Memorandum], federal prosecutors are authorized by Justice Department
policy to rend the fabric of confidential communications ranging fiom those that
occurred around the time of the conduct at issue to those that occurred during
and in connection with the criminal investigation itself. And once these privileges
have been waived, they will likely become fair game for plaintiffs in civil suits.")
(internal cross-reference omitted). The exception would be a situation in which a
court was willing to recognize a "limited waiver" for purposes of the governmental
investigation only. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611
(8th Cir. 1977) (concluding that employee interviews were confidential and enti-
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describe what "unusual circumstances" might justify requiring a waiver
that would in effect result in an across-the-board denial of counsel, and it
is difficult to envision a circumstance in which it would be appropriate to
do so. In fact, the kind of circumstances that might justify interfering with
the attorney-client relationship, such as misuse of counsel's advice to obstruct an investigation or destroy evidence, would almost certainly be subject to the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. In those cases, as
discussed above, the government can overcome the privilege under existing law without compelling a waiver.
As the discussion above suggests, the Holder Memorandum suffers
from two fundamental flaws. First, it inappropriately focuses on obtaining
privilege waivers in all cases, rather than on obtaining relevant underlying
factual information, which is what government investigators should be
seeking in the typical case and which usually can be obtained without requiring a waiver of privilege. 35 3 Second, it threatens to intrude inappropriately into ongoing attorney-client relationships by suggesting that in
some cases prosecutors should seek a waiver with respect to attorney-client
communications and opinion work product relating to current representation in the pending criminal investigation. Both of these flaws unnecessarily jeopardize the continued viability of the attorney-client privilege in
corporate criminal cases, and both are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's recent treatment of the privilege in the corporate context, discussed in Part II.B above.
Not surprisingly, the Holder Memorandum has been criticized for the
threat it presents to privilege protection in the corporate context. Commentators have questioned whether the Holder Memorandum ultimately
will be self-defeating because corporate counsel will be unable to conduct
effective internal investigations if employees come to understand that all
information they provide will be turned over to prosecutors.3 5 4 Others
have criticized the Holder Memorandum for threatening the quality of
tled to attorney-client privilege); see also Burke, supra note 55, at 71-72 (observing
that in applying limited waiver doctrine in government investigations, courts are
likely to adopt case-by-case analysis in which application of "the doctrine of limited
waiver probably will depend on the scope and nature of the privileged disclosure
in each specific case"); Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 6, at 193 (noting that court
is more likely to recognize limited waiver when disclosure is made to government
entity rather than to private party). For a recent decision by an influential court
holding that that disclosures to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a confidentiality agreement do not constitute a waiver, see generally Saito v. McKesson HBOC,
Inc., 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
353. For a further discussion of this important issue, and for an example of a
government cooperation policy that more adequately addresses it, see infra Part
III.E. (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission's new cooperation policy).
354. See National Institute on White Collar Crime, DOJ Guideline on Corporations' Waiver of Privilege Criticized, 16 CoRP. COUNS. WLY. (BNA) 112, 112 (April 4,
2001) [hereinafter DOJ Guideline] (reporting concerns about Holder Memorandum raised by participants in American Bar Association's 15th Annual National
Institute on White Collar Crime).
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legal representation available to corporations and "driving a wedge between senior management and employees. '3 55 This Article shares those
concerns, 356 but also seeks to emphasize that the Holder Memorandum is
only one of a number of recently adopted government law enforcement
policies and practices that threaten the privilege and should be considered together and in toto. The greater concern addressed by this Article is
that the federal government's various efforts to undermine privilege protections represents a situation in which the whole is greater than the sum
of the parts. The cumulative effect of these policies and practices ultimately may undermine the continued vitality of the privilege, even if each
policy or practice might reasonably be defended when analyzed separately.
To appreciate the significance of this issue, it is necessary to consider
other recent government policies and practices that have unnecessarily
impinged upon the attorney-client relationship, beyond the corporate
criminal context. The Parts that follow describe those policies and
practices.
D.
1.

Other Department of Justice Policies and Practices that
Undermine the Attorney-Client Privilege

The New Prison Inmate Attorney-Client EavesdroppingPolicy

On October 31, 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the September
11 terrorist attacks, the Justice Department's Bureau of Prisons amended
the federal regulations governing "special administrative measures" that
can be imposed on federal prison inmates..3 5 7 Among other things, 358 the
amendments gave the Attorney General the power, in cases where "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of
terrorism," to order monitoring of communications between that inmate
and his attorneys or attorneys' agents. 359 The regulations apply to all per355. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 6, at 161.
356. One former Department of Justice official has defended the Holder
Memorandum and challenged critics to articulate a different policy. See DOJGuideline, supra note 354, at 112 ('James K. Robinson, former assistant attorney general
for the DOJ's Criminal Division . . . challenged critics of the waiver guideline to
articulate a different policy."). This Article seeks to do so infra Part IV, which describes a more appropriate approach to cooperation and voluntary disclosure,
based in part on the Securities and Exchange Commission's new cooperation policy, described infra Part III.E.
357. See Prevention, supra note 141 (authorizing Bureau of Prisons to impose
special administrative measures for specified inmates in order to prevent acts of
violence or terrorism).
358. See id. (providing another important change-giving Attorney General
power to impose special administrative measures, including monitoring of attorney-client communications, for up to one year, when previous regulations had limited time period to 120 days).
359. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001). This Article examines the new monitoring
regulations as one of a number of recent federal law enforcement policies and
practices that threaten to undermine the attorney-client privilege, but it does not
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sons in custody under the authority of the Attorney General, which includes both persons held by Department ofJustice agencies other than the
Bureau of Prisons, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
3'6
and "persons held as witnesses, detainees, or otherwise. 0
The regulations do provide important limitations on their use and
availability. Most important, the regulations require that the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons must "provide written notice to the inmate and to
the attorneys involved, prior to the initiation of any monitoring. '3 6 1 They
also contain a set of safeguards that are intended to ensure that no inappropriate use is made of information obtained through the monitoring.
The regulations require that the monitoring will be conducted by a "privilege team" that consists of persons who are not involved in the underlying
investigation or prosecution of the monitored inmate.3 62 The regulations
further require approval of a federal judge prior to disclosure of information obtained through the attorney-client monitoring "[e]xcept in cases
where the person in charge of the privilege team determines that acts of

provide a detailed analysis or critique of the new regulations. For a detailed analysis and critique, see generally Cover, supra note 6. For ajudicial decision analyzing
special administrative measures (SAMs) not involving monitoring of communications with counsel and ord-ring that SAMs requiring "affirmations" from counsel
not be imposed, see United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 194-95 (D. Mass. 2002)
(addressing SAMs imposed upon alleged "shoe bomber" Richard Reid and taking
judicial notice of indictment of attorney Lynne Stewart for alleged false statements
in signing SAM affirmation and "chilling effect" of that indictment on defense
counsel); see also generally United States v. Sattar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2002) (describing Stewart indictment).
360. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (2001). The latter provision, making the regulations applicable to witnesses and detainees, is significant because the DOJ has been
criticized for holding a large number of persons in custody as material witnesses or
detainees and for not releasing to the public any information about those persons.
See Dan Eggen, About 600 Still Detained in Connection with Attacks, Ashcroft Says,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 2001, at A15 (reporting that DOJ detained 548 unidentified
people on immigration charges and undisclosed number of people as material
witnesses in connection with September 11 attacks); Jodi Wilgoren, Michigan "Invites" Men from Mideast to be Interviewed, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al (reporting
on DOJ initiative in Michigan to interview hundreds of young Middle Eastern men
following September 11 attacks).
361. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2). This requirement is not absolute, however.
The regulation provides an exception for cases in which there is "prior court authorization," in which no prior written notice is required. Id. For a judicial decision discussing the prior notice requirement, see Sattar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14798, at *9-12 (discussing assurance given by government that monitoring was not
taking place in case in which no prior notice had been provided).
362. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3) (discussing role of "privilege teams" for monitoring attorney-client privilege). For a critique of the effectiveness of this and the
other supposed safeguards in the regulations, see Cover, supra note 6, at 1255 (observing that "[g]iven the Justice Department's recent plans to focus FBI efforts on
thwarting acts of terrorism, rather than on prosecuting cases, it is unclear whether
a valid separation can exist now between prosecution, investigation, monitoring,
and other ostensibly preventative law enforcement efforts").
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violence or terrorism are imminent. '3 63 The regulations also provide that
"any properly privileged materials (including, but not limited to, recordings of privileged communications) are not retained during the course of
the monitoring."3 64 The Department ofJustice views these restrictions as
3 65
adequate to protect the interests served by the attorney-client privilege.
Despite the restrictions on availability, use, and retention, the monitoring provisions of the new regulations immediately provoked widespread
criticism. Commentators noted that the Justice Department had put the
new regulations into place on an emergency basis, without the usual waiting period for public comment.3 66 One law professor, who had previously
represented a client in an espionage case in which the government sought
to monitor his discussions with his client, professed to be "astonished" by
the new regulations and predicted that "[t]he chilling effect of this will be
positively glacial."'3 67 Another law professor observed that "monitoring,
even with these qualifications, seriously undermines people's constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of their choice when they are accused of a
363. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (3). The prior judicial approval requirement may
not be as effective as it first appears, however, because military tribunal judges may
be able to provide the approval. See Paul R. Rice & Benjamin Parlin Saul, Is the War
on Terrorism a War on Attorney-Client Privilege?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 22, 24 (2002) ("In the

military tribunal context, therefore, the executive branch will be sanctioning the
conduct of its own members. As a result, the apparentjudicial check on the executive branch is gossamer.").
364. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (3).
365. The Justice Department's position was described by a Department official as follows:
The Department ofJustice recognizes concerns that monitoring may chill
attorney-client communications and undermine the lawyer's representation of his or her client. However, in the rare cases in which monitoring
occurs, it should not chill legitimate communications about the client's
case. Given the protections that are in place, detainees should understand that they are free to discuss legitimately privileged matters with
their counsel without fear of disclosure. The only communications the
regulation should inhibit are those that may further or facilitate acts of
terrorism because the monitoring team is walled off from any prosecutors
or investigators working on the case; is prohibited from retaining any legitimately privileged communications; and, absent imminent danger,
must go to court before making any use of information obtained through
monitoring.
John P. Elwood, Prosecutingthe War on Terrorism: The Government's Position on Attorney-Client Monitoring, Detainees, and Military Tribunals, 17 CRIM. JUsT. 30, 33 (2002).
366. See George Lardner, Jr., U.S. Will Monitor Calls to Lawyers; Rules on Detainees Called 'Terrifying', WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 2001, at Al (quoting Justice Department

spokesperson) (explaining that emergency basis implementation of regulations
prior to comment "was necessary 'in view of the immediacy of the damages to the
public'"); Frank Rich, Editorial, Wait Until Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A27
(criticizing Attorney General John Ashcroft for having "discreetly slipped his new
directive allowing eavesdropping on conversations between some lawyers and clients into the Federal Register").
367. Jim Oliphant & Deirdre Davidson, DOJEavesdropping:Histoiry Lessons, LEGAt, TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 3 (quoting George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley) (quotations omitted).
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crime: only the most trusting prisoner will be willing to discuss defense
strategy candidly with his lawyer if he knows that agents from the organization that is trying to convict him are listening." 3 68 Leading academic experts on the attorney-client privilege characterized concerns about the
regulations' effect on the attorney-client relationship as "enormous because monitoring of attorney-client communications pursuant to the order will have significant implications for subsequent trials, whether in
369
civilian or military courts."
The hue and cry of criticism of the monitoring regulations has extended well beyond the halls of academia. The President of the American
Bar Association condemned the new regulations as violating the Constitu'3 7
tion's rights "to counsel and to be free from unreasonable searches.
The President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
denounced them as "an abomination. ' 37 1 An American Civil Liberties
37 2'
Union official said the new regulations are a "terrifying precedent."
The Center for National Security Studies has stated that the monitoring
scheme interferes with and undermines the lawyer-client relationship and
"will cause the ethical lawyer to advise her client against the kind of disclo' 373
sure that is necessary for adequate representation.
The Department of Justice's defense of the monitoring regulations is
essentially that the end (protecting against further terrorist attacks) justifies the means (an undeniable intrusion into the attorney-client relationship and interference with the constitutional right to counsel in criminal
cases). 37 4 Attorney General Ashcroft defended the regulations in congressional testimony by emphasizing the importance of the objectives of the
monitoring policy: "None of the information that is protected by attorneyclient privilege may be used for prosecution. Information will only be
3 75
used to stop impending terrorist attacks and to save American lives."
368. Ronald Dworkin, The 7lreat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28,
2002, at 44.
369. Rice & Saul, supra note 363, at 23.
370. Neil A. Lewis & Christopher Marquis, Longer Visa Waits for Arabs; Stir Over
U.S. Eavesdropping,N.Y. TIIES, Nov. 10, 2001, at Al (quoting American Bar Association President Robert E. Hirshon).
371. Lardner, Jr., supra note 366 (quoting National Association of Defense
Lawyers President Irwin Schwartz) (quotations omitted).
372. Id. (quoting Laura W. Murphy of the American Civil Liberties Union)
(quotations omitted).
373. Comments of the Centerfor National Security Studies on the Attorney Generals
Order Regardingthe Monitoringof Lawyer-Client Communications (Dec. 31, 2001 ) (copy
on file with author).
374. For a contrary conclusion, see Rice & Saul, supra note 363, at 29 (observing that: "Although punishment is a prominent and immediate objective, a longerterm goal of our justice system is both to appear and to be fair to those accused of
crimes. Maintaining certain baselines of fairness instills confidence in our justice
system both at home and abroad. In other words, the ends cannot justify the
means").
375. Anti-tenorism Policy Review: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,
107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (statement of Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft), available at
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Another senior Justice Department official has sought to deflect criticism
of the monitoring regulations and otherJustice Department actions in response to the September 11 attacks by arguing that "[t]he dichotomy between freedom and security is not new, but it is false." 376 This clever
argument seeks to justify intrusions into personal freedoms and infringements of constitutional rights, such as the monitoring regulations, as necessary to achieve the greater "freedom" of security of our persons and
3 77
absence of fear.
Despite these defenses, and even taking into account the horrific nature of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the need to take all appropriate steps to prevent future attacks, several things about the monitoring
regulations are troubling from a legal perspective. 378 First, the very terms
of the regulations, such as "reasonablesuspicion," 379 "future acts that could
result in death or serious bodily injury to persons" 38 0 and "properly privileged materials" 3 1 are inherently elastic and give enormous discretion to
the Attorney General and his subordinates to decide whether a particular
case is subject to the regulations. Concern about the extent of the discretion the regulations give to justice Department officials is heightened by
the fact that the regulations do not require or provide for judicial involvement in the decision to monitor attorney-client privileged communications. This effort to avoid judicial oversight is particularly troubling in
light of the Supreme Court's recent resistance to governmental efforts to
impinge upon the privilege.3 82 and, in particular, the Court's treatment of
38 3
the crime-fraud exception in United States v. Zolin.
2001 WL 26188084 (cited in Rice & Saul, supra note 363, at 23); see also Elwood,
supra note 365, at 32 (explaining that "[t]he principal purpose of the amendment
[to the Bureau of Prisons regulations] is not to develop leads on attacks that have
already occurred, but to prevent attacks from happening in the first place").
376. Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security after September 11, 25 HARV.J. L. & PUB.
PoL'v 399, 400 (2002). Mr. Dinh is Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Policy, United States Department of Justice. See id. at 399 n.*. Mr. Dinh has not
demonstrated particular sensitivity to the civil liberties implications of DOJ's actions in the wake of the September 11 tragedies, however. When asked in a CNN
interview about detainees being held in custody after September 11, he said: "What
we are doing is simply using our process or our discretion to the fullest extent to
remove from the streets those we suspect to be engaging in terrorist activity." CNN
Presents: The Eneny Within (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 12, 2002), quoted in

Dworkin, supra note 368, at n.2.
377. See Dinh, supra note 376, at 400 (using mandate to protect Americans as
justification for DOJ actions).
378. For additional criticisms of the monitoring regulations, including an explanation of why the safeguards they contain are unlikely to be adequate, see Rice
& Saul, supra note 363.
379. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001) (emphasis added).
380. Id. (emphasis added).
381. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3) (emphasis added).
382. For a further discussion on recent Supreme Court decisions on attorneyclient privilege, see supra Part II.B.
383. 491 U.S. 554 (1989). For a further discussion of the Zolin case, see supra
Parts lI.B.l.c. and II.C.I. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Department ofJustice

20031

REVOKING OUR PRIVILEGES

As discussed in Part II.B.1.c above, the Supreme Court in Zolin was
unwilling to accept an approach to the crime-fraud problem that would
"permit opponents of the privilege to engage in groundless fishing expeditions. ...

"84

The Court required judicial involvement in the determina-

tion of the applicability of the exception and concluded that to obtain in
camera review of privileged communications the party opposing the privilege "must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that
in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability." 38 5 As another commentator has noted, 386 by seeking to avoid
did not cite to the Zolin case in the analysis supporting the announcement of the
new regulations, even though it did cite a 1933 Supreme Court case on the crimefraud exception (the only other Supreme Court case directly addressing the crimefraud exception) and three circuit court cases (two of which were decided prior to
Zolin). See Prevention, supra note 141 at 55,064 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (The Corporation), 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soudan,
812 F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972,
975 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)). Presumably the
Department of Justice attorneys who prepared the legal analysis supporting the
regulations would have been aware of the most recent of only two Supreme Court
cases directly addressing the crime-fraud exception and would have cited it if it
had supported the Department's position. If they concluded that it did not support the Department's position and omitted mention of it for that reason, then
their failure to disclose and, if appropriate, distinguish such an important contrary
authority is troubling, even in a non-judicial tribunal context. Cf RESTATEMENT,
supra note 22, § 111(2) ("In representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a
lawyer may not knowingly ... fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
asserted by the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."). The analysis supporting the monitoring regulations would inspire far greater confidence if it included a straightforward analysis of how the regulations measure up to the most
recent Supreme Court guidance on the precise legal theory that is advanced. Unfortunately, the analysis does not do so.
384. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571. Of course, the comments of the Zolin Court in the
context of routine litigation and criminal investigations arguably are inapposite to
the law enforcement challenges facing the federal government after the September 11 terrorist attacks, but some consideration of the most recent relevant Supreme Court authority nonetheless seems appropriate. Cf Cover, supra note 6, at
1240-41 ("It is true that the BOP rule contemplates a context different from the
traditional evidentiary concerns that Zolin addresses. Yet notwithstanding national
security interests, the BOP rule will adversely affect the attorney-client relationship
and will have ramifications within the traditional evidentiary context. Security concerns cannot justify a complete abandonment of any judicial role."); cf also supra
note 383 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Department of Justice to
include analysis of Zolin case in legal analysis supporting new monitoring
regulations).
385. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574-75.
386. See Cover, supra note 6, at 1239-41 (discussing application of crime-fraua
exception to DOJ monitoring rule and concluding that "[g]iven the Zolin Court's
resistance to blanket in camera review for determining the crime-fraud exception's
applicability, it stretches credulity to think that the Attorney General's unilateral
review is acceptable"); cf. Rice & Saul, supra note 363, at 26-27 (describing potential application of crime-fraud exception to communications between suspected
terrorists and their counsel and concluding that Justice Department has offered
only "an unsubstantiated theory," with no evidentiary support, that crime-fraud
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judicial involvement and engage in fishing expeditions based upon "reasonable suspicion," the monitoring regulations arguably run afoul of the
Supreme Court's teachings in Zolin.
In conclusion, the widespread criticism that the new monitoring regulations have provoked, even in the post-September 11 environment of support for government efforts to protect against future terrorist attacks,
suggest that they are a misguided, even if well-intentioned, exercise of governmental power. Disregarding the important policy interests served by
the attorney-client privilege and seeking to avoid judicial review or oversight of government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship is not
the course of action that the Justice Department should follow, and alternative approaches should be explored. 38 7 Unfortunately, the approach
that the Department has taken with the new regulations is consistent with
the lack of regard it has shown for the attorney-client privilege in other
contexts, two of which are discussed below.
2.

Attorney Subpoenas in Criminal Cases

The Justice Department's willingness to invade the attorney-client
privilege in order to enhance, perhaps marginally, its ability to prevent
terrorism is consistent with recent Department practice in another area of
federal law enforcement: grand jury subpoenas to attorneys in white collar
criminal investigations. The Department's practice of subpoenaing attorneys in criminal investigations of matters in which the attorneys are providing legal advice has been a source of alarm and dismay to the defense
bar and academic commentators for almost twenty years.- 88 Ten years ago
exception may be applicable to those communications). But see Elwood, supra note
365, at 31 (quoting al-Qaeda training manual that appears to provide instruction
on using hidden messages to "communicate with brothers outside of prison").
387. See Cover, supra note 6, at 124145 (discussing "Other Options" for
preventing acts of terrorism, which would provide for judicial review of law enforcement intrusions into attorney-client relationship).
388. For a thorough analysis of the attorney subpoena problem, see Stern &
Hoffman, supra note 188, at 1796-1804. The authors of that article described the
genesis of the attorney subpoena problem as follows:
In the criminal context, prior to 1980, federal prosecutors generally believed that lawyers were not potential sources of information in criminal
investigations. Subpoenas to lawyers were rare and the government was
generally not successful in enforcing them. HoweverJustice Department
officials in the Reagan administration reexamined traditional assumptions about attorney subpoenas as they formulated aggressive approaches
to criminal investigation. They concluded that prosecutors had wrongly
assumed this investigative technique to be unavailable. The Department
then took the position that the attorney subpoena was a "new investigative tool" that could be used if nonprivileged information in the hands of
the attorney could be identified. This change in prosecutorial doctrine
coincided with developments in substantive criminal liability that made it
more feasible to characterize the provision of legal services as relevant to
proof of a criminal enterprise.
Id. at 1787 (citations omitted).
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a leading commentator on the subject succinctly described the problem:
"Grand jury subpoenas of lawyers raise a legitimate concern: lawyer testimony about client affairs may undermine clients' trust."38 9 Other commentators have focused more directly on the potential harm to the
attorney-client privilege.3 9 " Despite widespread criticism and concern
about the practice, the Justice Department's approach in this area has
been similar to that described above in connection with the prison inmate
attorney-client eavesdropping regulations: argue that the law enforcement
end justifies the investigative means and adopt regulations that purport to

contain the damage to the attorney-client relationship within acceptable
(to the Department) bounds. That approach, and why it is misguided, is
39 1
discussed briefly below.
Department of Justice regulations provide that "[pirior approval of
the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is required before
a grand jury subpoena may be issued to an attorney for information relat39 2
ing to the representation of a client or the fees paid by such client."
The Department's regulations acknowledge "the potential effects upon an
389. Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grandjuy Subpoenas
of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REv. 917, 918 (1992). Professor Zacharias goes on to point
out that "[t]he response by the bar and scholarly commentators has been uniformly negative." Id. at 921 & n.14 (collecting authorities). The response has not
changed in the ten years since Professor Zacharias made that observation. See, e.g.,
Allison E. Beach, et al., ProceduralIssues, in Sixteenth Survey of White Collar Crime, 38
A.M. CRIM. L. REv. 1151, 1193 (2001) ("Subpoenas served by United States Attorneys on counsel for the target of a grand jury investigation pose two problems.
First, they may threaten the attorney-client relationship. Second, they may become
a tool of prosecutorial abuse, permitting United States Attorneys to go on a 'fishing expedition' without first exhausting alternative means specified by DOJ guidelines to obtain the desired information.") (footnote references omitted); Rory K.
Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of FederalProsecutors?,65 FORDHAM L. REv. 355,
361, 427 (1996) (addressing ethical concerns over giving federal prosecutors too
much authority to compel information from private defense attorneys).
390. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 146, at 465 ("The use of grand jury subpoenas to attorneys has grown in use, and has been decried by commentators as placing an unfair burden on the attorney-client relationship by turning lawyers into
informants about their clients."); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 188, at 1794-95
("Clients will hesitate to consult lawyers unless absolutely necessary and will delay
Lawyers will insulate themselves from all
retaining counsel as long as possible ....
but the bare minimum of knowledge that seems necessary for discrete legal services, thus increasing the risk of mistake and ineffective representation.") (citations omitted).
391. As with the Justice Department's monitoring regulations discussed
above, this Article does not seek to provide an exhaustive analysis of the issues
presented by the attorney subpoena problem. Instead, this Article points out this
practice as one of several federal law enforcement policies and practices that most
directly impinge upon the attorney-client privilege, argues that the threat these
practices collectively present to the continued vitality of the privilege is greater
than may be apparent from analysis of any single practice and, most importantly,
suggests, infra Part IV, a more appropriate approach for federal law enforcement
officials to follow in seeking to balance legitimate investigative needs with the important policy interests that underlie the attorney-client privilege.
392. U.S. A-rrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.255 (une 2000).
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attorney-client relationship that may result from the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the attorney's representation of a client" and for that reason require prior approval for all such
subpoenas (for both criminal and civil matters).393 This approval requirement, much like the Attorney General approval requirement in the inmate monitoring regulations discussed above, reflects a judgment by the
Department that despite the potential intrusion on the attorney-client relationship, attorney subpoenas are a legitimate investigative tool in appropriate cases. In other words, the law enforcement end justifies the
investigative means, despite the risk posed to some of the most important
values and policies of our legal system. 39 4 Having made that judgment,
the Department then seeks to prevent abuses and contain damage to the
attorney-client relationship by adopting guidelines that limit the availability of attorney subpoenas as an investigative tool-subject to the discretion
of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division and with the

express proviso that the publication of those guidelines do not create any
395
substantive legal rights.
The Department's guidelines do impose significant limitations on the
use of attorney subpoenas. 396 They emphasize that (1) an attorney sub393. Id. § 9-13.410(A).

394. For a further discussion of the "end justifies the means" mentality of
some federal law enforcement authorities in the area of attorney-client privilege,
see infra Part IV.
395. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-13.410(E) (Nov. 1999) (limiting purpose of Guidelines). The relevant section of the Manual provided:
No Rights Created by Guidelines. These guidelines are set forth solely for
the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter,
civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful
investigative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
Id.
396. The Department of Justice guidelines are generally consistent with the
relevant provision of Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which provides that a criminal prosecutor should
not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to
present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; (2) the evidence sought is essential to
the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution;
and (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2002). See generally Bruce A. Green,
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How
Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460 (1996) (arguing that each
alternative contains vague rules and that instead federal judiciary should develop
single set of highly detailed rules of professional conduct); Amy R. Mashburn, A
Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of
Lawyers by FederalCourts, 8 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (1995) (proposing two alternative solutions to federal rules versus local rules: creating national federal bar with
uniform ethics rules or ceding primary responsibility for disciplinary matters
originating in federal courts to states); Casey P. McFaden, ProsecutorialMisconduct,
14 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1211 (2001) (collecting recent case law applying Model
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poena should not be used to obtain information that is protected by a
valid claim of privilege; (2) all reasonable effort should be made to obtain
the information from alternative sources; and (3) an attorney subpoena
should only be used to obtain information that is "reasonably needed for
the successful completion of the investigation or prosecution" and not to
39 7
Most important for
obtain "peripheral or speculative information."
purposes of this Article, the guidelines state that:
The need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse effects upon the attorney-client relationship. In particular,
the need for the information must outweigh the risk that the attorney may be disqualified from representation of the client as a
39 8
result of having to testify against the client.
Reasonable minds can debate-and have done so, extensivelywhether these regulations are sufficient to protect against undue interference with the attorney-client relationship and unnecessary erosion of the
attorney-client privilege.3 99 Even with these regulations in place, however,
concern about the Justice Department's use of attorney subpoenas as an
investigative tool has continued to grow. A recent survey of reported cases
found that federal prosecutors' use of attorney subpoenas and the crimefraud exception had "significantly increased" between 1995 and 1998.400
Rule 3.8); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of FederalProsecutors, or,
Who Should Regulate the Regulators?:Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996)
(suggesting that DOJ preemption process instead of ABA's model rules may
prompt Congress, "the most suitable decision-maker," to intervene in debate over
who has control over attorney professional conduct). The final requirement of
Rule 3.8(e), that there be "no other feasible alternative to obtain the information,"
arguably is considerably more restrictive than the Justice Department's requirement that all reasonable efforts should be made to obtain the information from
alternative sources, however. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2002).
Moreover, the commentary to Model Rule 3.8 states that "[p]aragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal
proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into
the client-lawyer relationship." Id. at 3.8(e) cmt. 4.
397. U.S. AtrORNEV's MANUAL § 9-13.410(C) (Nov. 1999). The guideline forbidding use of attorney subpoenas to obtain information that is protected by a
valid claim of privilege obviously implicates the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud
exception, see supra Parts II.B.l.c and II.C.1, respectively. For a further discussion
of the Justice Department's increasing reliance on that exception to overcome the
privilege, see infra Part III.
398. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-13.410(c) (Nov. 1999).
399. See Green, supra note 396, at 460. (arguing that DOJ regulations are too
vague); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, RegulatingFederalProsecutors'Ethics,55
VAND. L. REV. 381, 384 n.4 (2002) (collecting recent authorities relevant to question of whether federal courts should adopt state rules that would restrict federal
prosecutors' authority to issue grand jury subpoenas to criminal defense
attorneys).
400. Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 6, at 198 (surveying reported federal
cases in which attorneys were subpoenaed to testify before grand jury and finding
increase in percentage in which government invoked crime-fraud exception from
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Concerns about misuse of attorney subpoenas prompted the American
Bar Association to adopt a Model Rule of Professional Conduct on the
"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor" that, among other things, limits
the discretion of criminal prosecutors to subpoena attorneys. 40 1 These
concerns about abuse of attorney subpoenas also have precipitated a "debate over whether such practices should be supervised by the federal district courts." 4 112 The case law is divided over the power of the federal
courts to do so43 and the debate over whether federal prosecutors should
8.33% in 1995 to 38.01% in 1998). The findings of this survey are consistent with
observations of commentators since the Department of Justice began using attorney subpoenas as investigative tools, which have consistently raised concerns about
increases in the number of attorney subpoenas issued. See Abramovsky, supra note
6, at 682 ("According to statistics compiled by the American Bar Association and
published in the New York Law Journal, the number of subpoenas issued to attorneys by federal prosecutors rose from approximately 420 per year during 1985-87
to 645 per year between 1988 and 1990.") (citations omitted); William J. Genego,
The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 805-15 (1988) (reporting results of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers survey of prosecutorial investigative
practices, including attorney subpoenas, which showed "a consistent increase in
the practices over time"); Ross G. Greenberg, et al., Attorney-Client Privilege, 30 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (1993) ("The growing trend toward subpoenaing attorneys, rather than employing less destructive discovery techniques, has troubled
both practitioners and legal scholars."); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 188, at 178789 (noting "an explosion of subpoenas to lawyers" and citing Department of Justice statistics reflecting "a steady increase in the number of attorney subpoenas
approved by the Criminal Division").
401. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (explaining special responsibilities of prosecutor). The Model Rules were amended in February 2002,
and the provision on attorney subpoenas, previously Rule 3.8(f), became Rule
3.8(e); no changes were made to the text of the attorney subpoena provision of the
rule or the commentary on that provision. See id. at Rule 3.8 (showing 2002
changes to Rule 3.8 and accompanying commentary). The ABA had approved
resolutions in 1986 and 1988 "that denounced the practice of subpoenaing lawyers
to testify in grand jury proceedings about clients, [and] in February 1990 the ABA
added a paragraph (f) to its existing Model Rule 3.8 on the ethical duties of prosecutors." ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 55:1302 (1997). Versions of Model Rule 3.8 have been adopted in only a few states. See id. § 55:1303
(describing ethics rules in Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia that restrict
prosecutors' use of subpoenas to obtain information from lawyers about their clients). Most of those states (Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Virginia) require prior judicial approval
before a subpoena. See id. The original rule approved by the ABA in 1990 required prior judicial approval and an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding
before issuance of a subpoena, but that provision was removed in 1995 after prosecutors and others who opposed the provision successfully argued "that defense
lawyers and bar associations should attempt to secure amendments to the state and
federal rules of criminal procedure rather than try to curb attorney subpoenas
through ethical rules." Id. § 55:1302. For a further discussion of the role of courts
in the attorney subpoena process, see supra notes 388-400 and infra notes 402-403
and accompanying text (discussing role of courts in reviewing prosecutors' claims
that crime-fraud exception should be applied to compel testimony by subpoenaed
attorneys over claims of privilege).
402. Beach, et al., supra note 389, at 1193.
403. See id. at 1193 n.251 (collecting cases).
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be subject to state rules of professional responsibility-such as the rule on
40 4
attorney subpoenas in criminal cases-continues.
For purposes of this Article, the important point about the Department of Justice's practice of using attorney subpoenas as an investigative
tool, often accompanied by use of the crime-fraud exception to overcome
assertions of privilege by subpoenaed attorneys, is that the practice clearly
has contributed to a perception of continuing and significant erosion of
the privilege. 4 5 The most troubling aspects of the Department's position
in the nearly two decades of debate over the attorney subpoena issue are
its willingness to brush aside concerns about the effect of its actions on the
privilege and its apparent willingness to rely more and more heavily on the
practice in the face of repeated criticism by courts, commentators and
practitioners. Unfortunately, the Justice Department's position on this issue, under administrations of both political parties, is consistent with the
lack of sensitivity to privilege issues that the Department has shown in developing its policy on prosecution of corporations and, more recently, the
prison inmate attorney-client monitoring policy. As discussed in Part IV
below, it is time for the Department of Justice and other federal law enforcement agencies to reexamine the effects of their policies on the privi404. For a further discussion of the "McDade Amendment," see infra notes
415-20 and accompanying text.
405. One saving grace of the Justice Department's attorney subpoena practice
should be noted. Unlike the prison inmate attorney-client monitoring policy discussed above, an attorney subpoena cannot overcome the attorney-client privilege
withoutjudicial intervention. So long as the subpoenaed attorney asserts the privilege on behalf of his or her client, whether in the context of a motion to quash the
subpoena or in grand jury testimony, the government must seek judicial intervention to overcome the assertion of privilege and compel the testimony. Cf MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.6 cmt. 20 (1983) ("If a lawyer is called as a witness
to give testimony concerning a client, Rule 1.6(a) reqtiires the lawyer to invoke the
privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a
court or other tribunal of competentjurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client."). Whether the government relies upon the crime-fraud
exception or some other legal theory to challenge the attorney's assertion of privilege, see supra Part II.C (discussing various ways in which prosecutors can legitimately overcome assertions of privilege), the final decision on the privilege issue
will be made by a court, not by a prosecutor. Although this is a significant safeguard against prosecutorial overreaching and unwarranted invasion of the privilege, as a practical matter it is limited by the extremely disruptive effect of an
attorney subpoena on a client's ability to defend against a government investigation or prosecution. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 188, at 1789-95 (describing
disruptive effects of attorney subpoena and "considerable opportunities for abuse"
that exist when attorney is subpoenaed); Richard Cooper, Business Clime: Raising
the Stakes, NAT'L LJ., June 18, 2001, at Al0 ("The threats such subpoenas pose to
the attorney-client relationship are serious. Service of the subpoena may chill communications between client and lawyer. A grand jury appearance by the lawyer
may make the client suspicious of betrayal. The subpoena may lead to a diversion
of the lawyer's time and energies from concentration on defense of the client.").
For this reason, the significance of the attorney subpoena problem and its potential to erode the privilege should not be minimized, notwithstanding the ultimate
judicial resolution of the privilege issue in many such cases.
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lege, and to consider how those policies can be improved to avoid
unnecessary and unwise erosion of the privilege.

3.

Department ofJustice Policy on Contacts with Represented Persons

One other controversial Department of Justice policy relating to the
attorney-client relationship should be briefly recognized for its contribution to the growing perception that the attorney-client privilege is under
attack by federal law enforcement authorities. In a 1989 memorandum to
"All Justice Department Litigators," then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh took the position that state rules of professional responsibility limiting contacts with persons represented by counsel do not apply to Justice
6
Department attorneys. 4 11
Known as the "Thornburgh Memorandum,"
7
this new policy11 was enormously controversial and drew protests from
the ABA, the courts, and the chief justices of several states.4 °18 Congress
406. See Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93 (D.N.M. 1992) (reprinting
"Thornburgh Memorandum"). Relying in part upon the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, the Thornburgh Memorandum took the position that Department of
Justice attorneys and law enforcement officers they supervise are not subject to
state rules of professional responsibility:
Accordingly, an attorney employed by the Department, and any individual acting at the direction of that attorney, is authorized to contact or
communicate with any individual in the course of an investigation or
prosecution unless the contact or communication is prohibited by the
Constitution, statute, Executive Order, or applicable federal regulation.
Id. at 493; see also Neals-Erik William Delker, Comment, Ethics and the FederalProsecutor: The ContinuingConflict Over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to FederalAttorneys,
44 AM. U. L. REv. 855, 865 (1995) ("The second point asserted by the Department
for prosecutors' exemption from the anti-contact rule is that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution bars the enforcement of the ethics rule at the state or
local level.") (citation omitted); Sapna K. Khatiwala, Note, Toward Unifon Application of the "No-Contact" Rule: McDade is the Solution, 13 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 116
(1999) (discussing Thornburgh Memorandum's reliance on Supremacy Clause).
407. The Thornburgh Memorandum purported to build upon an April 1980
Carter Administration memorandum issued by the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel, which took the position that federal prosecutors were limited only
by the Constitution and federal statutes in carrying out their duties. See Doe, 801 F.
Supp. at 491 (discussing Thornburg Memorandum); see also Delker, supra note
406, at 865 n.61 (citing 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576 (1980)). Regardless of the
validity of its claim to having been an extension of the policy of a prior administration, the Thornburgh Memorandum provoked a firestorm of criticism when it was
announced.
408. See Delker, supra note 406, at 866 n.67 ("The American Bar Association
House of Delegates voted in its February 1990 Midyear Meeting to reject the
Thornburgh Memorandum.") (citations omitted); Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal
Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1251, 1260-61 (2001)
(describing opposition to new policy by many groups that were "quick to condemn
the Thornburgh Memorandum"). Although this Article does not seek to provide a
detailed examination of the history and legal issues relating to the Thornburgh
Memorandum, it probably is important to note that Attorney General Thornburgh's action was prompted, at least in part, by a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that raised important questions about the
extent to which Department of Justice attorneys are subject to state professional
responsibility rules. See Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 490-91 (reprinting portions of Thorn-
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also expressed its disapproval of the Justice Department's position, although it did not take legislative action at that time to overturn the
policy.

40 9

Although it was implemented by a Republican administration and was
the subject of widespread criticism, the Clinton administration Justice Department and Attorney General Janet Reno continued to embrace the
core principles of the Thornburgh Memorandum and eventually adopted
4 1°
The
a final regulation that in large measure adopted those principles.

"Reno Rules," 4 11 as they were called, did not diminish the criticism and
controversy over the Justice Department's position, nor did they receive a
4 12
or state bar authorringing endorsement from the federal courts

burgh Memorandum that discuss United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 864 (2d Cir.
1988), later revised 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Delker, supra note 406, at
862-65 (describing Hammad and its effect on Department of Justice policy); Khatiwala, supra note 406, at 115-16 (describing Hammad and stating that Attorney
General Thornburgh "responded to Hammad" by issuing his memorandum on
contacts with represented persons).
409. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of FederalProsecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 213-14 & n.31 (2000) (citing House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Environment: More
Attention Required, H.R. REP. No. 101-986, at 32 (1990)) ("We disagree with the
Attorney General's attempts to exempt Department attorneys from compliance
with the ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong and
in the rules of the Federal Courts before which they appear.").
410. See Mick, supra note 408, at 1258-59 (describing process by which regulations were proposed, revised and adopted, and observing that even though "Reno
Rules" were "significantly more temperate than Thornburgh Memorandum's original assertions," they "continued to grant federal prosecutors significant freedom
from state ethics rules in their investigative pursuits") (citations omitted); see also
Delker, supra note 406, at 871-73 (describing evolution of regulations and concluding that "the fundamental defect in the Department's position-regulation of federal prosecutors by the Department of Justice instead of by state tribunals and
federal courts-remains unchanged") (citations omitted); Khatiwala, supra note
406, at 119 ("In a surprising move, however, the Department ofJustice, under the
guidance of Attorney GeneralJanet Reno, republished the Thornburgh memorandum making only minor changes.").
411. The Reno Rules, which have since been rescinded, were previously published. See Ethical Standards For Attorneys for the Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 (1999),
reprinted in Khatiwala, supra note 406, at 119 n.77.
412. See State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d. 457, 465 (Minn. 1999) (asserting that
ruling in O'Keefe was "based upon a violation of the separation of powers principle
by U.S. Attorney General's internal 'housekeeping' rules which permitted such interviews [of corporate employees by government officials], and was not based
upon the ethical no-contact rule"); Brenna K. Devaney, Note, The "No-Contact"
Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL
Ertncs 933, 936 (2001) (discussing McDonnell court's challenge to validity of Reno
Rules and subsequent decision by state chiefjustices to declare federal policy invalid); Khatiwala, supra note 406, at 120-21 (describing invalidation of regulation by
court in United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 132 F.3d 1252
(8th Cir. 1998)). One commentator summed up the dispute as follows:
By 1998, the war over ethics regulations had reached a stalemate.
Whereas the DOJ insisted that it needed the power to exempt its prosecutors from certain rules, the federal judiciary, although sometimes siding
with the DOJ, rejected the argument that the Attorney General had the
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ities. 4 1: Neither the courts nor the Department ofJustice were to have the
last word on the matter, however.
In 1998, under unusual circumstances, 41 4 Congress had the last
word-so far-on the question of whether state professional responsibility
rules apply to federal prosecutors. Congressman Joseph McDade (previously the subject of a Justice Department investigation and ultimately acquitted of all charges), succeeded in attaching to the annual
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1999 a rider entitled the Citizens Protection Act (CPA). 4 15 The CPA, or the "McDade Amendment" as it became
known, survived Senate debate on the appropriations bill and ultimately
became law. 4 1 6 As presently in effect, the McDade Amendment prescribes
"Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government" and provides that
federal government attorneys "shall be subject to State laws and rules, and
local federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the
same manner as other attorneys in that State. ' 4 17 Critics in Congress, who
support the Department of Justice position that attorneys for the federal
government should be exempted from state ethics rules, have tried unsucauthority to create blanket ethics exemptions for federal prosecutors. At
the same time, state courts and local ethics regulators demanded that
federal prosecutors conform to the same standards as other attorneys in
their jurisdictions.
Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113
HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2088 (2000) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Note, Federal
Prosecutors].
413. See Jesselyn Alicia Radack, The Big Chill: Negative Effects of the McDade
Amendment and the Conflict Between Federal Statutes, 14 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHicS 707, 714
(2001) (describing Missouri Bar Chief Disciplinary Counsel advisory opinions applying Missouri no-contact rule even to former employees of represented corporate party).
414. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 409, at 208 ("With the 1998 federal
appropriations bill, Congress passed a remarkable rider regulating federal government attorneys. The rider was entitled the Citizens Protection Act (CPA) and encapsulated a previously proposed statute that had not survived the committee
process.") (citations omitted); Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 412, at 2080
("Buried within a 920-page appropriations act passed by Congress in October 1998
was the most significant change in the ethics regulation of federal prosecutors in
more than twenty years.").
415. For a detailed review and analysis of the enactment of the CPA and Congressman McDade's prior efforts to have the legislation enacted, see Zacharias &
Green, supra note 409, at 211-15.
416. See id. at 215 & n.53 (noting that President signed appropriation bill into
law on October 21, 1998). The effective date of the CPA was stayed until April 19,
1999, but despite efforts to repeal or revise it by Senator Orrin Hatch, it took effect
on that date. See id. at 209.
417. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2002). The CPA also requires the Attorney General to "make and amend rules of the Department ofJustice to assure compliance
with [the law]". Id. § 530B(b). The Justice Department implemented new regulations in April 1999, see Ethical Standards Recognizing State Laws and State and
Local Federal Court Rules, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,273 (Apr. 20, 1999), which superseded
the "Reno Rule" regulations, see supra note 416. The current regulations are at 28
C.F.R. pt. 77 (2002) (discussing ethical standards for government attorneys).
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cessfully to overturn or revise the McDade Amendment. 4 18 At present,
however, the McDade Amendment remains law, and for now the courts
4 19
are left with the task of interpreting and applying it.
For purposes of this Article, the important point concerning the debate over whether Justice Department attorneys should be subject to state
ethics rules is not the merits of the arguments on either side or even the
ultimate outcome. The important point is that the Department of Justice
adopted a policy and practice that, at least until it was curtailed by the
McDade Amendment, represented (or was perceived to represent, which
has the same negative effects) a significant intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. For a decade before the McDade Amendment became
law the express policy of the Justice Department was to decide for itself
whether or not to comply with state "no-contact" rules that forbid direct
contacts with represented persons. The no-contact rules serve a variety of
purposes that are central to our adversarial system of justice, including
protecting clients from disclosing privileged information. 421 As the huge
outpouring of criticism described above-from the bar, the courts, Congress (which ultimately "overruled" the Justice Department), and scholarly
commentators-demonstrates, the Justice Department's policy was perceived as an attack on the attorney-client relationship that threatened the
same interests that underlie the attorney-client privilege. For that reason,
this policy merits inclusion with the other Department of Justice policies
418. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 412, at 2093-97 (describing and
evaluating efforts to amend McDade Amendment). For a thoughtful analysis of
the McDade Amendment's effects on the activities of federal prosecutors, see
Zacharias & Green, supra note 409, at 215-24. Professors Zacharias and Green,
who have probably devoted more thought and scholarly attention to this issue than
any other commentators, have concluded that Congress should authorize the federal courts to assume control of the regulation of federal prosecutors' ethics,
through a cooperative mechanism that provides for input by the Justice Department, the defense bar, and state ethics regulators. See Green & Zacharias, supra
note 399, at 478 (arguing for regulation of prosecutorial ethics by federal
judiciary).
419. Review and analysis of cases interpreting and applying the McDade
Amendment is not necessary for purposes of this Article. Recent articles that analyze the case law include Green & Zacharias, supra note 399, at 423-24; Radack,
supra note 413, at 719-20; Zacharias & Green, supra note 409, at 228-30; Khatiwala,
supra note 406, at 128-29.
420. See Roger C. Crampton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and FederalProsecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV.
291, 325 (1992) (discussing reasons for anti-contact rule); Khatiwala, supra note
406, at 114 (discussing number of policy justifications for no-contact rule, including that "[t]he rule reduces the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or
other information that might harm their interests"). Although an argument can
be made that the no-contact rule should not apply to the investigatory activities of
law enforcement officials, see Crampton & Udell, supra, at 326 (citing H. Richard
Uviler, Evidence from the Mind of the CriminalSuspect: A Reconsideration of the Current
Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM L. REv. 1137 (1987)), that argument has not
gained sufficient currency to overcome the perception that the Justice Department's policy was an inappropriate intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
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and practices described in this Article that have collectively achieved a critical mass as a threat to the continued viability of the privilege.
E.

The Securities and Exchange Commission's New Cooperation Policy

The Department of Justice is not the only federal agency that has recently taken actions that significantly affect the attorney-client relationship
in general and the attorney-client privilege in particular. In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a formal agency policy of

granting leniency in exchange for cooperation in appropriate cases-an
approach that the agency previously had applied on a case-by-case basis,
4 21
although expert practitioners have long been aware of the practice.
The SEC announced its new policy in connection with an October
2001 enforcement proceeding, In the Matter of Gisela de Leon-Meredith.42 2 In
de Leon-Meredith, the Commission took action against an individual corporate official for misstating her employer's financial results, but did not take
any action against the corporate entities whose financial results had been
misstated. 4 23" The lack of enforcement action against the corporate parent
421. For an example from over a decade ago of an SEC administrative proceeding in which the agency gave favorable consideration to the subject's voluntary and proactive cooperation with the Commission's investigation, see In the
Matter of M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 27,208, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
73,714 (Sept. 1, 1989), in which the administrative order stated:
In resolving this matter by the entry of this Order, the Commission has
considered the affirmative corrective steps MDC has taken. As noted
above, in response to the Commission's investigation, the Company voluntarily initiated an extensive internal review that identified the accounting matters described in this Order. The Company advised its
independent auditors of the results of its review and, after consulting with
its auditors, recorded the accounting adjustments noted above. At the
conclusion of its internal review, the Company implemented new control
procedures which it asserts are intended to improve the Company's accounting and financial reporting. The Company also advised the Commission staff of the outcome of its internal review and the reasons for the
accounting adjustments recorded. The Company's proactive response to the
Commission's investigation and cooperation with the Commission's staff were
taken into account in resolving this matter through the enty of this Order.
Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis supplied).
422. In the Matter of Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Exchange Act Release No.
44969, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,986 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter de LeonMeredith

Release],

available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-

44969.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
423. The de Leon-Meredith case, at least as reported by the SEC, was a relatively
"easy" corporate cooperation case because of its somewhat unusual and uncharacteristic facts as compared to more typical financial fraud cases. First, the
SEC order indicates that de Leon-Meredith alone was responsible for the misstated
financial results. Second, the SEC order indicates that the wrongdoing was confined to a single subsidiary unit of the corporate parent, which was the reporting
entity. See id. Third, the restatements required to correct the misstatements of
prior years earnings, while significant, did not appear to change the overall trend
of earnings over the relevant period, and the price of the company's stock did not
decline after the restatement was made public. All of these factors combined to
make it easy for parent company management to promptly and filly report the
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was particularly noteworthy because the company was publicly traded and
its financial statements had been misstated for five years in amounts that
were significant in relation to previously reported earnings. 42 4 In such
circumstances, a reporting company normally would do well to avoid fraud
charges by the SEC and be "let off" with financial reporting and record
matter to the SEC and cooperate with its investigation. Such cooperation is most

likely to be forthcoming when senior management's own conduct is not at issue or
when new senior management discovers evidence of improper actions by predecessor management. An example of the latter circumstances, in which the SEC also
gave lenient enforcement treatment in exchange for cooperation, is In the Matter
of Cendant Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 42933, available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-42933.htm (June 14, 2000) [hereinafter Cendant
Release]. In Cendant, two companies merged and after the merger management of
one company discovered that a "massive financial fraud" had been conducted by
former management of the other company. See id. at n.2. They promptly reported
the fraud to the SEC, cooperated in its investigation, and in determining to settle
with the company on favorable terms (i.e., not fraud charges) "the Commission
considered remedial acts promptly undertaken by Cendant and cooperation afforded the Commission and other authorities." Id. at Part VI; see also In re Cendant
Corp. Securities Litigation, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving $3.2 billion
settlement of private securities fraud class action), cert. denied Mark v. Cal. Pub.
Employee Ret. Sys., 122 S.Ct. 1300 (2002). Cooperation is less likely to be forthcoming when the actions of current management are tinder investigation, although it may occur in such circumstances and may result in significant benefits
for the affected company. An example is M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., in which the company cooperated with the SEC staffs investigation and was charged with reporting
and recordkeeping violations, but not fraud, by the SEC. See Exchange Act Release
No. 27,208, supra note 421. For a further discussion of M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., see
supra note 421 and accompanying text.
424. See de Leon-Meredith Release, supra note 422 (noting that company's
books were inaccurate and its financial reports were misstated). For example, the
restatement negated some eighty percent of reported 1999 results, reducing net
earnings from $240,000 to $47,000. For 1995 net earnings were reduced by over
eight percent, from $20.2 million to $18.5 million. Another indicator of the unusually lenient treatment the company received is that nowhere in the Cease and
Desist Order did the agency characterize the amounts of these misstatements as
"material"-instead, the Order merely states that the company's "annual and quarterly financial reports from December 31, 1995 through March 31, 2000 did not
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles." Id. It is likely that the
Commission's actions in not bringing an enforcement proceeding against the reporting entity and not characterizing the amounts involved as "material" would be
beneficial to the company in seeking to defend or settle any private shareholder
securities litigation based upon the same facts. See generally RALPH C. FERRARA &
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 3:62
(2001) (describing benefits of negotiated settlements with SEC, including avoidance of adverse findings of fact that could be used against settling company in
subsequent private damages action). The Commission's failure to characterize the
misstatements in the de Leon-Meredith case as material to prior reported financial
results is a particularly striking concession, in light of the fact that the agency had
recently issued a Staff Accounting Bulletin cautioning reporting companies that
even a two percent overstatement of earnings may be deemed material by the
Commission. See Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 17 C.F.R. § 211 (1999) [hereinafter
SAB 99]. For an in-depth analysis of SAB and the SEC's views on materiality, see
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 1.11 (Law
Journal Press 1984 & 2002 Update).
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5

but for the corporate entity not to be charged at all
was a significant act of leniency on the part of the Commission and a notable departure from usual practice at the agency.
Apparently recognizing the significance of its action (or, more accurately stated, inaction) in not bringing an enforcement action against the
26
corporate issuer, the SEC took the unusual step 4 of explaining itself in a
separate "Report of Investigation" (Section 21(a) Report) that described
the reasons for its leniency toward the issuer in the de Leon-Meredith
case. 42 7 In its press release announcing the report, the SEC identified
425. For examples of negotiated administrative settlements with the SEC in
which the corporate issuers were charged with reporting and record keeping violations, but not violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws,
because of the company's cooperation and voluntary institution of corrective measures, see supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text and infra notes 426-38 and
accompanying text (discussing M.DC. Holdings and Cendant). The Cendant case
illustrates the point that obtaining lenient settlement terms from the SEC does not
necessarily ensure success in related private securities fraud class action litigation,
in which plaintiffs' counsel often will seek to make use of the factual allegations
and other information in SEC settlement documents. See Cendant,264 F.3d at 201
(approving $3.2 billion private securities fraud class action settlement-largest securities class action recovery in history at that time-after negotiated settlement
with the SEC in which company was charged with reporting and recordkeeping
violations but was not charged with fraud).
426. Publication by the Commission of a "Report of Investigation" pursuant
to section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a), is an
unusual agency action that typically is reserved for matters of broad public importance extending beyond the individual interests of the parties involved in a particular enforcement action. See The Commission's Practice Relating to Reports of
Investigations and Statements Submitted to the Commission Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 15,664,
1979 SEC LEXIS 1939 (Mar. 21, 1979); see also FERRARA & STEINBERG, supra note
424, § 3:37 (describing SEC practice with respect to Section 21(a) Reports). For
example, the Commission used a Section 21(a) Report to discuss its investigation
of New York City's financial crisis in the 1970's, a matter of widespread public
interest and importance not only to the holders of New York City municipal bonds,
but to the State of New York and the entire country. See Final Report in the Matter
of Transactions in the Securities of the City of New York, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6021, Exchange Act Release No. 15,547, 1979 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Feb. 10,
1979). A more recent example is the SEC's Section 21(a) Report on the Orange
County California bond crisis. See Report of Investigation In the Matter of County
of Orange, California, Exchange Act Release No. 36,761, 52 S.E.C. 681, 1996
LEXIS 132 (Jan. 24, 1996). The SEC has said that such reports "can appropriately
be issued where a question of public importance is involved and the public, or at
least the financial community, should be informed concerning the nature of the
situation and the Commission's response to it." In re Spartek, Exchange Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979) (quoted in FERRARA & STEINBERG, supra note 424,
at 46-47). The use of a Section 21(a) report to announce the Commission's cooperation policy, in an otherwise insignificant (at least in terms of importance to the
investing public and the financial markets generally) and unremarkable enforcement proceeding, suggests that the agency wished to go to unusual lengths to publicize its new cooperation policy.
427. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23,
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"four broad measures of a company's cooperation" that may influence the
agency's decision as to what enforcement action, if any, should be brought
against the company. 428 The four measures are:
Selpolicing prior to the discovery of the misconduct, including
establishing effective compliance procedures and an appropriate
tone at the top;
Self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered, including conducting a thorough review of the nature, extent, origins and consequences of the misconduct, and promptly, completely, and
effectively disclosing the misconduct to the public, to regulators,
and to self-regulators;
Remediation, including dismissing or appropriately disciplining
wrongdoers, modifying and improving internal controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of the misconduct, and appropriately compensating those adversely affected; and
Cooperation with law enforcement authorities,including providing the
Commission staff with all information relevant to the underlying
429
violations and the company's remedial efforts.
These measures of cooperation are unremarkable, and for the most
part are consistent with the policies of other agencies 430 and the coopera431
tion provisions of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
[hereinafter Section 21(a) Report]. The report outlines the steps taken by the
publicly traded parent company, Seaboard Corporation, after it discovered potential violations of the federal securities laws. See id. The Section 21 (a) Report states
that within a week of learning about the misconduct, the company's internal auditors had conducted a preliminary investigation and advised the parent company's
senior management of the problems. See id. Senior management then advised the
board's audit committee. See id. Consequently, Seaboard's full board of directors
authorized the company to engage independent outside counsel to conduct an
investigation. See id. Four days later, Seaboard dismissed de-Leon Meredith, who,
as the controller of a subsidiary, had caused the earnings overstatements, as well as
two other employees who had inadequately supervised her. See id. A day later,
Seaboard publicly disclosed that its financial statements would be restated. Furthermore, Seaboard cooperated fully with the SEC staff's investigation and produced the details of its internal investigation, including notes and transcripts of
interviews, and declined to invoke its attorney-client privilege, work product protection or other privileges or protections with respect to the investigation. See id.
428. SEC Press Release No. 2001-117, SEC Issues Report of Investigationand Statement Setting Forth Frameworkfor Evaluating Cooperationin ExercisingProsecutorialDiscretion (Oct. 23, 2001) (providing "framework for evaluating cooperation in
determining whether and how to charge violations of the federal securities laws"),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/prosdiscretion.htm.
429. Id. (emphasis in original).
430. For a further discussion of the Voluntary Disclosure Programs, see infra
Part II.F.
431. For a further discussion of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
see supra Part III.C.1.
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The manner in which the application of these factors was described in the
accompanying Section 21(a) Report, however, is somewhat troubling, particularly if the reader is not extremely attentive to the details of the Commission's Report. The troubling aspect of the Section 21(a) Report is that
on its first page, in the second, key paragraph 4 32 describing the SEC's reasons for not taking action against the parent company in the de Leon-Meredith case, it emphasizes that "[a]mong other things, the company
produced the details of its internal investigation, including notes and transcripts of interviews of Meredith and others; and it did not invoke the attorney-client privilege, work product protection or other privileges or protections with
433
respect to any facts uncovered in the investigation."

This language about privilege, and the prominence it was given in
what was clearly intended to be a major policy statement by the federal
agency with principal responsibility for policing the financial markets and
regulating corporate America, 43 4 is unfortunate because it tends to distort
an important nuance in what is otherwise a very carefully considered and
well-crafted policy statement by the SEC. The language could easily be
read to suggest that waiving privileges is necessary in order to obtain credit
for cooperation. 43 5 That interpretation is incorrect, however, because a
close reading of the entire Section 21 (a) Report makes clear that waiver of
privileges, as such, is neither an objective of the SEC nor a condition for
receiving full credit for cooperating with the agency.
Near the end of the Section 21 (a) Report the Commission provides a
non-exclusive list 4 36 of thirteen criteria that it may consider in determin-

ing whether to give the subject of an enforcement action credit for cooperation. The eleventh listed criterion identifies the relevant issues with
432. For a further description of the extent of the company's cooperation as
described in the Section 21(a) Report, see supra note 427 and accompanying text.
433. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 427, at I (emphasis added).
434. For a further discussion of the significance of the SEC's use of a Section
21 (a) Report to announce its new cooperation policy, see supra note 427 and accompanying text.
435. See Frank C. Razzano, To Cooperate With the Securities and Exchange Commission or Not to Cooperate, That is The Question, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 241, 248 (2002) ("Finaily, cooperation means providing the Commission with all relevant information,
which includes not invoking any privileges."); see also Stephen J. Crimmins, SEC's
New CooperationPolicy May Create Opportunitiesfor Counsel and Issuers, 33 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1581, 1582 (Nov. 5, 2001) ("The Commission's statement appears
to encourage privilege waiver without explicitly requiring it."); cf. generally Richard
A. Spehr & Claudius 0. Sokenu, SEC Self-Policing Policy Presents Benefits and Pitfalls,
16 ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (July 2002) (discussing "The Downside:
Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege" and noting that "the prudent course would be
to cooperate fully with the SEC investigation while preserving the company's
privilege").
436. The Section 21 (a) Report states that the intent of the Commission is not
to "limit ourselves to the criteria we discuss below" and that it will continue to
exercise its judgment in determining what enforcement action is appropriate in a
particular case. See Section 21(a) Report, supra note 427, at 2.
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respect to assertion of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
protection:
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff the
results of its review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the situation? Did the company identify possible violative conduct and evidence with sufficient precision to
facilitate prompt enforcement actions against those who violated
the law? Did the company produce a thorough and probing written report detailing the findings of its review? Did the company
voluntarily disclose information our staff did not directly request
and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the company ask
its employees to cooperate with our staff and make all reasonable
43 7
efforts to secure such cooperation?
Unlike the gratuitous reference to not invoking privileges found on
the first page of the Section 21 (a) Report, 438 this language neither emphasizes waiving privileges nor implies that doing so is necessary to obtain
credit for cooperation. Instead, the language appropriately focuses on voluntary disclosure of all relevant underlying factual information, 4 39 including information that might not otherwise be discovered by government
investigators, and cooperation by the corporate entities involved, such as
by encouraging employees to cooperate with the investigation. Moreover,
the omission of any references to waiving privileges in this criterion clearly
is both a considered and intentional decision by the agency, as an accom44°
panying footnote explains.
437. Id. at 3.
438. Another unfortunate example of language implying that waiver of privileges is necessary to obtain credit for cooperation can be found in the Commission's cease-and-desist order in the Cendant case, see Cendant Release, supra note
423 ("Cendant management promptly reported the discovery of the fraud and its
attendant accounting irregularities to the SEC staff; conducted a thorough internal investigation and compiled an extensive report thereon; waived privileges as to
the report and filed the report, and the accompanying exhibits, as Exhibits to a
Report on Form 8-K, and cooperated with the staff in its investigation of this matter.") (emphasis added).
439. Once again, this was the critical distinction that was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Upjohn between privileged communications, on the one hand,
and underlying factual information, on the other. See Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (scope of privilege protection). The latter is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Court made clear in Upjohn, and can
be communicated to a government law enforcement agency (or any other party)
without waiving the privilege. The discussion in footnote 3 of the SEC's Section
21(a) Report implicitly recognizes and is consistent with this important distinction.
See Section 21 (a) Report, supra note 427, at n.3. The broader language on the first
page of the Report, discussed above, unfortunately is likely to obscure this distinction, especially if it is read out of context and without the fuller explanation provided later in the Report.
440. See Section 21(a) Report, supra note 427, at n.3. (recognizing that attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine and other privileges serve important
social interests).
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In its footnote on privileges, the Section 21(a) Report takes a more
cautious and meticulous approach to addressing the relationship between
corporate cooperation and privilege protections. The footnote stresses
the Commission's recognition that the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, as well as other privileges, "serve important social
interests." 44' The footnote goes on to state explicitly that "the Commission does not view a company's waiver of a privilege as an end in itself,but only
as a means (where necessary) to provide relevant and sometimes critical
information to the Commission staff.' 442 Here, in a footnote at the end of
the Section 21 (a) Report, the SEC took the right approach. As the discussion in the footnote implicitly recognizes, it is possible (and probably possible in most cases) for a party under investigation to cooperate fully with
the government and provide investigators with all relevant underlying factual information without waiving privileges. Nothing in the SEC's carefully articulated analysis of the privilege issue in the footnote suggests
hostility to the privilege or implies that waiver is necessary to obtain credit
for cooperation. To the contrary, the footnote demonstrates sensitivity to
the importance of the compelled privilege waiver issue and a willingness to
work with parties to avoid unnecessary waivers that might undermine the
continued vitality of the privilege. Unfortunately, this subtle point may
not be appreciated by those who do not read the entire Section 21(a)
Report carefully, and instead only rely on the language on its first page.
The Commission's solicitous approach to the privilege and its desire
to avoid unnecessary waiver is further evidenced, although very subtly, by
the carefully chosen wording that is used in the text at page one of the
Section 21(a) Report and in the privilege footnote. The text at page one
says that the company under investigation "did not invoke '443 the privilege, while the footnote says that companies under investigation by the
SEC may "consider choosing not to assert" 444 the privilege. The Commission's use of this very precise language, rather than referring to "waiver" or
"waiving" the privilege, is consistent with the overall conclusion that the
SEC did not intend to require wholesale waivers of privilege by companies
under investigation in order to obtain the benefits of the new cooperation
441. Id. The footnote does not further identify or describe those interests,
but it hardly need do so in light of the near-universal acceptance of the "modern
theory" of the policy interests that are served by the privilege. For a further discussion of the policy interests identified by Wigmore and the Supreme Court, see
supra Part II.A.
442. Id. (emphasis added). The footnote also points out that the Commission
has taken the position in litigation that "the provision of privileged information to
the Commission staff pursuant to a confidentiality agreement did not necessarily
waive the privilege as to third parties." Id. This language reinforces the point,
discussed below, that the SEC did not intend to suggest that waiving privileges is
necessary to obtain credit for cooperation. In fact, it appears that the Commission
would not regard providing even privileged information (as opposed to underlying
factual information) under such circumstances as necessarily constituting a waiver.
443. Id. at 1.
444. Id. at n.3.

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRVILEGES

policy. 4 4 5 In fact, the footnote indicates that in at least one litigated case

the SEC has taken the position that voluntarily providing information to
the SEC pursuant to a confidentiality agreement should not operate as a
446
waiver as to third parties.
This is an important point that should be noted both by companies
that are under investigation by the SEC and by other federal law enforcement authorities that are developing or applying cooperation policies.
The approach taken by the SEC in its new cooperation policy statement,
properly understood, is consistent with the approach to privilege issues
employed by the Supreme Court in its recent privilege cases, which is discussed in Part II.B, above. In most cases it is not necessary or appropriate
for law enforcement officials to require waiver of privileges by parties
under investigation. If they do so, they risk undermining the important
public policy interests that underlie the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine.
F.

Other FederalAgencies' Cooperation and Voluntary DisclosurePrograms

Although its discussion of the compelled privilege waiver issue could
be more prominent and explicit, the SEC's new cooperation policy is still
very important as a source of guidance for other federal agencies because
of the SEC's long history of success with cooperation policies and voluntary disclosure programs. 4 4 7 The SEC created a voluntary disclosure program in the 1970s to deal with the "questionable and illegal corporate
payments" scandal that was exposed by the Watergate Special Prosecutor's
investigation. 4 48 The scope of the questionable payments problem and
445. Again, however, it is unfortunate that this subtle nuance of wording is
likely to be lost on many readers of the Section 21 (a) Report.
446. See Section 21(a) Report, supra note 427, at n.3. For a recent judicial
decision by an influential court holding that providing information to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a confidentiality agreement does not constitute a
waiver, see generally Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
447. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 187 n.157 (1990) ("A particularly effective program of the 1970s was the Commission's Voluntary Disclosure
Program."). But cf. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate
Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J.
1559, 1584 (1990) (describing criticism of SEC's foreign payments investigations

by academics and government officials).
448. See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Report of
the Securities and Exchange Comm'n on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (discussing creation program); see
also Edward D. Herlihy & Theodore A. Levine, CorporateCrisis: The Overseas Payment
Problem, 8 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 547, 584-94 (1976) (discussing SEC's voluntary disclosure program); Pitt & Groskauifmanis, supra note 447, at 1582-87
(describing SEC program and legislative response to foreign payments scandal).
For a judicial description of the SEC's foreign payments voluntary disclosure program, see JudgeJ. Skelly Wright's opinion in In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 800-01
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the number of companies involved was so great that the SEC did not have
the resources to investigate each case individually. 449 To deal with this
glut of cases, the SEC devised a voluntary disclosure program and announced that the Commission "would be less inclined to bring enforcement proceedings against companies that issued a 'declaration of
cessation"' of questionable payments and took appropriate investigative
and remedial steps.450 The effectiveness of the SEC's program was widely
publicized, 4 5 1 and other government agencies have since developed their
own versions of voluntary disclosure programs. 452 Unfortunately, some of
those programs are structured in a manner that unnecessarily and inappropriately pressure participants in the program to waive privileges. The
discussion that follows briefly describes those programs and highlights the
privilege waiver issues they present.
1.

The Department of Justice Antitrust Division Voluntary Disclosure Program

In 1978, shortly after the SEC's successful utilization of a voluntary
disclosure program to resolve the questionable payments cases, the Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice instituted a voluntary disclosure
program. 453- The program became known as the corporate "amnesty" policy because under the program a corporation (the original program did
449. See Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 800 n.10 (citing Herlihy & Levine, supra note
448, at 577-79, and Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,
94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 23 (1976) (testimony of R. Hills, Chairman, SEC)).
450. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 447, at 1582 (documenting SEC's
institution of voluntary disclosure program); see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note
318, at 651-52 (same). The SEC program required companies to appoint a committee of independent outside directors, retain independent counsel to conduct
an internal investigation for the committee, and file with the SEC a public report
on Form 8-K describing in general terms the investigation conducted, management's knowledge of the questionable payments, and the impact of the company's
decision to abandon the payment practice. See Richard H. Porter, Voluntary Disclosures to FederalAgencies-Their Impact on the Ability of Corporationsto Protect From Discovery MaterialsDeveloped During the Course of Internal Investigations, 39 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1007, 1020 (1990) (noting that to encourage participation in program, SEC
provided incentives such as relief from expense of formal investigation and litigation and, promised "leniency" to companies participating in program).
451. As one pair of commentators noted:
In the end, four hundred companies admitted to questionable or illegal
payments totaling $300 million. In the wake of public disclosures about
payments made to foreign officials by American-based companies, three
foreign governments collapsed, American relations with some of its western allies became strained, and a monarchy was weakened.
Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 447, at 1583 (citations omitted).
452. See generally Stephen R. Geisler, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations
of Federal Law, 51 ALA. L. REv. 375, 376-79 (1999) (discussing various voluntary
disclosure programs); Porter, supra note 450, at 1018-020 (describing development
of Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Defense voluntary disclosure programs).
453. See, e.g., Geisler, supra note 452, at 377 (citing Gary G. Lynch & Eric F.
Grossman, Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing, SC73 ALI-ABA 155, 186 (1998)).
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not apply to individuals) could "avoid criminal prosecution, i.e., obtain
'amnesty,' by confessing its role in illegal activities, fully cooperating with
the Division, and meeting other specified conditions." 454 Under the original program leniency was available only if a corporation voluntarily disclosed a violation before the Antitrust Division had commenced an
investigation of the matter, but the Antitrust Division revised and expanded the program in August 1993 to provide amnesty even in cases in
455
which an investigation already had been commenced by the Division.
The 1993 revision to the program also provided amnesty for individual
corporate directors, officers and employees of the self-reporting corporation who admit wrongdoing and assist the Division with its investigation. 456 In August 1994, the Division further revised and expanded the
amnesty program by establishing a new leniency policy for individuals who
approach the Division on their own behalf, and not as part of a corporate
45 7
voluntary self-report.
The Antitrust Division program essentially rewards corporations who
voluntarily report an antitrust violation, which by definition involves collective activity and similar violations by other corporations, thereby providing amnesty only to the first corporation to come forward, whether or not
an investigation already is underway. 45 8 The requirements for receiving
454.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL

IlI-

93 (3d ed. rev. 2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/
ch3.htm.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL]; see also Laurence A.
Urgenson, Voluntary Disclosure: Opportunitiesand Issues for the mid-1990's, 943 P.L.L./
CORP. 225, 236 (1996) (citing DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL (2d ed. 1987)).
455. See Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, CorporateLeniency Policy, (Aug. 10, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/len
corp.htm [hereinafter 1993 CorporateLeniency Policy] (describing revised corporate
amnesty policy). The policy granting amnesty for voluntary self-reporting before
the Division has commenced an investigation is usually referred to as "Type A"
amnesty. See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 454, at 111-112 n.266 (discussing "Type A" amnesty). Alternatively, the policy granting amnesty for voluntary
reporting after the Division is aware of the illegal activity is usually referred to as
"Type B" amnesty. See id. 111-113 n.267 (discussing "Type B" amnesty).
456. See 1993 Corporate Leniency Policy, supra note 455, at Part C (listing who
within company may receive leniency if corporation qualifies for leniency).
457. See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 454, at 111-111 (describing
changes implemented in 1994). Individuals who approach the Division on their
own behalf also must meet specified criteria in order to obtain amnesty. See id. at
111-114, 15 (listing criteria).
458. See 1993 CorporateLeniency Policy, supra note 455, at A. 1, B. 1 (emphasizing
importance of voluntary disclosure for corporations); see also ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL, supra note 454, at 111-112 ("Only the first corporation to come forward
with regard to a particular violation may be considered for leniency as to that violation."). Because the Antitrust Division program applies only to the first reporting
company, and therefore likely will lead to convictions of other participating companies who are ineligible for amnesty after the first company self-reports, the program can promise something that other voluntary disclosure companies cannot
promise-full amnesty from prosecution. According to one commentator, "[n]o
other government voluntary disclosure program offers as great an opportunity or
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amnesty under the program differ depending on whether or not an investigation is underway at the time of the self-reporting; but, for purposes of
this Article, the important provisions are those relating to cooperation
with the Division's investigation, the relevant provisions of which are identical. When the self-reporting occurs before an investigation has begun,
the cooperation requirement is: "The corporation reports the wrongdoing
with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing and complete
cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation ....

,45

When

the self-reporting occurs after an investigation has begun, the cooperation
requirement is: "The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and
completeness and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation
that advances the Division in its investigation .... ,,460 Thus, in both instances, the reporting corporation must provide full, continuing and complete cooperation, which suggests that the corporation may be required to
waive privileges.
Nevertheless, the Antitrust Division has sought to address the privilege waiver problem. After enacting the new corporate leniency policy in
1993, the Antitrust Division published a model corporate conditional leniency letter.4 6 1 The model letter specifically states that disclosures made in
furtherance of an amnesty application under the program will not constitute a waiver of either the attorney-client privilege or the work product
privilege. 4 62 In a 1998 speech to the American Bar Association Antitrust

Section, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division
referred to the model letter and reassured his audience that "the Division
will not consider disclosures made in furtherance of the amnesty application to constitute a waiver of the attorney client privilege or the work prod463
uct privilege."
The Antitrust Division's policy of not considering disclosures made
under the amnesty program to constitute a waiver does not resolve all potential waiver issues, however. Even if the Division does not assert that a
waiver has occurred, it is still possible that third parties will be able to

assert that a waiver has occurred and thereby obtain the privileged materiincentive for companies to self report and cooperate." Gary R. Spratling, Making
Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency
Policy-An Update, presented at the Bar Association of the District of Columbia's
35th Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust (Feb. 16, 1999), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.pdf.
459. 1993 CorporateLeniency Policy, supra note 455, at A.3.
460. Id. at B.4.
461. Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter reprinted inJames M. Griffin, Status Report: InternationalCartel Enforcement, SF63 ALI-ABA (2000), available in

LEXIS, Combined ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials.
462. See id. (discussing effect of disclosures on confidentiality),
463. Gary R. Spalding, The CorporateLeniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions, presented at the ABA Antitrust Section 1998 Spring Meeting (April 1, 1998)
reprintedinJames M. Griffin, Status Report: InternationalCartelEnforcement, SF63 ALI-

ABA (2000), available in LEXIS, Combined ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials.
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als. 464 The same issue exists with respect to the Department of Defense
(DOD) voluntary disclosure program, which takes a similar position regarding waiver of privileges. The Department of Defense program is described below, and the third-party waiver issue that both programs present
is examined in greater detail in connection with that program.
2.

The Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program

After the SEC and the Department of justice Antitrust Division, the
government agency with the longest history of developing and implementing voluntary disclosure programs is the Department of Defense. In July
1986, the DOD adopted regulations to encourage voluntary reporting by
defense contractors of "any suspected or possible violation of law" in con465
The regulations
nection with contractual relationships with the DOD.
464. For a discussion of the law of wavier, see supra Part I1.C.2. A recent
health care fraud case illustrates the potential adverse consequences of voltntarily
providing privileged materials to law enforcement officials, even when the government agrees that doing so will not constitute a waiver of privilege. In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., Columbia/HCA provided internal
audit results to the Department of Justice in an effort to settle a criminal fraud
investigation, after initially withholding the materials based on the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. 293 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 2002). The
company agreed to cooperate and turn over the privileged documents only after
reaching an agreement with the Justice Department that doing so "does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or claim under the work product doctrine." Id. The company ultimately settled the case and paid an $840 million fine,
which represented criminal penalties as well as civil remuneration to the government for overcharges. See id. Not surprisingly, after the settlement was announced, private parties sued the company and sought access to the privileged
materials that had been voluntarily provided to the government. See id. at 292-93.
In an opinion affirming the trial court's order to produce the materials, the Sixth
Circuit applied a strict waiver rationale and concluded that voluntary production
by the company waived both the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection as to the materials produced. See id. at 294-307. In applying its
waiver analysis the court rejected the company's selective waiver argument, based
upon Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, that voluntary disclosure to the government pursuant to a confidentiality agreement should not waive the privilege as to third parties. See Columbia/HLCA, 293 F.3d at 302-04 (citing Diversified Industries v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978)). The Columbia/HCA case illustrates both
the potential adverse consequences of "voluntary" disclosure of otherwise privileged information and the willingness of courts to enforce strict waiver rules in
such circumstances. For further discussion of voluntary disclosure in health care
cases, see infra Part III.F.4. For a recent judicial decision by an influential court
holding that providing information to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement does not constitute a waiver, see generally Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished
opinion).
465. Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, with attachment detailing the Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program
(dated July 24, 1986) reprinted in Voluntary Disclosure: 1994 Update, Report by the
Special Committee on Voluntary Disclosure, American Bar Association Section of
Public Contract Law (August 1994) [hereinafter Taft Letter]; see also Department
of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Implementation of Recommendations Made by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
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required "[flull cooperation with any Government agencies responsible
for either investigation or corrective actions." 466 The DOD took the position that "early voluntary disclosure, coupled with full cooperation and
complete access to necessary records are strong indications of an attitude
of contractor integrity even in the wake of disclosures of potential criminal
467
liability."
Compliance with the DOD voluntary disclosure program presents
privilege issues, particularly if the company involved has relied on attorneys to investigate the potential wrongdoing that is the subject of the voluntary disclosure. 468 Voluntary disclosure and cooperation under the
DOD program may constitute a waiver if materials provided to the government are subject to the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. 469 The DOD has made an effort to address this problem with
language in its standard voluntary disclosure agreement, known as the
"XYZ Agreement.""4 7 The XYZ Agreement provides that:
The Government will not contend that the Company's production of the report and its underlying documents, or the furnishing of additional information relating to this disclosure will
constitute a waiver of the attorney-client and work-product privi471
leges as may be applicable.
Although this language may address the waiver issue with respect to
the government, it does not ensure that third parties will not be able to
assert that a waiver has occurred and thereby obtain the privileged materials. 4 7 2 Moreover, disclosure of particular privileged material may constitute a "subject matter" waiver of the attorney-client privilege that applies to
Management, 52 Fed. Reg. 34386 (Sept. 11, 1987) (stating that internal controls
are means to ensure companies conduct themselves with high degrees of integrity
and honesty). The new regulations were published in the Federal Acquisition Regulations System at 48 C.F.R. §§ 203.7000, 209.406-1, 252.203-7003 (1987). See also
Porter, supra note 450, at 1020 (describing implementation of program); Walsh &
Pyrich, supra note 318, at 657-58 (describing program).
466. 48 C.F.R. § 203. 7 0 0 0(g).
467. Taft Letter, supra note 465; see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 318, at 657
(citing Taft Letter).
468. See generally Special Committee on Voluntary Disclosure, American Bar
Association Section of Public Contract Law, Voluntary Disclosure: 1994 Update (August 1994) [hereinafter 1994 ABA Report] (discussing DOD voluntary disclosure
program).
469. See Porter, supra note 450, at 1029-32 (discussing waiver and analyzing
application of "limited waiver doctrine" to such disclosures).
470. Form of Agreement Between XYZ Company and Inspector General, Department
of Defense [hereinafter XYZ Agreement], reprinted in 1994 ABA Report, supra note
468, at Tab 7, App. C.; see also Porter, supra note 450, at 1020-21 (noting that government contractors have strong incentive to participate in program because felony conviction can result in debarment for up to three years).
471. XYZ Agreement, supra note 470, 6.
472. See 1994 ABA Report, supra note 468, at III-1 (discussing XYZ Agreement
waiver provision and noting that "[i]n collateral litigation, however, a third party
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undisclosed privileged communications related to the same subject matter
as the disclosed material. 47 3 A subject matter waiver is somewhat less likely
to be found if the voluntarily disclosed material is work product, such as
attorney interview notes, rather than attorney-client privileged communications. Nevertheless, the case law is unsettled and there can be no assurance that a court will not conclude that a subject matter waiver has
occurred.

474

The XYZ Agreement provides some relief from the potential waiver
problem by not generally requiring that voluntary disclosure reports contain copies of counsel's notes or summaries of interviews. 4 75 The XYZ
Agreement does provide, however, that the DOD may seek such materials
after reviewing a company's voluntary disclosure report, "if it believes that
it is necessary [to] obtain further details beyond that provided in the report."476 A report by the American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law has noted that "the Government should not seek such materials
simply as a means to avoid conducting its own interviews" and "even where
the contractor provides such materials, the Government should expect
that they will include factual information only and not counsel's impressions."' 477 This ABA position is consistent both with the Supreme Court's
analysis in Upjohn,478 and the position taken in this Article that law enforcement authorities administering voluntary disclosure and cooperation

policies should not require waiver of privileges as a condition of obtaining
credit under those programs so long as all relevant underlying factual in479
formation is provided to the authorities.
By including language in its cooperation agreement stating that it
does not regard submission of information as a waiver of privilege, and by
not generally requiring that voluntary disclosure reports contain copies of

counsel's notes or summaries of interviews, the DOD voluntary disclosure
policy has sought to address the privilege waiver problem. The DOD approach is generally consistent with that of the SEC's cooperation policy,
discussed in Part III.E above, in that both recognize, more or less explicitly, that waiver of privileges is not a necessary condition of cooperation.
As noted above, these two federal agencies have the longest and most successful experiences with voluntary disclosure and cooperation policies, so
other agencies should look to the SEC and DOD policies as models. Un-

may claim that disclosure to the Government constituted a waiver of any privileges
that otherwise would have applied").
473. Id. at 111-7 & n.ll (collecting cases on subject matter waiver).
474. See id. at 111-8, 15 (same).
475. See id. at 11-28 (discussing scope of agreement).

476. XYZ Agreement, supra note 470, 1 A.5.b.
477. 1994 ABA Report, supra note 468, at 11-29.
478. For a further discussion of the Upjohn decision, see supra Part 1I.B.l.a.
479. For a further discussion of this Article's position on the administration of

voluntary disclosure and cooperation policies by law enforcement authorities, see
infra Part 1V.B.3. For an analysis of the SEC's cooperation policy noting that waiver
of privileges is not required by the SEC's policy, see supra Part III.E.
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fortunately, the voluntary disclosure programs at other agencies do not
address the compelled waiver problem as effectively as the SEC and the
DOD have done. Those programs are discussed below.
3.

The EnvironmentalProtection Agency Voluntary DisclosureProgram

In 1985 the Environmental Protection Agency published an Interim
Policy Statement on environmental auditing which provided that in evaluating enforcement responses to violations, the agency would "take into account, on a case-by-case basis," compliance efforts and remedial actions. 4 8°,
The Policy Statement emphasized that consideration of leniency "applies
particularly when a regulated entity promptly reports violations or compliance data which otherwise were not required to be recorded or reported
to EPA. ' 4 8 1 A Final Policy Statement, published by the EPA in July 1986,
482
contained the same provisions.
In July 1994, the EPA announced that the agency would reevaluate its
policy regarding environmental auditing and self-policing. 4 83" After eighteen months of evaluation, the EPA produced a new policy statement on
voluntary disclosure entitled "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations" that took effect in January 1996.484 The new policy statement set out specific conditions that
must be met for a company to be eligible for reduced civil based penalties
and to avoid a recommendation of criminal prosecution. 485 For purposes
480. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement: Interim Guidance, 50 Fed.
Reg. 46,504 (Nov. 8, 1985).
481. Id. Although the Policy Statement provided that EPA would give
favorable consideration, on a case-by-case basis, to voluntary compliance, remediation, and self-reporting, it also stated that "EPA will not promise to forgo inspections, reduce enforcement responses, or offer other such incentives in exchange
for implementation of environmental auditing or other sound environmental
practice. Indeed, a creditable enforcement program provides a strong incentive
for regulated entities to audit." Id.
482. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement: Final Statement, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,004 (July 9, 1986).
483. See generally Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing,
59 Fed. Reg. 38,455 (July 28, 1994) (clarifying EPA's current policies on and approach to auditing).
484. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) (effectiveJan. 22, 1996) [hereinafter
Final Policy Statement]. For a general description of the EPA program, see Geisler, supra note 452, at 378. A number of states have followed the EPA's lead and
enacted their own voluntary disclosure programs. See generally Andrew M. Reidy, et
al., Strategies Choosing Between EPA 's and a State's Voluntary Disclosure Plan: Maybe Not
a Hobson's Choice; Business Interruption Coverage: Issues to Consider When DisasterStrikes,
Bus. CRIMES L. REP., Oct. 2001, at 1 (discussing voluntary disclosure programs at
state level).
485. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 484, at Parts I.D.3 and II.D (setting
forth nine conditions that company must meet to evade criminal action by EPA);
see also Geisler, supra note 452, at 378 ("The EPA will not recommend criminal
prosecution of the disclosing entity if all the conditions are satisfied and 'so long as
the violation does not demonstrate or involve: (i) a prevalent management philosophy or practice that concealed or condoned the environmental violations; (ii)
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of this Article, the most important of those conditions is section D(9),
entitled "Cooperation," requiring that:
The regulated entity cooperates as requested by EPA and provides such information as is necessary and requested by EPA to
determine applicability of this policy. Cooperation includes, at a
minimum, providing all requested documents and access to employees and assistance in investigating the violation, any noncompliance problems related to the disclosure, and any
environmental consequences related to the violations.4 8"
Neither the "Explanation of Policy" section nor the "Statement of Policy:
Incentives for Self-Policing" section of the 1996 EPA Policy Statement addressed assertion or waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine protections. Concerns about the degree of cooperation required
and waiver of privileges apparently contributed to a reluctance on the part
48 7
of potentially eligible companies to participate in the program.
In April 2000, the EPA issued a revised final policy on "Incentives for
Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations."4 88 The revision maintained the basic structure and terms of the
policy that took effect in 1996 "while clarifying some of [the policy] language, broadening its availability, and conforming the provisions of the
Policy to actual Agency practice." 48 9 The revised policy statement's section on cooperation omits the requirements pertaining to providing documents and access to employees, requiring only that: "The regulated entity
cooperates as requested by EPA and provides such information as is neces49
sary and requested by EPA to determine applicability of this Policy. "
The Explanation of Policy section of the Final Policy Statement, however,
clarifies that the agency may require disclosure of more information when
potential criminal violations are voluntarily disclosed, including at a
minimum:
high-level corporate officials' or managers' conscious involvement in, or willful
blindness to, the violations.") (citing Final Policy Statement, supra note 484, at
66,711).
486. Final Policy Statement, supra note 484, at 66,712.
487. SeeJacqueline C. Wolff, How to Protect Your Client Under The EPA's Voluntary Disclosure Policy, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Dec. 1998, at 2 ("Since [adoption of the
1996 policy], 325 companies have disclosed violations under the Policy and 137
received penalty waivers (or substantial mitigation). This is a small fraction of the
millions of potentially eligible companies that fall under the EPA's complex regulatory scheme. Why have so few companies availed themselves of this seemingly
beneficial Policy? The problem may be in the nature of the 'cooperation'
required.").
488. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
489. Id.
490. Id. at 19,626.
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access to all requested documents; access to all employees of the
disclosing entity; assistance in investigating the violation, any
noncompliance problems related to the disclosure, and any environmental consequences related to the violations; access to all
information relevant to the violations disclosed, including that
portion of the environmental audit report or documentation
from the compliance management system that revealed the violation; and access to the individuals who conducted the audit or
49
review. 1
Unfortunately, like the 1996 Policy Statement, the new EPA Policy Statement does not provide sufficient guidance as to the EPA's position on
492
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine protection,
and does not contain provisions like those in the DOD voluntary disclosure program and the SEC cooperation policy, described above, that to
some degree protect against unnecessary coercion of privilege waivers.
4.

The Department of Health and Human Services Provider Self-Disclosure
Protocol

In 1998, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services (OIG) implemented a new voluntary disclosure program called the "Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol. ' 493 The 1998 Protocol
evolved from an "Operation Restore Trust" pilot program developed by
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department ofJustice to encourage voluntary disclosures of fraud by health care
providers. 494 The 1998 Protocol was developed to provide guidance to
health care providers on what HHS considers to be the appropriate elements of an effective investigative and audit plan to address potential violations of law. 4 9 5 Participation in the program is entirely voluntary, and
precise compliance with the Protocol is not mandatory, but HHS cautions
491. Id. at 19,623.
492. The Explanation of Policy section of the Final Policy Statement does
contain a strong statement in opposition to the audit privilege and immunity laws
that exist in some states, taking the position that those laws "are unnecessary, tindermine law enforcement, impair protection of human health and the environment, and interfere with the public's right to know of potential and existing
environmental hazards." Id. Although that portion of the Explanation of Policy
contains some anti-privilege statements, it appears that those statements are directed at state laws creating audit privileges and immunities and not at assertions
of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine protection. See id. at 19,62324.
493. Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998).
494. See id. at 58,400 (describing origin of protocol); see also Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 6, at 195-96 (describing operation of 1998 Protocol); Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government's Stick and CarrotApproach to
Fighting Health Care Fraud,51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 357-59 (1999) (describing development of HHS Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol).
495. See Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. at 58,400 (noting intentions of OIG and HHS in enacting protocol).

2003]

REVOKING OUR PRIVILEGES

that failure to conform to each element of the Protocol "will likely delay
496
resolution."
The Protocol sets out a detailed procedure for health care providers
to follow in conducting an internal investigation of a potential violation of
federal criminal, civil or administrative law and voluntarily reporting the
results of the internal investigation to HHS. 49 7 For purposes of this Article, the most important element of the Protocol is its provision on verification by HHS Office of Inspector General. The "OIG's Verification"
provision of the Protocol states that the extent of verification will depend
on the "quality and thoroughness of the internal investigative and selfassessment reports" that are submitted by providers pursuant to the Protocol. 4 98 The Protocol then addresses assertion of privileges in connection
with the voluntary disclosure of the results of a provider's internal
investigation:
To facilitate the OIG's verification and validation processes, the
OIG must have access to all audit work papers and other supporting documents without the assertion of privileges or limitations
on the information produced. In the normal course of verification, the OIG will not request production of written communications subject to the attorney-client privilege. There may be
documents or other materials, however, that may be covered by
the work product doctrine, but which the OIG believes are critical to resolving the disclosure. The OIG is prepared to discuss
with provider's counsel ways to gain access to the underlying information without the need to waive the protections provided by
4 99
an appropriately asserted claim of privilege.
This provision of the Protocol recognizes the potential privilege waiver
problem and addresses it in a general way, but it provides no assurance
that the production of privileged material will not be required by the HHS
in order for the health care provider to obtain the liability mitigation benefits of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, once the initial step of voluntary
disclosure is taken, it is unlikely that a provider will refuse to provide re-

496. Id.
497. See id. An important exception to the application of the Protocol is an
ongoing fraud. The Protocol states that providers who discover "an ongoing fraud
scheme" should immediately contact the HHS Office of Inspector General, but
should not follow the internal investigation procedures set out in the Protocol
because doing so creates a "substantial risk that that the Government's subsequent
investigation will be compromised." Id. Thus, it appears that the internal investigation procedures in the Protocol are only intended to apply to past, completed
violations of law, and any ongoing violations should be reported to HHS for investigation by the agency.
498. Id. at 58,403.
499. Id.
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quested material and in doing so risk much harsher government enforce50 ° °
ment action.
Practitioners have recognized that the HHS Provider Self-Disclosure
Protocol, like the other voluntary disclosure programs discussed in this
Part, puts substantial pressure on participants to waive privileges and, in so
doing, undermines the continued viability of the privilege in our legal system. 5 01 Practitioners also realize that a waiver in the context of the HHS
Protocol is likely to constitute a waiver with respect to other government
agencies in collateral investigations. 50 2 As was the case with the EPA voluntary disclosure program discussed above, it appears that concerns about
privilege waivers and exposure to liability in collateral lawsuits prompted
by voluntary disclosure may have discouraged participation by health care
50 3
providers in the HHS program.
For purposes of this Article, however, the important point is not the
success of the HHS program as a means to curtail health care fraud.
Rather, the important point is that (as presently structured) the effect of
the program is to coerce waivers of privilege by health care providers who
choose to participate in the program. In so doing the HHS program, like
500. Two practitioners have described the impact on health care lawyers of
these developments in particularly dramatic terms, as follows:
they sail between the Scylla of zealous federal law enforcement agents
and prosecutors who attack privilege under the guise of the so-called
'crime-fraud' exception and the Charybdis of besieged clients who readily
waive privilege in an attempt to show that they acted pursuant to the advice of counsel and not with any intent to violate the law or to minimize
financial and prosecutorial risk by participating in government voluntary
disclosure programs.
Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 6, at 164-65 (emphasis in original).
501. See id. at 195-96 (observing that "real interest" of potential self-discloser
in HHS program "is that any potential liabilities will be mitigated and be reflected
in a potential settlement agreement between the provider and OIG," and that as
consequence attorney providing health care transactional advice or conducting internal investigation cannot assume client confidentiality will be maintained, in part
because government may force disclosure, but also because of "even greater likelihood that the client itself will make a voluntary disclosure"). Gerson and Gladieux
conclude that the health care attorney "must come to realize that the traditional
expectations of near absolute confidentiality of attorney advice and communications no longer are assured." Id. at 204.
502. See Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations,
Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization,51 ALA. L.
REV. 205, 226 (1999) ("Regardless of the decision on the duty to disclose, the organization does have a duty to discontinue any conduct that violates the law. If the
organization does not discontinue the activities revealed as a result of the investigation, that inaction itself becomes fraud."). For a recent example of a health care
fraud case in which disclosure of privileged materials to the Department ofJustice
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement was held to constitute a waiver of privilege
that permitted private plaintiffs to obtain the privileged materials, see generally In
re Columbia Healthcare/ HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing PracticeLitig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 2002), discussed in more detail, supra note 464 and accompanying text.
503. See Morris & Thompson, supra note 494, at 360-61 (describing concerns
about collateral litigation).
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the other voluntary disclosure programs discussed in this Part, has contributed to the substantial erosion of the privilege that has occurred over the
past two decades.
G.

InternalRevenue Service Form 8300 Reporting Requirements

One final federal law enforcement initiative that has adversely affected the attorney-client privilege should be noted briefly. For almost
twenty years now, federal law has required persons who are "engaged in a
trade or business" and in the course of that trade or business "receive
more than $10,000 in cash in [a single] transaction, (or two or more related transactions)," to report their cash receipts to the Internal Revenue
Service. 5 114 The relevant statute and the Internal Revenue Service form for
reporting cash transactions-Form 8300-requires the filer to provide
identifying information about the person from whom the cash was received. 5 0 5 Sanctions for failure to comply with the reporting requirements
50 6
include both civil and criminal penalties.
Congress did not exempt attorneys from the coverage of the cash
transaction reporting law, and the Internal Revenue Service refused to exempt attorneys by regulation, so the Form 8300 reporting requirement
50 7
applies to attorneys in the same manner as other trades and businesses.
504. 26 U.S.C. § 60501(a) (2002). For a detailed analysis of the history, enactment and application of section 60501 and the Internal Revenue Service form used
to report cash transactions, see generally Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise of
Law as a Profession, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 485 (1992). Another federal statute,
enacted in 2001, imposes a similar reporting requirement for coin and currency
receipts of more than $10,000 received by a non-financial trade or business. See 31
U.S.C. § 5331 (2002).
505. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501(b) (listing requirements necessary to file form); see
also Internal Revenue Service Form 8300 [hereinafter Form 8300], available at
http://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/forms.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003) (providing
manner for reporting executed cash transactions). The current version of Form
8300 requires that the filer provide the name, address, taxpayer identification
number, and occupation, profession, or business of the individual from whom the
cash was received. See id., at items 2-13. The form also requires the filer to verify
the identity of the person from whom cash was received by "examination of a document normally accepted as a means of identification when cashing checks." Id. at
item 14 and Instructions.
506. See26 U.S.C. §§ 60501, 7203 (2002) (providing that "a willful violation of
any provision of section 60501" is felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five
years).
507. In fact, as Professor Podgor has noted, the original implementing regulations for section 60501 even used attorneys as the recipient of funds in the examples of how the statutory provision was to operate. See Podgor, supra note 504, at
487 n.10; see also Harrington & Lustig, supra note 6, at 634-35 (noting that
"[r]ather than promulgating an attorney-client exception, however, the IRS flatly
rejected any idea that lawyers should be treated differently than others subject to
section 60501") (citation omitted). Subsequent efforts to amend the law to exempt
attorneys also have been unsuccessful. See Podgor, supra note 504, at 492 & n.45
(discussing American Bar Association's adoption of formal resolution opposing application of section 60501 to attorneys); cf Katrina R. Abendano, The Role of Lawyers
in the Fight Against Money Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement Appropriate?, 27 J.

584

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 469

Attorneys have challenged the application of the reporting requirement to
members of the legal profession on a variety of legal grounds, including
the attorney-client privilege and state rules of professional responsibility
requiring attorneys to maintain the confidences and secrets of clients, but
the courts have declined to strike down the reporting requirement's application to attorneys. 50 8 Of particular concern to those who oppose application of the reporting requirement to attorneys is federal law enforcement
authorities' use of Form 8300 reports to investigate criminal activity other
than tax law violations based upon unreported income, which was the
50 9
original purpose of the reporting requirement.
Commentators have argued that requiring attorneys to file Form 8300
reports about their clients is inconsistent with the practice of law as a proLE.Is.

463, 465-66 (2001) (describing continuing applicability of Form 8300 to

lawyers).
508. See Aurelle S. Locke & Patricia Nodoushani, Can Attorneys Ever Escape Section 60501's Cash Reporting Requirements?, 85]. TAX'N 361, 364-66 (1996) (collecting
section 60501 cases); see also Ronald K. Vaske, Uncertain Attorney-Client Privilege Provides No Assurance: The IRS Form 8300 Dilemma in United States v. Sindel, 29 CREICIITON L. REV. 1323, 1357-60 (1996) (analyzing Eighth Circuit case holding, after in
camera review, that attorney-client privilege may apply to Form 8300 reporting by
attorney if providing information would reveal subject matter of confidential
communication).
509. See Harrington & Lustig, supra note 6, at 637 (noting that section 60501 is
used as monitoring mechanism for drug control enforcement); Podgor, supra note
504, at 494-500 (describing four sections of Form 8300 and its questions concerning "suspicious activities"). Professor Podgor points out that section 60501 is not a
"money laundering" statute because money laundering is "a process of changing
illegal funds into legitimate money." Podgor, supra note 504, at 487 n.12; cf Harrington & Lustig, supra note 6, at 674-75 (comparing section 60501 to federal
money laundering statute). Section 60501, in contrast, applies to all cash transactions, regardless of the legitimacy by which the cash was obtained (and requires
attorneys and others to report the receipt of the cash in excess of the statutory
amount, without regard to the source of the funds). Another federal statute more
directly targets money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2002). For a discussion of
the money laundering statute and the issues it presents with respect to criminal
defense lawyers, see generally Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1165 (1992); Paul G. Wolfteich, Making
CriminalDefense a Crime Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957, 41 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1988).
Because the money laundering law prohibits transactions involving the proceeds of
criminal activities, it arguably represents less of an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship than the cash transaction reporting requirement, which applies to
all transactions in excess of the statutory amount whether or not the funds were
derived from criminal activity. The money laundering statute also contains a "safe
harbor" for "any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(f)(1). Despite these limitations, however, the money laundering statute is
perceived as a serious threat to the attorney-client privilege by defense counsel,
particularly since the Justice Department has used the statute to prosecute a lawyer
for a fee transaction with a client. See Daniel E. Rovella, Going From Bad to Worse:
Defense Bar FearsJailOver Tainted Fees, NAT'LJ., Mar. 11, 2002, at Al (reporting that
"[e]fforts ...
to make lawyers 'gatekeepers' of the financial system may further
impede the ability of criminal defense lawyers to properly represent their clients").
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fession, 5 1°1 has a detrimental effect on attorney-client relations 5 1 1 and is
misguided as a tax policy because a law that was "designed to capture a
part of the underground economy has become a tool in the war against a
wide variety of crimes." Despite these criticisms, Congress has declined to
exclude attorneys from the reporting requirement and attorneys appear to
have accepted, or become resigned to, the application of the reporting
requirement. The significance of the Form 8300 controversy for purposes
of this Article is that it represents yet another chink in the armor of the
attorney-client privilege inflicted by federal law enforcement authorities
willing to subjugate the privilege to their agencies' law enforcement
goals. 512 Even accepting the premise that a valid issue exists as to whether
the objectives of the cash reporting requirement (whether the original objective of capturing unreported income for tax enforcement purposes or
the subsequent objective of using the reports to ferret out other criminal
activity) might have been frustrated by an attorney exemption, it would
seem that the government could have given the benefit of the doubt to the
privilege and later amended the form to apply to lawyers if the cost of
protecting the privilege proved too high. In failing to do so there can be
no doubt that federal law enforcement took yet another step to undermine and erode the privilege. The long-term results of that step are difficult to predict, but at least two potential adverse effects are identifiable.
The first, discussed at numerous points in this Article, is that the cumulative effect of the many injuries inflicted upon the privilege ultimately may
prove fatal. 513 A second, more immediate, concern is the "camel's nose in
the tent" effect-that, as often is the case, the initial invasion into the pro510. See Podgor, supra note 504, at 492 (noting sacrosanct nature of attorneyclient relationship).
511. See Harrington & Lustig, supra note 6, at 634 n.48 & n.49 (explaining
section 60501's effects on attorneys). Professors Harrington and Lustig conclude,
however, that notwithstanding the detrimental effect of section 60501 on the attorney-client relationship, there is no justification in the case law for permitting attorneys to refuse to comply with the reporting requirements, and therefore the only
available remedy is for Congress to amend the statute to provide an exclusion for
attorneys. See id. at 626 (arguing that Congress should amend section 60501 because it is inconsistent with its initially intended policy). To date, Congress has not
seen fit to do so.
512. Although at first blush it might appear that Congress, rather than federal
law enforcement agencies, is responsible for the impact of section 60501 and Form
8300 on the legal profession, the agencies could have exempted attorneys from
coverage under the form. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501(b)(1) (2002) (granting authority
to Secretary of Treasury to prescribe form for required report); see also Harrington
& Lustig, supra note 6, at 634-35 (describing IRS's adoption of regulations under
section 60501 and noting that IRS "initially contemplated the possibility that the
attorney-client privilege might prevent attorneys from making the required disclosures" but later "flatly reject[ing] any idea that lawyers should be treated differently") (citations omitted).
513. Other commentators have recognized this "collective impact" threat with
respect to federal money laundering laws. Professors Gaetke and Welling analyzed
how money laundering laws apply to criminal defense lawyers and concluded that
"there is a legitimate, if undocumented, concern about their practical impact on
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tected sphere of the privilege will be followed with additional encroachments and the eventual harm to the privilege will be much greater than
5 14
even the most vocal critics initially anticipated.
IV

A.

CONCLUSION

The Risks of an Eroded Attorney-Client Privilege

The discussion above of federal law enforcement policies and practices over the past two decades demonstrates that the protections provided
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine have been
significantly diminished in recent years. Commentators have recognized
this trend toward diminished privilege protections, 5 15 and have analyzed
its impact on particular areas of law. 5 16 This Article has examined the
areas in which the privilege has been under attack at the federal level, with
the objective of highlighting the cumulative effect of these attacks. While
it is not possible to quantify, or even to measure with precision, this cumulative effect, the extent of the erosion of privilege protections and the level
of concern about that erosion suggest that the system may be nearing a
our criminal justice system." Gaetke & Welling, supra note 509, at 1167. They
identified significant concerns regarding attorney-client communications:
It is likely that the laws and the publicity surrounding them cause clients
to be more circumspect in the information they disclose to their lawyers,
which may lead to defense lawyers being less informed. Defense lawyers'
fear of the laws may hamper them from giving lawful advice to clients or
otherwise reduce their zeal.
Id. at 1243. They also identified overall systemic concerns: "At the personal level,
the laws may be reducing the quality of the representation received by some defendants charged with serious crimes. More importantly, at the systemic level the
laws may tip the present balance of the adversary process significantly in favor of
the prosecution." Id. This Article shares those concerns, but also seeks to demonstrate that the overall cumulative effect of federal law enforcement authorities'
many attacks on the attorney-client privilege raises similar concerns with respect to
our entire-civil and criminal-jtstice system.
514. There is some evidence that this may be the case with attorney Form

8300 reports. The Justice Department reportedly is considering requiring attorneys (and accountants, which of course does not raise the attorney-client privilege
issue) to file "suspicious activity reports" or "SARs" if they know of or suspect a
money laundering violation or other financial crime. See R. Christian Bruce, Justice
Eyeing Attorneys, Accountants for New Anti-Money LaunderingDuties, 34 Svc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 175, 175-76 (Feb. 4, 2002) (discussing Justice Department "efforts to
craft a new response to money laundering that could require attorneys and accountants to file reports of suspicious client activity ...").Financial institutions
already are required to file such reports, see 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2002), but it is
difficult to imagine how those requirements could be imposed upon attorneys
without significant intrusion into the attorney-client relationship and accompanying invasion of the attorney-client privilege. The fact that such reporting by attorneys even is being seriously considered is a consequence, at least in part, of the
precedent established by the Form 8300 reporting requirement.
515. For a list of articles discussing the trend toward diminished privilege protections, see supra note 6.
516. For a further discussion of the impact of this trend on particular areas of
law, see supra note 7.
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turning point-a point at which the continued viability of the privilege is

at risk.
Most commentators, and certainly most practicing lawyers, agree that
5 17
the attorney-client privilege is an integral element of our legal system.
In 1978 Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr. offered a compelling articulation
of the modern rationale for the attorney-client privilege:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of
the modern American lawyer's professional functions. It is considered indispensable to the lawyer's function as an advocate on
the theory that the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if
the client is free to disclose everything, bad as well as good. The
privilege is also considered necessary to the lawyer's function as
confidential counselor in law on the similar theory that the legal
counselor can properly advise the client what to do only if the
51 8
client is free to make full disclosure.
A review of the Supreme Court's attorney-client privilege cases over the
past two decades demonstrates that Professor Hazard's assessment of the
importance of the privilege remains valid today. 5 19 A review of federal law
enforcement actions over the past two decades, however, demonstrates
that the privilege is increasingly under attack and at risk. 52 0 If one agrees
that the attorney-client privilege and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the attorney work product doctrine are central to our adversarial system of justice
517. An American Bar Association publication described the importance of
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, and the concerns of
practicing lawyers regarding loss of the protections provided by those doctrines, as
follows:
Lawyers fret that the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product protection are being eroded. That concern is hardly surprising. Of all the evidentiary and discovery rules, these two go to the
heart of both the attorney's relationship with a client and with [sic] the
attorney's jealously guarded right to develop litigation strategies without
fear of compelled disclosure to an adversary.
EPSrEIN, supra note 23, at 700.

518. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1061. At about the same time, Professor
Saltzburg aptly described the consequences of unchecked erosion of the attorneyclient relationship:
To imagine what the relationship between an attorney and her client
would be like if no privilege existed, suppose an attorney began a relationship with a client by giving her the equivalent of Miranda warnings.
An attorney would tell the client that anything the client says could be
used against her and that the lawyer might have to testify about the statement. This obviously seems to be a counter-productive beginning to a
relationship in which one person renders personal help to another.
Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 606-07.
519. For a further discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the
importance of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, see supra
Part 11.B.
520. For a further discussion of recent attacks on the privilege by federal law
enforcement officials, see supra Part Ill.
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and therefore worth preserving, then the recent developments that are
discussed in this Article beg the question of what should be done to stop
unnecessary attacks on the privilege and prevent further erosion of the
protections that the privilege provides. Some suggested changes in the
policies and practices of federal law enforcement officials are described
below.
B.

Suggested Refinements to Federal Law Enforcement Policies and Practices
Relating to the Attorney-Client Privilege

It is unrealistic and unreasonable to assume that law enforcement officials will simply stop challenging assertions of privilege by the subjects of
investigations and prosecutions, and this Article does not take the position
that those officials should do so. It is realistic and reasonable, however, to
argue that law enforcement officials should consider the cumulative effect
on the justice system of their efforts to overcome assertions of privilege,
and should not simply attack the privilege at every opportunity if doing so
is likely to have an adverse long-term effect on our legal system. When
considered together, the attacks on privilege described in Part III above
and the criticisms that those attacks have provoked suggest three possible
refinements to the approach to privilege issues that federal law enforcement authorities have demonstrated over the past two decades. These refinements are subtle, but if consistently employed by law enforcement
officials they should go quite far toward curtailing further erosion of the
privilege.
1.

Refinement One: Rely Upon Existing Legal Doctrines, Rather Than Seeking
to Create New Exceptions to the Privilege

As discussed in Part II.C above, a number of existing legal doctrines
are available to protect the interests of law enforcement in instances where
the privilege is abused or its assertion is unwarranted. These checks on
the privilege are already in place in our legal system and are adequate to
ensure that information is not wrongfully withheld from law enforcement
authorities. If a client is misusing legal advice, the crime-fraud exception
is available to overcome assertions of the privilege. The in camera review
procedure and "reasonable belief' standard that the Supreme Court mandated in Zolin gives law enforcement authorities the ability to establish that
the crime-fraud exception is applicable without having to overcome unduly burdensome procedural requirements. 52 1 The limitations that have
523
evolved under the law of waiver 522 and the "common interest" doctrine
also are available to prevent unwarranted assertions of privilege. Finally,
521. For a further discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see supra Part
II.C.1.
522. For a further discussion of the law of waiver, see supra Part II.C.2.
523. For a further discussion of the common interest doctrine, see supra Part
II.C.3.
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the work product doctrine features a built-in protection against unwarranted withholding of information through the "substantial need and undue hardship" exception. 52 4 In most cases these exceptions and
limitations on confidentiality protections should be adequate to ensure
that information is not wrongfully or unfairly withheld from law enforcement officials.
If one of the established exceptions and limitations has not been applicable in a particular case, however, some federal law enforcement officials have demonstrated a disturbing enthusiasm for advocating that the
courts create new exceptions to the privilege in order to further law enforcement interests in that particular case. This Article takes the position
that elevating the interests of law enforcement in a particular case over the
important systemic interests that are served by the privilege is inappropriate and, in the most egregious cases, an abuse of government power. Two
examples that are discussed in greater detail above illustrate this troubling
trend. The unsuccessful effort of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's
office to create a "posthumous exception" to the privilege in the Foster
notes case is an example of prosecutorial overreaching in an effort to overcome a valid assertion of privilege, as demonstrated by the Supreme
Court's emphatic rejection of Starr's arguments and the Court's strong
affirmation of the importance of the privilege in our legal system. 525 A
second example, in which law enforcement officials succeeded in overcoming an assertion of privilege-and by doing so created new uncertainty about the application of the privilege to an important area of legal
practice-is the Marc Rich pardon case. 526 Although the prosecutors in
the Rich case convinced a federal judge that the privilege should not apply
to activities the prosecutors characterized as "lobbying" rather than "lawyering," they apparently gained nothing of value to their investigation and
in the process further weakened the confidentiality protections provided
by the attorney-client privilege.
Reasonable minds can differ about the merits of the legal arguments
presented to overcome the privilege in these two cases, and fair-minded
commentators can debate the propriety of the prosecutors' decisions to
advocate new exceptions to the privilege, but there can be no doubt that
the cumulative effect of advocating new exceptions in such cases will be a
weakened privilege. At a minimum, responsible law enforcement officials
should advocate a new exception to the privilege only when a new exception is consistent with the policies underlying the privilege and will benefit, rather than harm, the justice system as a whole. Advocating an
524. For a further discussion of the "substantial need and undue hardship"
exception to the work product doctrine, see supra Part II.C.4.
525. For a further discussion of recent privilege issues decided by the Court,
see supra Part II.B.1. For a further discussion of the OIC's attack on the attorneyclient privilege while investigating President Clinton, see supra Part III.A.3.
526. For a further discussion of the Marc Rich pardon investigation, see supra
Part III.B.
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exception to the privilege simply to gain either information or a tactical
advantage in a particular case is inconsistent with the responsibility of law
enforcement officials to seek justice rather than simply trying to "win"
cases. Applying this standard, it will be a rare and unusual case in which
advocating a new exception to the privilege will be an appropriate course
of action for a responsible law enforcement official.
2.

Refinement Two: Rely Upon Judicial Review, Rather Than Seeking to Avoid
JudicialScrutiny

Analysis of the attacks on privilege that are described in Part III above
and the criticisms that those attacks have provoked suggests another potential refinement to the approach to privilege issues that should be employed by responsible law enforcement officials. The law enforcement
policies and practices that have generated the most forceful and widespread criticism are those that have sought to avoid judicial review. The
Justice Department's new prison inmate attorney-client eavesdropping
policy,52 7 its practice of increased use of attorney subpoenas in criminal
investigations, 5 28 and its policy on contacts with represented persons 529 all
sought to avoid a requirement of prior judicial approval before engaging
in the controversial practices at issue. In all three instances the Department's efforts to avoid judicial review generated substantial criticism and
contributed to widespread concerns and misgivings about the Department's policies. This experience suggests that the Department's efforts to
rely on self-regulation alone, with no procedure for prior judicial review,
to oversee and control practices that are perceived to threaten the attorney-client relationship has been misguided. The better approach, and the
one advocated by this Article, is for responsible law enforcement officials
to embrace judicial review procedures and utilize them whenever there is
a need to challenge attorney-client privilege.
3.

Refinement Three: Rely Upon Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure
Programs That Are Based Upon FactualDisclosure, Rather Than
Waiver of Privileges

A final refinement suggested by the recent attacks on the privilege by
federal law enforcement officials arises out of an analysis of the differing
ways federal agencies have developed and administered voluntary disclosure and cooperation policies. This point is best illustrated by a comparison of two relatively recent policy statements in this area-the Justice
527. For a further discussion of the new prison inmate attorney-client eavesdropping policy, see supra Part III.D.1.
528. For a further discussion of attorney subpoenas in criminal investigations,
see supra Part III.D.2.
529. For a further discussion of the Department ofJustice's policy on contacts
with represented persons, see supra Part III.D.3.
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Department's policy on prosecuting corporations 530 and the SEC's policy
statement on cooperation in enforcement cases. 53 1 The critical difference
between the approaches the two agencies have taken is that the SEC policy
recognizes that a waiver of privilege, as such, need not and should not be
the goal of law enforcement. Rather, the goal should be obtaining relevant underlying factual information. The Justice Department policy, in
contrast, treats waiver of privileges as a condition of obtaining credit for
cooperation. Fortunately, this important difference in the two policies
presents an opportunity for federal law enforcement authorities to choose
the better of two approaches, rather than a situation in which a complete
change in existing policy is required.
A requirement that all relevant factual information be disclosed (perhaps including factual attorney work product, but not opinion work product or attorney-client communications) is sufficient to meet the needs of
law enforcement authorities in all cases except those in which there is
credible evidence of attorney involvement in wrongdoing. In those cases
the law enforcement authorities can overcome the privilege under existing
law, through the crime-fraud exception, without coercing waiver in all
cases. The SEC's cooperation policy represents a substantial step toward
recognition of these important considerations, but the Justice Department's corporate prosecution policy does not adequately address these issues. Moreover, the cooperation and voluntary disclosure policies of other
federal agencies, such as the EPA53 2 and the HHS, 5"3 also do not adequately address these considerations. The consequence of that failure is
voluntary disclosure programs that create excessive and unnecessary pressure to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine. When waivers of privilege are required or coerced, even
indirectly, fundamental values in our legal system are unnecessarily undermined. Responsible government officials should not pursue that course of
action. Rather, they should clarify-as the SEC to some extent has donethat waiver per se is neither a requirement nor an objective of these
programs.
For all of these reasons, voluntary disclosure and cooperation policies
should require only that relevant factual information be provided to law
enforcement authorities. Those authorities have no need for legal analysis
of private defense counsel unless the subject of the investigation is seeking
to make some improper use of that advice or the law enforcement authorities have reason to believe that the crime-fraud exception applies to the
530. For a further discussion of the Department of Justice's policy on the
prosecution of corporations, see supra Part IlI.C.2.
531. For a further discussion of the Security and Exchange Commission's new
cooperation policy, see supra Part III.E.
532. For a further discussion of the Environmental Protection Agency's voluntary disclosure program, see supra Part III.F.3.
533. For a further discussion of the Department of Health and Human Services' provider self-disclosure protocol, see supra Part IIl.F.4.
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advice. In either of those cases, current law provides the means for law
enforcement authorities to overcome the privilege5 - 4 without coercing
waivers in all cases through a voluntary disclosure or cooperation policy.
Moreover, withholding or revoking the benefits of cooperation if facts are
withheld or presented inaccurately should provide sufficient protection
against incomplete or misleading disclosures. This more refined and carefully calibrated approach to voluntary disclosure and cooperation policies
both furthers law enforcement objectives and protects the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
C.

Concluding Observations

In addition to the three specific refinements of law enforcement policies and practices that are discussed above, analysis of federal law enforcement authorities' attacks on the privilege over the past two decades
prompts some general observations. First, this is not an area in which the
end (law enforcement objectives) always will justify the means (overriding
and eroding the protections provided by the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine). The values underlying the privilege and the
work product doctrine are simply too important to our legal system, as the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized over the past twenty years.
Second, misguided and overzealous attacks on the privilege are inconsistent with the responsibility of law enforcement officials to support our system ofjustice. Attacking the privilege to gain information or an advantage
in a particular case poses real and substantial risks to the system as a whole
and is an inappropriate course of action for federal law enforcement officials to pursue. These risks have been unnecessarily magnified over the
past two decades, as shortsighted law enforcement officials have pursued
policies that have resulted in significant erosion of the protections provided by the privilege. In sum, responsible law enforcement officials
should respect and protect the privilege, rather than attacking it at every
opportunity.
As a final observation, there can be no doubt that the attorney-client
privilege today is a significantly diminished legal doctrine compared with
the state of the law even twenty years ago. The legal developments that are
analyzed in this Article without question have eroded the confidentiality
protections provided by the privilege. Two decades ago a lawyer could
have a high level of confidence that his or her communications with clients and opinion work product were-and would remain-immune from
discovery by adversaries and government investigators. Today, it is unwise
for any lawyer to make that assumption. To the contrary, a prudent attorney today will assume that there is a significant risk that the same materials
may be discovered by adversaries or obtained by government investigators
and will counsel clients and conduct himself or herself accordingly. The
534. For a further discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see supra Parts
II.C.I. For a further discussion of waiver, see supra Part II.C.2.
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question that remains is whether this erosion of the privilege will continue
unchecked, with the ultimate outcome that the presumption of confidentiality is completely reversed and the privilege is lost entirely. The objective of this Article is to help avoid that unfortunate result.
V.

ADDENDUM:

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF

2002

In July of 2002, as this Article was being completed, Congress passed
and President Bush signed into law sweeping corporate reform legislation,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 5 - 5 The passage of that legislation was precipitated, at least in part, by the corporate financial scandals that are referenced at the beginning of this Article. 536 Among other things, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides for the creation of a new public accounting
oversight board, imposes new reporting and corporate governance rules
on public companies, imposes new rules and requirements on accounting
firms that audit public companies, and establishes new criminal penalties
for securities fraud, destruction of documents, and knowingly filing false
certifications of the accuracy of public company periodic reports that contain financial statements. 5 3 7 One provision of the Act, however, is particularly relevant to the attorney-client privilege issues that are the subject of
this Article. Section 307 of the Act provides as follows:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall issue rules, in
the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting
forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in
the representation of issuers, including a rule(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to
the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial mneasures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the
attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed
538
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
535. 15 U.S.C. § 7201, et seq. (2002) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 07_cong-bills&docid=f:h3763enr.txt.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
536. For a further discussion of the corporate and financial scandals of the
1980s and 1990s, see supra Part I.
537. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 535.
538. Id. § 307 (2002) (providing rules of professional responsibility for
attorneys).
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As this Article was being prepared for publication, the Securities and
Exchange Commission proposed implementing rules that go beyond the
"reporting up the corporate ladder" requirement in the text of section
307, set forth above. 539' The initial SEC rule proposal also imposed a "reporting out" requirement on counsel who do not receive an "appropriate
response" to their internal reporting of a violation. Under the initial SEC
proposal, outside counsel who do not receive an appropriate response

from the company are required to effect a so-called "noisy withdrawal" by
withdrawing from the representation and disaffirming any submissions to
the Commission that they have participated in preparing that are tainted
by the violation.54 11In-house attorneys are not required to resign, but they
are required to disaffirm any tainted submission they have participated in
preparing. 54 1 In addition, the initial proposed rule provided that an attorney who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged by a company for fulfilling the reporting obligations imposed by the rule may, but
is not required to, notify the Commission and disaffirm in writing any submission to the Commission that he or she participated in preparing that is
tainted by the violation. 54 2 Remarkably, the SEC has taken the position
that "notification to the Commission under [the proposed rules] does not
54
breach the attorney-client privilege."

3

This Addendum obviously is not an appropriate vehicle for exanining the SEC's attorney-client privilege position. Courts and commentators
will no doubt expend considerable energy doing so if a "reporting out"
rule is ultimately adopted. Two points that are of particular relevance to
the issues discussed in this Article should be noted, however. First, it is
539. See Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of ProfessionalConduct for Attorneys, 17 CFR Part 205, SEC Rel. Nos. 33-8150, 34-46868 (Nov. 21, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 SEC Release] available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.
htm. On January 24, 2003, the SEC approved a "reporting up" rule, but extended

the comment period on the "noisy withdrawal" provisions of the original proposed
rule and approved the publication for comment of an alternative proposal. See
SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxey Act, SEC Press Release 200313, Jan. 23, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.1htm ("The
Commission voted to extend for 60 days the comment period on the 'noisy withdrawal' and related provisions originally included in proposed Part 205. Given the
significance and complexity of the issues involved, including the implications of a
reporting out requirement on the relationship between issuers and their counsel,
the Commission decided to continue to seek comment and give thoughtful consideration to these issues. The Commission also voted to propose an alternative to
'noisy withdrawal' that would require attorney withdrawal, but would require an
issuer, rather than an attorney, to publicly disclose the attorney's withdrawal or
written notice that the attorney did not receive an appropriate response to a report
of a material violation."). At the time of this writing it is unclear precisely what
form the final rtle will take.
540. See 2002 SEC Release, supra note 539, § IV.B (summarizing "noisy withdrawal" and related provisions of Part 205).
541. See id. (comparing and contrasting differences in obligations of "outside"
attorneys and "in-house" attorneys).
542. See id. (discussing obligations of formerly employed attorneys).
543. Id.
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noteworthy that the text of the statute, quoted above, imposes only internal reporting requirements. Compliance with the requirements does not
raise attorney-client privilege issues, while both the SEC's initial proposed
rule and the revised rule announced on January 23, 2003 go beyond the
statute 544 and require external reporting requirements that raise serious
attorney-client privilege issues. In this regard, the SEC's proposed rules
are a striking example of the trend that is the subject of this Article-the
recent willingness of federal law enforcement agencies to adopt policies
5"45
that threaten and undermine the attorney-client privilege.
Second and finally, whether adopted in the initial proposed form or
in the revised form announced by the SEC on January 23, 2003,546 the
SEC rules no doubt will have a significant effect upon the relationship
between attorneys and clients in the context of corporate representations.
While it is impossible to predict the magnitude of that effect at this timebefore final rules are adopted and subjected to judicial review-it is unlikely that the SEC's "noisy withdrawal" outside reporting approach could
have a positive effect on the attorney-client privilege. In fact, if enacted in
a form that mandates an "involuntary reporting out" obligation, whether
by the attorney or by the client, the SEC rules implementing section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could well prove to be the law enforcement straw
that breaks the metaphorical attorney-client privilege camel's back, at least
in the context of attorneys representing publicly held companies.
544. The SEC presumably reads the "including a rule" language in section
307, set out above, as providing the agency with statutory authority to promulgate
rules in addition to the "reporting up" through the corporate hierarchy rule that is
specifically required by the Act. Even if that is the case, whether the SEC's proposed "noisy withdrawal reporting out" rule is a wise exercise of the agency's
rulemaking authority is a separate question.
545. It is particularly disappointing that this proposal comes from a federal
agency that in other contexts has shown greater sensitivity to, and sophistication in
addressing, privilege issues. For a further discussion of the SEC's new cooperation
policy, see supra Part III.E.
546. For a further discussion of initial proposed rule and the revised rule announced on January 23, 2003, see supra note 539.

